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Overview 
 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a complex disorder that is associated with a 
range of functional, emotional and inter-personal difficulties. In recent years, 
consensus regarding whether or not BPD should be diagnosed in childhood and 
adolescence has altered, moving from the view that such a diagnosis is potentially 
harmful, to observations that the diagnosis may in fact be beneficial, by increasing 
understanding about young people‟s difficulties and improving access to timely and 
formulated interventions. Developmental theories of BPD have placed difficulties in 
mentalizing, and more recently difficulties with epistemic trust, at the core of BPD. 
However the nature of these difficulties remains unclear. This thesis therefore aims 
to explore and clarify the relationship between mentalizing abilities, epistemic trust 
and BPD in adolescence.  
Part one is a literature review which aimed to critically assess studies that have 
investigated the relationship between mentalizing and BPD symptomology in young 
people. The review revealed the challenges that are associated with the assessment 
of mentalizing in young people, due to the complexity of mentalizing as a 
psychological construct and the challenges associated with measuring and 
assessing mentalizing abilities. Although there is an overall lack of clarity among 
findings, a body of evidence appears to be emerging to suggest that a relationship 
exists between hypermentalizing and BPD symptomology in young people. 
Part two is an empirical research paper which explored the relationship between 
epistemic trust and BPD symptomology in adolescents. It investigates whether 
severity of BPD symptomology is associated with performance on tasks designed to 
measure epistemic trust. Additionally, the relationships between psychopathology, 
relationship difficulties and epistemic trust were also explored. No support was 
found for the hypothesis that BPD symptom severity is associated with reduced 
epistemic trust in adolescents. However, there was mixed support for the 
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hypotheses that there is an association between psychopathology and lower levels 
of epistemic trust, and relationship difficulties and lower levels of epistemic trust. 
Reasons for these findings are explored and implications for future research and 
clinical practice are considered. This study was conducted as part of a joint project 
(Greisbach, 2017; Reches, 2017). 
Part three presents a critical appraisal of the research project, which provides 
reflections on the difficulties and benefits associated with diagnosing BPD in 
adolescence, the difficulties associated with measuring complex psychological 
constructs and methodological challenges that occurred when carrying out the 
research project, alongside reflections on the research process as a whole. 
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Abstract 
 
Aims 
The developmental model of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) places 
difficulties with mentalizing at the centre of the problems experienced by young 
people with BPD. However research into the form that these mentalizing difficulties 
take have provided heterogeneous results. This review aims to critically assess 
studies which have investigated the relationship between mentalizing abilities and 
BPD symptomology in adolescents, in order to try and provide further clarity as to 
the form that these mentalizing abilities take. 
Method 
A literature search was carried out focusing on studies which investigated the 
relationship between mentalizing and BPD symptomology in young people. A quality 
appraisal assessment tool was used to rate the quality of these studies. 
Results 
An initial 540 references were identified by the search. After applying the limitations 
of the search and following an abstract review, 13 references were finalised to be 
included in the review.  
Conclusions 
The studies reviewed produced heterogeneous results in regards to the relationship 
between mentalizing abilities and BPD symptomology in young people. Some 
studies found that greater severity of BPD symptomology was associated with 
reduced mentalizing abilities, whereas others did not replicate this finding or even 
found enhanced abilities. It was concluded that the measures used to assess 
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mentalizing abilities appeared to play an important role in the findings that were 
produced. Additionally, it appears that recently, the use of more complex measures 
to assess mentalizing has led to an association being observed between severity of 
BPD symptomology and a specific form of mentalizing; hypermentalizing. It is 
recommended that future research be carried out in order to further clarify this 
relationship.  
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Introduction 
 
Borderline personality disorder in young people 
Adolescence has long been considered a time of emotional development and many 
of the characteristics that we associate with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), 
such as frequent changes in affect and intense relationships are, to some extent, 
also considered part of the usual developmental course of adolescence. BPD is a 
complex disorder, the features of which include a pervasive pattern of impulsivity as 
well as instability of affect, behaviours, self-image and interpersonal relationships 
over a range of contexts and situations (The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 5th edition, DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). BPD 
is associated with negative outcomes in a range of areas including social, emotional 
and occupational functioning; with severity of BPD symptoms predictive of poorer 
outcome over time (Gunderson et al., 2006). The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
defines adolescence as the transitional stage of growth between childhood and 
adulthood (World Health Organisation; WHO, 1986). The WHO defines the age of 
an adolescent as being between 10 and 19 years, although they acknowledge that 
age is only one characteristic that is associated with this development and that other 
factors, such as social transitions which occur at different ages across cultures are 
also valuable to consider (WHO, 1986). Adolescence falls within the WHO‟s 
definition of „young people‟, which refers to individuals between the age of 10 and 24 
years (WHO, 1986). 
Until recent years, the diagnosis of BPD in children and adolescents has been 
frowned upon, with reasons for this including concerns relating to the instability of 
symptoms over time in young people, and the proposed stigma and negative 
consequences that such a diagnosis may bring (Bernstein et al., 1993). The difficulty 
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in differentiating borderline symptomology from the usual developmental trajectory 
that is seen in adolescence has also been highlighted (Miller, Muehlenkamp & 
Jacobsen, 2008). Often, although young people may meet criteria for a diagnosis of 
BPD, they are only diagnosed with and offered treatment for Axis I disorders due to 
these aforementioned concerns, with previous research suggesting that clinicians 
often do not feel comfortable making a diagnosis of personality disorder in children 
or adolescents (Laurenssen, Hutsebaut, Feenstra, Van Busschbach, & Luyten, 
2013). 
More recently it has been proposed that ignoring personality disorder symptomology 
in adolescents may mean that subsequently young people do not receive the 
specific intervention they require (Miller et al., 2008). This in turn could exacerbate 
the serious problems that these young people may already be experiencing due to 
the difficulties associated with personality disorders including; academic failure, 
relationship and social problems and self-harm or suicidality (Kernberg, Weiner & 
Bardenstein, 2000). It has been suggested that being able to recognise personality 
disorder earlier on (i.e. in adolescence) may help young people and their families to 
achieve a greater understanding of their difficulties (Baverstock, & Wright, 2015). 
Access to earlier treatment and intervention is also thought likely to reduce some of 
the long-term problems associated with adult personality disorder (Chanen et al., 
2008). Findings now suggest that personality disorder can be reliably diagnosed in 
adolescence (Chanen & McCutcheon, 2013). Reflecting this, the DSM-5 permits the 
diagnosis of personality disorders in adolescence, with criteria for a BPD diagnosis 
reflecting those used to diagnose BPD in adults. In an attempt to acknowledge the 
aforementioned concerns around the instability of symptoms, the DSM-5 states that 
a diagnosis may be made only if symptoms persistently interfere with an individual‟s 
functioning for at least a year.  
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Mentalizing 
BPD, in both adults and adolescents, shows itself as a highly interpersonal disorder, 
with marked impairments in the ability to maintain stable, well-functioning 
relationships being a key marker (Chanen et al., 2008). Consequently, there has 
been much exploration into the social-cognitive processes, particularly any potential 
disruption to these processes, which may underlie the disorder. Fonagy‟s 
developmental model of BPD proposes that at the core of the difficulties 
experienced by individuals with BPD lies a dysfunction in mentalizing (Fonagy, 
1991). In this context, mentalization (a multi-faceted form of social cognition) is 
understood as the mental process by which individuals are able to reflect implicitly 
and explicitly on the minds of themselves and others and to understand the ways in 
which mental states underpin actions and behaviours (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004).  
In this developmental model, mentalization is thought to first be nurtured and 
developed as an infant, through the experience of „being mentalized‟ by others (i.e. 
the caregivers) within a secure attachment relationship. Within this relationship the 
infant is able to make use of the marked mirroring responses of the caregiver to 
discover their own emotions and symbolise unlabelled internal states into 
understandable and recognisable experiences, learning that these internal states 
are able to be regulated. Therefore this early experience of mentalization by the 
caregiver creates the correct conditions to enable exploration of the internal worlds 
of both ourselves and others (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2002). 
So why is it that in certain individuals this process becomes disrupted, leading to a 
dysfunction in the ability to mentalize? Fonagy and Luyten (2009) have described 
that as the early attachment relationship is so crucial for the development of 
mentalizing abilities, that problems within this relationship (as is often see in the 
context of BPD) may have a knock on effect; disrupting the development of 
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mentalization abilities. Indeed a review of thirteen studies found a strong association 
between BPD and insecure attachment (Agrawal, Gunderson, Holmes, & Lyons-
Ruth, 2004). Research has also previously found that secure attachment is 
correlated with a greater amount of care-giver marked mirroring and appropriate 
responding (Russell, 1940). When difficulties within the attachment relationship 
occur, children may find that the conditions necessary to develop this understanding 
of their emotional experience is not present, or they may find that they are not 
accurately held in the mind of the other; preventing the formation of accurate internal 
representations and mentalization abilities (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  
Although there is generally a consensus that a disruption in the ability to mentalize is 
present in individuals with BPD, a lack of agreement has been found as to the exact 
form that these difficulties take. Certain theories preclude to a loss of the ability to 
mentalize at all, whereas others have suggested that individuals with BPD may in 
fact have enhanced mentalization abilities in certain areas, or alternatively that they 
mentalize through the use of unusual strategies (Domes, Schulze & Herpertz, 2009).  
 
BPD and deficits in mentalizing 
As mentalization is fundamental in understanding the minds of both the self and 
other, it is possible that some of the difficulties seen in young people with BPD, 
especially the observed difficulties with maintaining healthy social relationships and 
with emotional regulation, may be caused by a lack or absence of mentalizing 
abilities. Difficulties with social relationships has been well documented as being 
one of the most pervasive difficulties faced by those with BPD, including 
adolescents, and also one of the difficulties which leads to the most distress (Levy et 
al., 1999). Negative affective states in individuals with BPD are often precipitated by 
interactions within relationships that the individual with BPD perceives as difficult 
and individuals with BPD often have intense reactions to social encounters 
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(Herpertz et al., 1997). Without the ability to recognise, understand and moderate 
one‟s own affective states and the ability to reflect on the mental states of others, 
appropriate responding during social interactions, which is so key in maintaining 
healthy interpersonal relationships, is likely to be challenging. The outcomes of such 
interactions are also then likely to have a further negative impact on emotional 
regulation. These difficulties with social interactions have given weight to the theory 
that an absence of mentalizing may be a core mechanism involved in the 
development of BPD (Bateman & Fonagy, 2003).  
When considering how a lack of mentalizing would present clinically, an absence in 
mentalizing can be understood as concrete thinking; showing an inability to consider 
the complexities of one‟s own and others‟ minds (Fonagy & Luyten, 2016). 
Therefore it is hypothesised that individuals with BPD do not have the required 
abilities to adequately process, appraise and reflect on emotional information; to 
mentalize, especially within interpersonal social contexts (Bateman & Fonagy, 
2003). Research carried out with adult participants with BPD has provided support 
for a deficit in mentalizing abilities on tasks assessing recognition of facial 
expressions of emotion in others and on tasks assessing the ability to understand 
emotions elicited in characters using vignettes (Levine, Marziali, & Hood, 1997; 
Bland, Williams, Scharer, & Manning, 2004). However, other studies have found no 
differences in the mentalizing abilities of adults with BPD as compared to controls 
(Schilling et al., 2012; Ghiassi, Dimaggio, & Brune, 2010). 
 
BPD and the use of unusual mentalizing strategies 
In contrast to this concept of a deficit or inhibition of mentalization abilities in 
individuals with BPD, a review of the literature by Domes et al. (2009) found 
evidence to support the notion that adults with BPD actually have a heightened 
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sensitivity in the processing of emotional expressions in others. Therefore it is 
possible that similar mentalizing abilities may be present in adolescents with BPD. 
Adults with BPD have been shown to be more sensitive than controls at emotion 
recognition using stimuli depicting the eye region of the face (Fertuck et al., 2009). 
Additionally adults with BPD have been found to score more highly than controls on 
tasks where they have to imagine character‟s emotions using vignette tasks (Arntz, 
Bernstein, Oorschot & Schobre, 2009).These findings have led to it being 
questioned as to whether individuals with BPD may therefore actually have 
enhanced mentalization abilities of some kind. However, this hypothesis suggesting 
enhanced mentalization abilities in individuals with BPD is difficult to make sense of, 
given the clinical observations that those with BPD frequently experience difficulties 
with social relationships.  
In trying to understand these findings, let us return now to the notion that 
mentalization is a multi-faceted concept. Fonagy and Luyten (2009) propose that 
mentalizing impairments in individuals with BPD are not global, but are found in 
specific domains and that these impairments may even at times look like enhanced 
mentalizing. Mentalization can be viewed along four polarities; controlled/automatic, 
cognitive/affective, external/internal and self/other focused (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). 
Some aspects of mentalization are automatic and implicit, for example knowing 
intuitively in a conversation when it is our turn to talk and adjusting our expression to 
let the other know we are listening. In contrast, actively taking the time to think and 
reflect on how we and the other is experiencing the conversation is a very different 
process and relies on the more explicit and controlled type of mentalizing. It can also 
be differentiated as to whether we rely on external features, such as facial 
expressions, or internal features, such as cognitions and emotional states, of both 
the self and other when formulating underlying mental states. Cognitive 
mentalization refers to the ability to understand another‟s mental state i.e. being able 
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to recognise their thoughts, feelings and beliefs, whereas affective mentalization 
refers more to the emotional response that is triggered in oneself when observing 
emotion in another (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Additionally, these different aspects of 
mentalization have been found to be underpinned by different neurobiological 
systems (Allen, Fonagy & Bateman, 2008). 
Fonagy and Bateman (2006) propose that for individuals with BPD, a likely history of 
trauma within the attachment relationship reduces the threshold at which one is able 
to utilise explicit, controlled and reflective mentalizing in particular. When this ability 
is lost, individuals instead rely more on the automatic, intuitive mentalizing 
processes. Additionally, due to overcompensation of this implicit mentalizing 
pathway, they may even demonstrate superior abilities in this dimension (Fonagy, & 
Luyten, 2009). Whereas individuals with BPD may find it difficult to reflect 
consciously on the internal experiences of themselves and others, they are more 
successful in inferring states of mind from external and physical cues. It also 
appears that cognitive mentalizing is more impacted than affective; individuals with 
BPD can often powerfully experience the emotional states of others without being 
able to fully comprehend their perspective (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  
The result of the automatic, intuitive mentalizing pathway going into overdrive has 
been described as hypermentalization (Dziobek et al., 2006). Hypermentalizing, also 
known as an excessive theory of mind, is a social-cognitive process by which 
observations about others‟ mental states go beyond what is actually observable 
(Dziobek et al., 2006). Although this can look like enhanced mentalizing, as it means 
that individuals are often very alert and sensitive to emotional cues in others, this 
mentalizing strategy may lead to the over-attribution of mental states and 
consequently, their misinterpretation. For example, an individual who 
hypermentalizes, when meeting a friend for a coffee, may quickly notice that the 
friend is a little quieter than usual, however they may attribute this to the friend being 
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very angry with them for some past disagreement, consequently believing that the 
friendship is doomed, rather than identifying the more likely reason i.e. that the 
friend has had a stressful week.  A situation such as the one described here shows 
that the individual is still using a form of mentalizing; they have not given up the 
strategy altogether, as they are using mental states to try and decipher the other‟s 
actions. However, the mental state underpinning the action is in some way distorted 
and misinterpreted, which would then have implications for the individual‟s 
interpersonal reaction to the situation. 
Research carried out by Preißler et al. (2010) with adults with BPD adds support to 
this hypothesis. In this study two different measures were used to assess 
mentalizing abilities of adults with BPD as compared to controls. Results from a 
mentalizing measure which assessed external-focused mentalizing found that BPD 
participants performed no differently to controls. However on the measure of 
internal-focused mentalizing, BPD participants showed poorer mentalizing ability 
than controls. Therefore, this may add weight to the notion that it is specific aspects 
of mentalizing that are disrupted in individuals with BPD (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). 
A further complicating factor is related to the emotional dysregulation often 
associated with BPD (Linehan, 1993). This low threshold for emotional arousal of 
the attachment system, which is triggered by interpersonal relationships, has been 
shown to facilitate implicit automatic mentalization and further inhibit the more 
controlled and explicit mentalization which is likely to already be disrupted in 
individuals with BPD (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Therefore, when the ability to 
mentalize explicitly is impaired, individuals with BPD rely on the implicit system 
which is dominated by reflexive, impression-driven assumptions about internal 
states which are hard to integrate with one‟s own experience and which are not 
counterbalanced by a controlled, conscious and reflective type of mentalizing 
(Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). 
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In order to bring these ideas together Sharp (2014) produced a model to describe 
mentalizing in individuals with BPD. Firstly, mentalizing difficulties occur in stressful 
inter-personal situations which are linked to arousal of the attachment system. In 
situations where the attachment system is not aroused, normal mentalizing can 
occur. Difficulties with mentalizing occur in situations where higher-order 
mentalizing, that is the integration of both implicit and explicit mentalizing, is 
required, as opposed to situations which rely solely on implicit mentalizing. 
Additionally, mentalizing based on internal features is more affected than 
mentalizing based on external features. These resultant mentalizing deficits reflect 
hypermentalizing, or the over-attribution of mental states to others, with negative 
consequences for both interpersonal relationships and emotional regulation. This 
model could possibly therefore help make sense of the conflicting findings 
surrounding BPD and mentalizing difficulties, as it may be that the type of 
mentalizing which is assessed during these studies, i.e. implicit versus explicit, 
internal-focused versus external-focused, has important implications for the 
mentalizing abilities or difficulties that are observed.  
 
Aim of review 
It is important to understand the factors that may cause or contribute to a disorder; 
in this case whether difficulties in mentalizing underlie some of the difficulties 
experienced by young people with BPD, as this can then provide a focus for 
intervention. In order to do this efficiently, it is necessary to understand exactly what 
form these difficulties take. The downward extension from initial research, which 
mainly focused on the mentalization strategies of adults with BPD, has begun. It is 
not yet evident as to whether BPD related mentalization characteristics found in 
children and adolescents share the same etiological features as those found in 
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adults. Instead it may be that mentalization difficulties in childhood or adolescence 
take a different form, or that mentalizing difficulties develop during adulthood or later 
on in the course of the disorder. Due to the developmental nature of the 
mentalization theory of BPD and the growing evidence that BPD in young people is 
a valid and potentially helpful diagnosis, targeting any known difficulties in 
mentalization during adolescence is likely to be important in terms of prevention, 
formulation and intervention (Sharp et al., 2011). The aim of this review is to 
critically evaluate current evidence regarding the specific nature of the relationship 
between mentalizing difficulties and BPD in young people.  
 
Method 
In order to explore the review question, a literature search was carried out using the 
following method: 
 
Search Strategy 
A systematic review of the literature was conducted in August 2016. Relevant 
papers were identified initially by searching three electronic databases; PsycINFO, 
MEDLINE and EMBASE. The following terms were used to search headings and 
keywords in abstracts and titles: („Borderline Personality Disorder‟ OR BPD OR 
borderline OR „emerging borderline*‟) AND (mentali* OR „reflective function‟ OR 
„theory of mind‟ OR „social cognition‟ OR hypermentali* OR empath* OR „social 
understanding‟) AND (Teenager* OR „young person‟ OR „young people‟ OR 
adolescen* OR child* OR youth). 
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Screening and Study Selection 
All resulting papers were screened and for those that appeared relevant, the 
abstracts were read. Any studies that referred to mentalization (including any of the 
previously noted terms) and BPD in adolescence were included for further detailed 
screening. The full articles were obtained and reviewed before being compared to 
the inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
 
Table 1. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Inclusion Criteria 
    Published in a peer reviewed journal 
    Participants were aged 10-24 years old (based on the WHO‟s definition 
    of „young people‟). 
    Participants had a diagnosis of BPD or BPD traits were assessed  
    Mentalization or some form of social cognition was assessed 
 
Exclusion Criteria 
    Case Series Studies 
    Studies not in English 
 
Method of appraising studies 
In order to assess the quality of studies methodologically, Kmet, Lee and Cook‟s 
(2004) Quality Assurance Checklist (Appendix A) was used. The quality checklist is 
able to evaluate studies which use varying research designs and quality is 
determined by the extent of the internal validity of the studies. The tool contains 14 
items which assess internal validity of the studies, mainly focusing on factors 
relating to study design and analysis. On each of the 14 items a score of two is 
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awarded when all specified criteria are met, a score of one when the specified 
criteria are partially met and a score of zero when none of the specified criteria are 
met. A total quality percentage can then be calculated for each paper. In this review 
items five, six and seven were excluded, due to these items being related to the 
quality of intervention studies, which was not the focus of this review. The checklist 
has been found to have high internal consistency and good test-retest and inter-
rater reliability (Kmet et al., 2004). 
 
Results 
 
Prior to the limitations being imposed and duplications being removed, the database 
search resulted in a total of 540 references. Once the limitations were imposed and 
duplications were removed, the database search resulted in 33 references. These 
33 remaining references were then reviewed using the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria which resulted in a further 21 references being excluded. Finally 12 studies 
were selected to be included in this review. One further study that fit the inclusion 
criteria was identified through a search of the reference lists of the initially included 
studies and was therefore added, giving an end total of 13 papers for review.  
The 13 papers reviewed were published between the years of 2011 and 2016. They 
consisted of 12 cross-sectional studies and one randomised control trial (RCT).  
Sample sizes ranged from 41 participants to 501 participants. Three of the studies 
utilised community samples, where associations between mentalizing and BPD 
traits were investigated and 10 studies used clinical samples. In studies where a 
clinical sample was used, some chose to use community controls, whereas others 
additionally included psychiatric controls. Two studies used an entirely female 
sample, ten studies used a mixed sample and one study did not specify gender (Ha, 
Sharp, Ensink, Fonagy & Cirino 2013). Studies were conducted in a range of 
24 
 
countries including the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and Australia. 
Additionally, one study used a multi-site format across three European countries. 
The studies are summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Summary description of included studies 
Author, 
year & 
country 
Sample 
type & age 
range if 
specified 
Experimental 
& 
Comparison 
groups 
IV -  BPD DV – Mentalization Findings related to this review Effect 
Size 
Measur
e 
Type of 
Measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Aspects of 
mentalization 
assessed 
Mentaliz
ation 
measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Fossati, 
Feeney, 
Maffei & 
Borroni 
(2014) 
 
Italy 
Non-clinical 
 
Age: mean 
age 16.7 
years, SD 
=1.71 
High-BPD 
n=29 
(16 females, 
13 males) 
 
Average- BPD 
n = 31 
(11 females, 
20 males)  
 
Low-BPD 
n=29 
(11 females, 
18 males) 
BPI Self-report 
questionna
ire 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.97 
Other 
External  
Explicit 
Cognitive 
 
 
 
RET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No significant differences in RET 
scores between the 3 groups. 
 
Although insignificant, a 
moderate observed effect for 
mean difference on RET total 
score between high-BPD group 
& low-BPD group.  
 
 
 
 
 
d = - 0.66  
Scott, 
Levy, 
Adams & 
Stevenson 
(2011) 
 
UK 
Non-clinical 
 
Age: High 
BPD mean 
age 19.63 
years, SD = 
2.82 
  
Low-BPD 
group mean 
age 18.85 
years, SD = 
1.26 
High BPD 
group n =38  
(25 females, 
13 males) 
 
Low BPD 
group n=46  
(31 females, 
15 males)  
 
 
 
MSI- 
BPD 
(modifi
ed 
version
)  
 
Self-report 
questionna
ire 
 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.93 
Other 
External  
Explicit 
Cognitive 
RME   
 
N/A High-BPD group significantly 
better at recognising negative 
stimuli than low-BPD group. 
 
No significant differences 
between groups for neutral/ 
positive stimuli.  
 
High-BPD group showed 
response bias for attributing 
negative mental states to neutral 
stimuli 
d = 0.47 
 
 
 
Neutral: 
d=0.19 
Positive: 
d=0.24 
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Author, 
year & 
country 
Sample type 
& age range if 
specified 
Experimental 
& 
Comparison 
groups 
IV -  BPD DV – Mentalization Findings related to this review Effect 
Size 
Measur
e 
Type of 
Measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Aspects of 
mentalization 
assessed 
Mentaliz
ation 
measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Berenschot 
et al. 
(2014) 
 
Netherland
s 
Clinical 
 
Age: Age 
range 12-18 
years for all 
groups 
Personality 
pathology 
group n=42 
(34 females, 8 
males) 
 
Psych control 
group n=28 
(13 females, 
15 males) 
 
Community 
control group 
n= 111 
(57 females, 
54 males) 
N/A – 
MDT 
decisio
n 
making 
Clinical 
interview. 
 Other 
External  
Explicit 
Cognitive 
Face 
morphing 
task 
N/A Personality pathology group 
significantly more accurate at 
emotion recognition than either 
control group.  
 
Personality pathology group 
significantly more sensitive at 
emotion recognition than 
psychiatric controls but not 
community controls.  
 
Personality pathology group not 
significantly more accurate at 
recognising negative emotions. 
 
The main 
Group 
effect 
partial 
η2 = 0.06 
Jovev et al. 
(2011) 
 
Australia 
Clinical 
 
Age: BPD 
group mean 
age 18.9 
years, SD = 
3.1. 
 
Community 
group mean 
age 20.40, 
SD=2.72  
BPD group 
n=21  
(18 females,3 
males 
 
Community 
control group 
n=20 
(13 females, 
7 males) 
SCID –
I/P 
Semi-
structured 
interview  
Good 
psychometric 
properties 
reported 
Other 
External  
Explicit 
Cognitive 
Modified 
face 
morph 
task 
 
N/A No significant differences found 
between groups for either 
accuracy or sensitivity. 
Effect 
sizes 
ranging 
from d= 0 
to d=0.6  
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Author, year 
& country 
Sample 
type & age 
range if 
specified 
Experiment
al & 
Comparison 
groups 
IV -  BPD DV – Mentalization Findings related to this review Effect 
Size 
Measur
e 
Type of 
Measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Aspects of 
mentalization 
assessed 
Mentaliz
ation 
measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Robin et al. 
(2012) 
 
France, 
Belgium & 
Switzerland 
(multi-site) 
 
Clinical 
 
Age: age 
range 15 to 
19 years. 
BPD group 
n=22  
(all females) 
 
Community 
control group 
n=22 
(all females) 
SIDP-
IV 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
 
Not reported Other 
External  
Explicit 
Cognitive 
Face 
Morph 
Task  
 
N/A No significant differences 
between groups in recognition of 
fully expressed emotions. 
 
BPD group significantly less 
sensitive to facial expressions of 
happiness & anger than control 
group.  
 
Not 
reported 
Fossati, 
Feeney,  
Maffei & 
Borroni (2011) 
 
Italy 
Non-clinical 
 
Age: mean 
age 17.22 
years (SD = 
0.88) 
 
N= 501  
(255 
females, 246 
males) 
PDQ-4 
þ 
 Self-report 
questionna
ire 
Cronbach‟s α 
= 0.58 
Self 
Internal 
Explicit 
Affective 
MAAS Cronbach‟s α = 
0.81 
Mindfulness scores significantly 
negatively associated with 
number of BPD features. 
r2 = 0.15 
Kalpakci, 
Vanwoerden,  
Elhai  &  Sharp 
(2016) 
 
USA 
Clinical 
 
Age: age 
range 12-17 
years 
BPD group 
(n=107) 
(all female) 
 
Psychiatric 
control group 
(n=145)  
(all female) 
CI-BPD Semi-
structured 
interview 
 
 
Interrater 
agreements: 
Kappa‟s 
cohen= 0.77-
0.89 
Other 
Internal 
Explicit 
 
Cognitive & 
affective empathy 
 
MASC 
 
 
 
BES 
 
Not reported 
 
 
Cronbach‟s α for 
cognitive 
empathy = 0.75 
Cronbach‟s α for 
affective 
empathy = 0.83 
 
BPD group significantly higher 
affective empathy than control. 
 
No significant differences in 
cognitive empathy between 
groups. 
BPD group: hypermentalizing 
related to decreased cognitive 
empathy; non-BPD: group 
hypermentalizing not related to 
either empathy type.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r = −0.23 
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Author, year 
& country 
Sample 
type & age 
range if 
specified 
Experiment
al & 
Comparison 
groups 
IV -  BPD DV – Mentalization Findings related to this review Effect 
Size 
Meas
ure 
Type of 
Measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Aspects of 
mentalization 
assessed 
Mentaliz
ation 
measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Sharp et al. 
(2011) 
 
USA 
Clinical 
 
Age: age 
range 12-17 
years 
N = 111  
(62 females, 
49 males) 
BPFS
C 
 
 
 
CI-
BPD 
Self-report 
questionna
ire 
 
Semi-
structured 
interview. 
 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.9 
 
 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.82. 
 
Other 
Internal 
Explicit 
Cognitive 
 
MASC 
 
N/A Significant relationship between 
BPD traits & hypermentalizing. 
 
No significant relationship 
between BPD & absence of 
mentalizing/ undermentalizing. 
 
r=0.41 
Sharp at al. 
(2016) 
 
USA 
Clinical 
 
Age: mean 
age 15.42 
years, SD = 
1.43 
 
N=259 
 
(158 
females, 101 
males) 
BPFS
C 
Self-report 
questionna
ire  
Cronbach's α = 
0.88 
Other 
Internal 
Explicit 
Cognitive 
MASC N/A More severe BPD features 
significantly associated with 
elevated hypermentalizing 
r=0.24 
Sharp et al. 
(2013) 
 
USA 
 
Clinical 
 
Age: mean 
age 15.5 
years, SD 
1.44 
BPD group 
n=68 
(46 females, 
22males) 
 
Psychiatric 
control  
group n=96 
(55 females, 
41 males) 
 
CI-
BPD 
 
 
 
BPFS
C 
Semi-
structured 
interview  
 
Self-report 
questionna
ire. 
 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.82 
 
 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.88 
Other 
Explicit 
Internal 
 
Other 
Explicit 
External 
 
Other, implicit  
 
Self, explicit, 
Affective 
MASC 
 
 
 
CET  
 
 
MSTA 
 
 
BES 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.76 
 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.86 
BPD group showed greater 
hypermentalization than controls 
at admission. 
 
Hypermentalizing significantly 
reduced between admission & 
discharge for both groups; 
reduction was more pronounced 
for BPD group. 
 
Other forms of mentalization 
were not changed by treatment. 
r = 0.29 
 
 
 
interactio
n effect 
for BPD 
and 
hyperme
ntalising: 
partial η2 
= 0.03 
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Author, year 
& country 
Sample 
type & age 
range if 
specified 
Experiment
al & 
Comparison 
groups 
IV -  BPD DV – Mentalization Findings related to this review Effect 
Size 
Meas
ure 
Type of 
Measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Aspects of 
mentalization 
assessed 
Mentaliz
ation 
measure 
Quality of 
measure 
Hessels et al. 
(2016) 
 
Netherlands 
Clinical 
 
Age: Age 
range 12-18 
years 
N= 96 
 
(52 females, 
38 males) 
DSM-
IV 
check
list 
MDT 
consensus 
Not reported Other & Self 
Explicit 
Internal 
Cognitive 
The SIP 
interview 
in 
adolesce
nts  
Inter-rater 
agreement κ 
reported for 
some subscales 
Significant relationship between 
BPD pathology & 2 SIP 
variables; inadequate coping 
and frustrating past memories. 
 
No significant relationship 
between BPD pathology & 6 SIP 
variables, including „reflecting 
upon other‟s motives‟ (i.e. 
mentalizing)  
Coping: 
r= 0.21 
 
Memorie
s: r= 0.34 
Ha, Sharp, 
Ensink,  
Fonagy & 
Cirino (2013) 
Clinical 
 
Age: mean 
age 15.57 
years, SD = 
1.39 
 
N = 146 
 
BPFS
C 
 
 
 
BPFS
P 
Self-report 
questionna
ire 
 
Parent-
report 
questionna
ire 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.89 
 
 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.91 
Self 
Explicit 
Internal 
 
RFQY  
 
Cronbach‟s α  = 
0.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significant difference in 
reflective function between 
participants above & below BPD 
cut-off on both self and parent 
reported BPD symptoms.  
 
 
BPFSC:  
r = - 0.34 
 
 
 
BPFSP: 
r= - 0.16 
Jennings, 
Hulbert, 
Jackson & 
Chanen (2012) 
 
Australia 
Clinical 
 
Age: Age 
range 15-24 
years 
BPD group 
n=30 
(24 females, 
6 males) 
 
MDD control 
group n=30  
(22 females, 
8 males) 
SCID-
II 
Structured 
Clinical 
Interview 
Not reported Self 
Explicit 
Internal 
Cognitive 
 
 
INS 
 
Cronbach‟s α = 
0.77 - 0.83 
BPD group responded to all 
vignettes with significantly lower 
social perspective coordination 
scores than the control group 
 
partial 
eta 
squared 
= 0.48 
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Key: BES: Basic Empathy Scale ;  BPFSC: The Borderline Personality Features Scale for Children; BPD: Borderline Personality Disorder Scale;  BPFSP: The 
Borderline Personality Features Scale for Parents;  BPI: Borderline Personality Inventory;  CET: Childs Eye Test;  CI-BPD: Childhood Interview for DSM-IV 
Borderline Personality Disorder;  CFRS: Child Reflective Function Scale; DERS: Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale;  INS: Interpersonal Negotiation 
Strategies Interview;  MAAS: Mindful Attention Awareness Scale;  MASC: Movie Assessment of Social Cognition;  MSI-BPD: McLean Screening Instrument 
for BPD; PDQ-4 þ: Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4 þ;  MSTA: Mentalizing Stories Test for Adolescents ;  RET: Reading the Mind in the Eyes test 
revised version;  RFQY: Reflective Function Questionnaire for Youths;  RME: Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test;  SCID-II: Structured clinical interview for 
DSM-IV personality disorders;  SIDP-IV: The Structured Interview for DSM-IV Personality 
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Quality of studies 
The overall quality of the included studies was satisfactory. The ratings of the 
studies are shown in Table 3. All studies scored highly on the „objective sufficiently 
described‟ and „study design evident and appropriate‟ scales, suggesting studies 
were fairly well designed and clearly described. However, there were some general 
limitations that applied to many of the studies reviewed.  
Firstly, all but one of the studies (Sharp et al., 2013) reviewed were of a cross-
sectional design. Cross-sectional surveys can be an extremely useful way to 
investigate whether BPD and mentalization are correlated. However, given the 
cross-sectional nature of these studies, it must always be held in mind that 
alternative causal relations may apply and that the direction of causality cannot be 
determined. 
As the study of the association between mentalization and BPD in young people is 
an emerging area, this is reflected by the relatively small sample sizes that were 
found throughout some of the studies (those scoring a 1 on item 9). Overall, in the 
majority of the studies reviewed, the sample sizes lacked power to determine small 
effects. None of the reviewed studies reported power analyses in order to determine 
sample sizes. Additionally, when looking at the samples used, it is noted that several 
of the studies showed a selection bias due to not having a clinical control group, 
making it difficult to determine how much of the relationship between BPD and 
mentalization is due to BPD and how much is due to psychopathology more 
generally. The samples of most studies which used clinical populations were 
skewed towards female participants. The reasons most commonly cited for 
excluding participants from the samples were psychotic symptoms, learning 
disability or other neuropsychological conditions. 
32 
 
Another issue across studies related to the wide range of mentalizing measures 
used, making comparisons across results challenging, as well as the varying 
reliability and validity of mentalization measures used. Due to the wide range of 
different measures across the studies, this issue will be addressed in the following 
section of the review. 
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Table 3. Quality rating of studies included in review 
 
Kmet Quality Criterion 
 
Study 
 Fo
s
s
a
ti e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
4
) 
S
c
o
tt e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
1
). 
F
o
s
s
a
ti e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
1
) 
B
e
re
n
s
c
h
o
t e
t 
a
l. (2
0
1
4
) 
J
o
v
e
v
 e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
1
) 
R
o
b
in
 e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
2
) 
K
a
lp
a
k
c
i e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
6
) 
S
h
a
rp
 e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
1
) 
S
h
a
rp
 e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
6
) 
S
h
a
rp
 e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
3
) 
H
e
s
s
e
ls
 e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
6
) 
H
a
 e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
3
) 
J
e
n
n
in
g
s
 e
t a
l. 
(2
0
1
2
) 
1. Question / objective 
sufficiently described? 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2. Study design evident 
and appropriate? 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3. Method of 
subject/comparison group 
selection or source of 
information/input variables 
described and 
appropriate? 
2 2 1
b
 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
k
 
4. Subject (and 
comparison group, if 
applicable) characteristics 
sufficiently described? 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
5. If interventional and 
random allocation was 
possible, was it described? 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6. If interventional and 
blinding of investigators 
was possible, was it 
reported? 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7. If interventional and 
blinding of subjects was 
possible, was it reported? 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8. Outcome (if applicable) 
exposure measure(s) well 
2 1
a
 1
c
 1
d
 1
e
 2 2 2 2 2 1
h
 2 1
l
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defined and robust to 
measurement / 
misclassification bias? 
means of assessment 
reported? 
9. Sample size 
appropriate? 
1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
10. Analytic methods 
described/justified and 
appropriate? 
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
j
 2 
11. Controlled for 
confounding? 
2 2 N/A 2 1
f
 2 2 2 2 2 N/A 2 2 
12. Results reported in 
sufficient detail? 
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
13. Conclusions supported 
by the results? 
2 2 2 2 2 1
g
 2 2 2 2 1
i
 2 2 
14. Total score 95% 95% 90% 95% 90% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 95% 85% 
 
Note: Coding: 2= all specified criteria are met, 1= specified criteria are partially met, 0 = none of the criteria met. 
 
Key: 
a- Made own changes to a standardised measure (created a 21-item modified version of the MSI-BPD). 
b- No inclusion/exclusion criteria or sampling method reported. 
c- Participants were administered only the nine-item BPD scale of the PDQ-4 þ. The internal consistency reliability of the BPD scale was Cronbach‟s 
alpha = 0.58. 
d- Emotion recognition task not standardised and no information given about Cronbach‟s alpha. 
e- Outcome measure (face morph task) was adapted for the study, but no information about the validity/reliability of the measure is provided. 
f- Significantly higher levels of education in the healthy control group were not controlled for in the analysis. 
g- The authors conclude that BPD adolescents are more sensitive at identifying emotions. This was on found for 2/6 emotional expressions; meaning 
that for 4/6 emotions there were no differences in sensitivity. 
h- Outcome measure (SIP interview) described as being based upon previous interviews published in the literature; it is not clear as to how it is based on 
previous interviews.  
i- Not enough acknowledgements given to all the SIP factors which did not have a significant correlation with BPD when drawing conclusions. 
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j- As the main aim of the study was to investigate the construct validity of the RFQY; only limited information given about the statistical analysis used to 
look at the relationship between BPD and mentalizing. 
k- Sampling strategy unclear 
l- Standardised outcome measure adapted and three vignettes constructed by the researchers; validity of these was not investigated. 
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Measuring Mentalization 
One of the major challenges that became apparent in comparing findings across 
studies in this review was related to the wide range of measures used to assess 
mentalizing. This seems to be partly related to the difficulty in the defining and 
operationalising of „mentalizing‟, and then in its measurement. Mentalizing is a multi-
dimensional and heterogeneous construct (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Theory of mind, 
empathy, reflective function, affective cognition and social cognition are all areas 
that over-lap somewhat with the broad concept of mentalizing.  Mentalization and 
theory of mind are often used interchangeably in the literature, however these 
concepts stem from different models, with mentalization being rooted in attachment 
theory and theory of mind being rooted in cognitive theory (Hessells, van Aken, 
Orobio de Castro, Laceulle & van Voorst, 2016).  Due to the similarities across these 
concepts, research into each of these areas is likely to provide important information 
related to mentalization in young people with BPD and have been included in this 
literature review. However it must be held in mind that the aspects of social 
cognition that are being targeted and measured may have important implications for 
the results found and for the generalisability of findings. 
Furthermore, investigation into the mentalizing abilities of young people with BPD 
has been hampered by the lack of mentalizing measures available for this 
population (Sharp et. al., 2011). Most tasks used to measure mentalizing are 
actually theory of mind tasks and have been developed for use with autistic 
spectrum disorders and therefore it can be questioned as to how valid the use of 
such measures with young people with personality disorder actually is. Additionally, 
as previously described; mentalizing can be viewed along four different polarities; 
implicit/explicit controlled, self/other focused, internal/external based and 
cognitive/affective (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Different mentalization tasks assess 
these different aspects of mentalization to different extents and following from this, 
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are likely to identify different deficits or abilities dependent on the type of 
mentalization being assessed by the measure, especially given the hypothesis that 
different aspects of mentalizing are affected to different degrees in individuals with 
BPD (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  
Although it is unlikely that measures will ever purely assess one single dimension of 
mentalizing, due to the complexities of human cognition, it appears that certain tasks 
require more explicit-controlled mentalizing whereas others rely on more implicit-
controlled mentalizing. Therefore, for the sake of this review, mentalization 
measures have been divided broadly into these two groups. The following measures 
were used by studies included in this review:  
 
External-focused mentalization measures: 
Measures which assess external-focused mentalization involve the assessment of 
emotions and mental states using external cues, usually facial expressions of 
emotion. Two of the studies reviewed assessed mentalization using versions of the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. Scott, Levy, Adams and Stevenson (2011) used 
the original version of the measure (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; RME; 
Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997),  and Fossati, Feeney, Maffei, 
and Borroni (2014) used the revised version (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, 
revised; RET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). This task was 
initially developed as a measure of Theory of Mind and involves the identification of 
the emotional states of others from images of the eye region of the face, which 
depict various emotions, both emotionally charged and neutral. Participants are then 
asked to make a choice from provided responses as to which semantic definition of 
a mental state e.g. „angry‟ or „worried‟ matches the emotion being depicted. 
Both versions of the measure are similar, although the revised version has an 
increased number of items in the test and the number of mental state responses that 
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participants are able to choose from for each image was increased from two to 
three. Adequate psychometrics including reliability and validity have been reported 
for these measures (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
Three studies made use of Face Morph tasks to assess emotion recognition (Jovev 
et al., 2011; Robin et al., 2012 & Berenschot et al., 2012). These tasks involve 
participants having to identify as quickly and accurately as possible various 
emotions from videos of facial stimuli which progressively morph over time from an 
initially neutral expression to a fully expressed emotion. Such tasks have the benefit 
of allowing exploration of differences in recognition between fully expressed 
emotions and low level expressions of emotions, which hypothetically require a 
greater sensitivity to recognise and deduce. Jovev et al., (2011) and Robin et al., 
(2012) both used stimuli taken from the empirically reliable and valid „pictures of 
facial affect‟ series by Ekman and Friesen (1976), whereas Berenschot et al., (2012) 
used a similar Face Morph Task that was developed by Montagne, Kessels, De 
Haan and Perrett (2007).  However, Jovev et al., (2011) modified their images for 
use in the study, which would therefore impact the validity and reliability of the 
measure. Confounding factors which may have an impact on reaction-time tasks 
such as these include participant‟s visual-perceptual awareness, attention and 
impulse control. 
There are some general limitations that apply to both the RET and face morph 
paradigms. Both types of task use faces that are unfamiliar to the participants and 
therefore the tasks are unable to examine some of the more relational and social 
aspects of emotion recognition. Both tasks also lack real-life validity, although it has 
been argued that face morph tasks are a more life-like measure of mentalization 
than the RET, due to the use of videos of whole faces rather than pictures of just the 
eye region and due to the images being dynamic (Jovev et al., 2011).  
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Internal-focused mentalization measures 
Measures which tap into internal-focused mentalization involve the assessment of 
emotions and mental states by reflecting consciously on the internal experiences of 
self or others. One study (Fossati, Feeney, Maffei, & Borroni, 2011) used the Mindful 
Attention Awareness Scale Mindful Attention (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) to 
assess self-focused internal mentalizing. The MAAS is a 15-item self-report 
Mindfulness measure which assesses an individual‟s ability to attend to and reflect 
on their on-going experiences. The reliability and validity of the measure has been 
demonstrated (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
One of the studies (Sharp et al., 2013) used the Mentalizing Stories Test for 
Adolescents (MSTA; Vrouva & Fonagy, 2009) to assess mentalizing. The MSTA 
involves participants being provided with a narration about a teenager‟s behaviour, 
before then being given three different interpretations as to the mental states driving 
the behaviour. These three interpretations make conclusions that suggest either 
non-mentalizing, appropriate mentalizing or hypermentalizing; therefore producing a 
more sophisticated assessment of mentalizing than just simply its presence or 
absence. Good psychometric properties have been reported for the MSTA (Vrouva, 
Target, & Ensink, 2012). 
Jennings, Hulbert, Jackson and Chanen (2012) used the Interpersonal Negotiation 
Strategies Interview (INS; Schultz, Yeates & Selman, 1998) to assess mentalization. 
This measure uses vignettes describing interpersonal conflicts which participants 
are then asked perspective-taking questions about, in order to give an indication of 
mentalizing ability. In this study a total of six vignettes were used; three from the 
standardised measure and three that were constructed by the investigators, as they 
wanted the vignettes to specifically reflect BPD-relevant themes of abandonment, 
mistrust/abuse, and deprivation. However the validity of these extra vignettes was 
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not established and the inclusion of these may have implications for the validity and 
reliability of the measure. 
Two studies (Sharp et al., 2013; Kalpakci, Vanwoerden, Elhai &Sharp, 2016) used 
the Basic Empathy Scale (BES; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006), which is a valid 
multidimensional measure of empathy, to assess mentalization abilities. The BES is 
a 20-item self-report scale which assesses both cognitive and affective empathy by 
asking participants to identify their abilities to empathise with others based on 
identifying and reflecting on their internal states. Good divergent and convergent 
validity have been demonstrated for the BES (Jolliffe &Farrington, 2006). 
The Reflective Function Questionnaire for Youths (RFQY; Sharp et al., 2009) was 
the mentalization measure used by one of the studies (Ha et al., 2013). The RFQY 
is a self-report questionnaire developed specifically for use with young people which 
assesses the capacity to reflect on both the mind of the self and other by asking 
young people to rate how much they agree or disagree with statements of reflective 
function. Adequate internal reliability and validity have been demonstrated (Ha et al., 
2013). 
One study (Hessels et al., 2016) measured mentalizing using a measure based on 
Social Information Processing theory (SIP; Crick & Dodge, 1994). In the interview 
participants were read six vignettes about conflict situations among adolescents and 
then asked questions relating to the mental states of the characters involved. 
Although the study provides information about the model that the interview was 
based on and it is reported that the interview was based on others used in previous 
literature, it is not made clear as to whether there is a standardised form of the SIP 
interview and no reference to this was provided. Although detailed information is 
given as to the nature of the questions asked, as this interview appears to be non-
standardised this has implications for the validity of the measure.  
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The Movie Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006) was the 
mentalization measure of choice in four of the studies reviewed (Kalpakci et al., 
2016;  Sharp et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2013; Sharp et al., 2016).  The MASC 
involves participants watching a 15 minute film which depicts four people at a dinner 
party and shows different social interactions that elicit different mental and emotional 
states in the characters. The film is paused at 45 points throughout and participants 
are asked various questions relating to the character‟s internal mental states. It has 
been suggested that the MASC is able to produce a fairly refined understanding of 
participant‟s mentalizing style; rather than a presence or absence of mentalizing, 
deficits are broken down into three categories; 1) less theory of mind 
(undermentalizing), 2) no theory of mind (no mentalizing) and 3) excessive theory of 
mind (hypermentalizing) (Sharp et al., 2011).  Psychometrics have shown the MASC 
to be a valid and reliable measure (Dziobek et al., 2006) and it has been shown to 
be sensitive in its ability to discriminate adolescents with BPD from those without 
(Sharp et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2013). 
 
Measuring BPD 
Additionally, measuring and assessing BPD in young people is not without its 
difficulties. There are questions that arise related to several factors in assessing 
BPD symptomology that were found to differ across the studies reviewed and which 
may affect the quality of the assessment; whether standardised measures are used, 
where to place cut-offs when deciding someone‟s BPD status, the suitability of self-
report measures for BPD and the validity of standardised measures as compared to 
more clinical-led MDT decisions. Therefore, all of these factors relating to the 
assessment of BPD need to be taken into consideration when assessing the quality 
of the studies reviewed. 
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Summary of studies assessing external-focused mentalizing 
One of the foundation stones of mentalizing is the ability to use external and 
physical cues, such as facial expressions of emotion, in order to correctly identify 
mental states in others. From here it is possible to deduce intentions, predict 
actions, respond appropriately and to regulate our own emotional responses, all of 
which are crucial for adequate social functioning (Bateman & Fonagy, 2003). Five 
studies were identified which focused on the relationship between mentalizing and 
BPD symptomology in young people using paradigms related to recognition of facial 
emotional expressions. However these studies have produced heterogeneous 
results in the relationship between BPD symptomology and mentalizing, ranging 
from deficits to heightened sensitivity in emotion recognition. 
 
Summary of studies using community samples 
Two of the studies investigating the relationship between BPD and recognition of 
facial expressions of emotion did so using community samples (Fossati et al., 2014; 
Scott et al., 2011). Both studies used the RET to assess mentalization abilities.  
Fossati et al. (2012) found that there were no significant differences in the accuracy 
or sensitivity of emotion recognition in Italian high school students allocated to either 
a high BPD group (n=29), an average BPD group (n=31) or a low BPD group (n=29) 
when attachment was controlled for. However, despite this insignificant result, an 
effect size in the moderate to large range (Cohen d= - 0.66) was found when looking 
at the difference in emotion recognition between the high BPD group (n=29) and the 
low BPD group (n=31), with the high BPD group performing more poorly on the 
emotion recognition task. The authors felt that such an effect size should not be 
overlooked clinically and may point to a deficit in mentalizing abilities in individuals 
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with BPD. However, caution needs to be made when making conclusions from 
findings which have been found non-significant. 
Turning to the Scott et al. (2011) study, it was found that a high BPD group (n =38), 
although no different to the low BPD group (n=46) in the recognition of neutral or 
positive stimuli, were significantly more accurate at recognising stimuli of a negative 
emotional valence. This finding of an enhanced ability to identify negative emotions 
fits with findings with adults; a review by Domes, Schulze and Herpertz (2009) found 
that adults with BPD actually performed particularly well at recognising negative 
emotional expressions. Additionally, Scott et al. (2011) found that the high BPD 
group showed a response bias for attributing negative mental states to stimuli; they 
reported a more negative emotion than that which was actually depicted. These 
findings may be understood by hypotheses that individuals with BPD have a bias 
towards negative emotional attributions; ascribing negative emotions to facial stimuli 
which are actually benign or neutral, possibly due to previous negative interpersonal 
experiences (McClure, 2000). Therefore, this may indicate subtle impairments in 
labelling accuracy accompanied by a negative attribution bias in young people with 
BPD. The enhanced ability to detect negative emotions may make sense 
developmentally; it is advantageous for a child who experienced abusive or 
neglectful incidents in childhood, as is often the case in BPD, to become adept at 
recognising negative emotions in others in order to potentially avoid associated 
negative consequences (Harkness et al., 2005). However such a response may 
become maladaptive when benign expressions are misinterpreted, leading to social 
difficulties. 
When considering the results from both studies, it is important to hold in mind that 
they utilised a homogenous (student based), non-clinical sample. Therefore these 
results have limited generalisability to clinical populations with BPD. Additionally, as 
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the samples were made up of students, questions may also be raised about the 
generalisability of these findings to samples with different educational levels. 
 
Summary of studies using clinical samples 
Three of the studies reviewed investigated the relationship between BPD and 
recognition of facial expressions of emotion using clinical samples. Research 
conducted by Jovev et al., (2011) found no significant differences in either accuracy 
or sensitivity in emotion recognition between BPD adolescents (n=21) as compared 
to community controls (n=20). Similarly, Robin et al., (2012) found that BPD female 
adolescents (n=22) showed no difference in the accuracy of recognising fully 
expressed emotions than matched controls (n=22); however the BPD group were 
found to be significantly less sensitive at identifying 2 particular emotions; anger and 
happiness.  
In contrast, Berenschot et al., (2012) found that young people with personality 
pathology (n=42) showed an enhanced emotion recognition accuracy compared to 
both community controls (n=111) and psychiatric controls (n=28), which they 
hypothesised may suggest enhanced mentalizing. Additionally, the personality 
pathology group were more sensitive at recognising emotions than the psychiatric 
controls, although not more so than the community controls. It had been 
hypothesised that when emotional valence was considered, BPD adolescents would 
be more accurate at recognising negative as opposed to positive emotions, 
presenting a similar finding as to that of Scott et al. (2011). However it was found 
that contrary to this, that the personality pathology group were no better at 
recognising negative emotions than neutral or positive emotions.  
How is it possible to understand the varied findings produced by these three studies, 
with one study finding no mentalizing differences between BPD and controls, one 
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study finding reduced sensitivity in emotion recognition in BPD adolescents and one 
study finding enhanced emotion recognition? Let us consider the samples used in 
these studies. In the Jovev et al. (2011) study, criteria for inclusion in the BPD group 
was meeting 3 or more DSM-IV BPD diagnostic criteria. This threshold meant that 
only 57.1% of participants in the BPD group would have met full criteria for DSM-IV 
BPD diagnosis (meeting 5 or more criteria). Comparatively, in the Robin et al. (2012) 
study, BPD participants all reached diagnostic threshold for BPD using the DSM-IV 
criteria. Additionally, 64% of the BPD group were inpatients; possibly suggestive of 
young people with more severe BPD symptomology than those in the Jovev et al. 
(2011) sample. Jovev et al. (2011) hypothesised that difficulties in emotion 
recognition may only be present in young people with severe BPD. It may be that 
the inclusion of sub-syndromic patients in the BPD sample in their study may have 
reduced the contrast between groups and may explain the lack of significant 
difference between BPD participants and controls.  
Let us turn now to consider the finding that BPD adolescents differ in their sensitivity 
of emotion recognition as compared to controls (Robin et al., 2012; Berenschot et 
al., 2012). Robin et al. (2012) hypothesised that their finding that BPD adolescents 
were less sensitive, but not overall less accurate, at recognising certain emotions 
than controls, may lead to individuals with BPD experiencing difficulties when 
entering into emotionally ambiguous situations, as they require more intense 
emotional depictions to be displayed before recognising these. This hypothesis 
could explain some of the difficulties that young people with BPD have in social 
situations, where it is often necessary to deduce subtle emotions in others. 
However, caution needs to be used when interpreting these findings, as although 
there were differences between the groups for the recognition of two emotions at 
low levels of intensity, there were four other facial expressions of emotion where 
there were found to be no differences between groups.  
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How can we make sense of the opposite finding by Berenschot et al. (2012), that 
young people with personality pathology have enhanced emotion recognition? The 
authors hypothesised that this enhanced recognition may make sense clinically; 
young people with BPD may experience a hypersensitivity to emotion, potentially 
due to previous negative experiences due to potential attachment difficulties. This 
hypervigilance would then help in defending against the psychic pain that such 
experiences could bring. However, this hypervigilance may in turn trigger the 
individual to experience negative emotions and cognitions, which when combined 
with the emotional dysregulation seen in BPD, may lead to extreme social reactions 
(Berenschot et al., 2012). Therefore, this would fit with the hypothesis that 
mentalizing difficulties in young people take the form of hypermentalizing (Fonagy & 
Luyten, 2009). Alternatively, enhanced recognition may fit with the theory that due to 
deficits in the internal mentalizing modality, that individual‟s with BPD actually 
become adept at mentalizing using external cues and therefore may actually have 
enhanced abilities in this area (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). However, it is important to 
consider that although the authors professed an interest in mentalizing in young 
people with BPD, they decided to focus on broader personality pathology in this 
study. The justification for this was that in young people there is high overlap in 
different personality disorders features, with interest recently moving towards a more 
dimensional approach to personality disorders. However, this has obvious 
implications for the generalisability of these results beyond personality pathology 
generally and to BPD more specifically. Additionally, MDT decision making was 
utilised to inform group allocation as opposed to any standardised diagnostic 
instrument, possibly affecting the validity and reliability of the group allocation 
procedure. 
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Summary of studies assessing internal-focused mentalizing 
Although logically the identification of others‟ emotions using external features, such 
as emotional expressions, is a key component of mentalizing, this is not the full 
picture. Mentalizing using internal structures, through the identification of thoughts, 
feelings and mental states in both the self and other is also hugely important. It has 
been hypothesised that it is this internal-focused aspect of mentalizing that may be 
particularly impaired in young people with BPD (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  
 
Summary of studies using community samples 
One of the reviewed studies (Fossati et al., 2011) used a community sample to 
investigate mentalizing using internal-focused processes however, unlike many of 
the other studies reviewed, chose to investigate the self-focused aspects of 
mentalization. The researchers proposed that the ability to identify and reflect on 
one‟s own internal states is an equally important aspect of mentalization that is often 
overlooked in research. It was proposed, due to the over-lap between the two 
constructs, that self-report measures of mindfulness would provide an indirect 
measure of internal-focused mentalization, as both mentalization and mindfulness 
involve the direction of attention onto the self in a way that involves reflection and 
reduces reactivity. In a non-clinical sample of Italian young people (n= 501), BPD 
features were found to be significantly negatively correlated with mindfulness; with 
higher number of BPD symptoms associated with lower mindfulness scores. 
Therefore, it was concluded that young people with BPD have deficits in the ability 
to direct attention to one‟s own experiences, necessary to understand and reflect on 
one‟s own internal states, suggesting a deficit in internal-focused mentalization.  
These findings support the hypothesis that in young people with BPD; the internal 
and explicit pathway to mentalizing (which is likely to be involved in the self-
reflection of one‟s own mental states) is disrupted (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  
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However, caution needs to be taken when generalising from these findings; it has 
not been established as to exactly what extent the constructs of mindfulness and 
mentalization do overlap and therefore how adequate such a measure would be in 
determining mentalizing ability. Along with the fact that this study used a community 
sample, reducing generalisability of results to clinical populations, it should also be 
noted that the internal consistency of the BPD measure in this study, the PDQ-4 þ 
BPD scale, was fairly low (Cronbach‟s alpha = 0.58), possibly due to only a 9-item 
subscale of the measure being used, bringing the reliability of the measure into 
question.  
 
Summary of studies using clinical samples 
Turning next to studies using clinical samples, Jennings et al. (2012) used social 
perspective coordination to operationalise and assess internal-focused mentalizing. 
Social perspective coordination has been defined as the ability to both differentiate 
and assimilate one‟s own perspective with the perspective of the other, creating an 
understanding of underlying mental states (Selman et al., 1986). A BPD group 
(n=30) were found to have significantly lower social perspective coordination scores, 
measured using the INS, than a major depression control group (n=30). This was 
taken as evidence that young people with BPD have deficits in social cognition and 
were functioning at a lower than expected developmental level of social perspective 
coordination, unable to integrate that the other may have a perspective different to 
one‟s own.  
This research adds support to the theory that young people with BPD have deficits 
in the ability to mentalize using internal structures. The lack of ability to differentiate 
one‟s own perspective from those of others would understandably impact on the 
ability to form and maintain stable relationships. However, these findings need to be 
considered tentatively as, as previously described, the INS vignettes used were 
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adapted specifically for this study, impacting on reliability and validity. Additionally, 
as one of the authors scored all of the vignettes without any assessment of inter-
rater reliability, there was no established reliability for the vignettes overall. 
However, the inclusion of a clinical control group helps to support the findings as 
being specific to BPD, rather than characteristic of psychopathology in general, 
which has been a critique of previous research. 
Hessels et al. (2016) used SIP as a way to conceptualise and measure 
mentalization. SIP suggests that individuals enter social situations with a „database‟ 
made up of past experiences and innate capabilities, which they are able to access 
during social encounters and which allow the processing of social information (Crick 
& Dodge, 1994). SIP is made up of eight different variables and the variable which 
most resembles mentalizing relates to the use of social cues to interpret other‟s 
feelings and intentions. In a clinical sample (n=96) there was found to be a 
significant relationship between BPD symptomology and two of the  SIP variables; 
inadequate coping and frustrating past memories. Therefore the more severe BPD 
symptomology participants had, the higher their reported intensity of emotions to 
past memories and the more likely they were to rely on inadequate coping strategies 
in inter-personal situations, such as avoidant interactions. 
However, no significant relationship between BPD pathology and the other six SIP 
variables, including the ability to interpret other‟s actions as being based on internal 
states or emotions, was found. As this is the SIP factor that most resembles 
mentalizing these results suggest that BPD adolescents do not show mentalizing 
deficits. The problems relating to the reliability and validity of the SIP interview have 
already been commented on. Additionally, the researchers determined BPD status 
using a checklist and MDT consensus. The lack of use of a semi-structured 
interview or other standardised measure may affect the reliability of determining 
BPD symptomology.  
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The use of unusual mentalizing strategies 
Four of the studies reviewed used the MASC as the internal-focused mentalization 
measure of choice. Rather than just the identification of mentalizing deficits or 
abilities, the MASC provides more specific information as to the nature of 
mentalizing strategies used, including allowing hypermentalizing to be identified. 
This is important given the hypothesis that hypermentalizing is the main mentalizing 
strategy used by individuals with BPD (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). 
Two of the reviewed studies demonstrated that mentalizing in young people with 
BPD does indeed seem to reflect the use of unusual mentalizing strategies, rather 
than the loss of mentalizing per se (Sharp et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2016). Sharp et 
al. (2011) found that in an inpatient sample, BPD traits were negatively correlated 
with total mentalizing score and that the correlation was clearly driven by 
mentalizing errors of the hypermentalizing type, with no other mentalizing errors (no 
mentalizing or undermentalizing) correlating with borderline traits. Sharp et al. 
(2016) provided further support for the link between BPD and hypermentalizing with 
a sample of adolescent inpatients (n=259). Pearson's correlations showed that more 
severe borderline features were significantly associated with elevated 
hypermentalizing.  
Further support for the notion that a mentalizing dysfunction, neither in the form of 
absence or suppression of mentalizing, but instead in the form of excess 
mentalizing, is present in young people with BPD comes from research by Sharp et 
al. (2013). It was found that BPD inpatient adolescents (n=66) displayed significantly 
greater hypermentalizing than psychiatric controls (n=98) at admission, suggesting 
hypermentalizing is specific to BPD, rather than to psychopathology in general. 
Throughout the course of a mentalization-based treatment, hypermentalizing was 
found to reduce significantly for both BPD and non-BPD patients, however this 
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reduction was more pronounced in the BPD group. The correlation between the 
reduction in hypermentalization and BPD symptomology was highly significant and 
in a negative direction; a reduction in hypermentalizing was associated with a 
reduction in BPD symptoms. It was assessed as to whether other aspects of 
mentalizing including explicit-focused mentalizing, external-focused mentalizing and 
empathy were also affected by the inpatient admission; however no improvements 
were found in these domains. It is of interest that hypermentalizing was found to be 
„treatable‟ through an inpatient treatment, whereas other more explicit-controlled and 
external-focused forms of mentalizing were not similarly affected, as this may have 
important implications clinically for treatment and intervention. These findings are 
given weight due to the good quality of the research, in particular the use of a 
psychiatric control group, large sample size and the use of measures previously 
found to be reliable and valid. The researchers were also thorough in their 
assessment of BPD, using both a semi-structured interview (CI-BPD) and a self-
report measure (BPFSC), both with good internal consistency as shown by the 
Cronbach‟s alpha levels. Although the pre-post design of this study allows greater 
conclusions to be drawn than the cross-sectional design of the other studies 
reviewed, a more controlled study would still be required that includes a wait-list 
control, in order to fully consider the impact of the mentalization-based treatment on 
hypermentalization. 
The main research aim of Ha et al. (2013) was to examine the construct validity of 
the RFQY. Investigating the relationship between BPD and mentalizing as 
measured by performance on the RFQY was a secondary aim of the study. Of 146 
inpatient participants, it was found that adolescents who scored above clinical cut off 
for BPD, on both self-report and parent-report measures, demonstrated significantly 
poorer reflective function than patients below cut-off. Due to a significant inverse 
relationship between the RFQY and the MASC hypermentalizing sub-scale, it was 
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shown that the poorer reflective functioning of the BPD participants was related to 
mentalizing errors of the hypermentalizing type. This provides further evidence for 
mentalization difficulties in young people, especially on a task which assesses 
internal-focused mentalization. However, as the main aim of the study was to 
examine the construct validity of the RFQY, only basic statistical analysis was used 
to investigate this relationship. 
Kalpakci et al. (2016) investigated the differences between implicit and explicit 
internal-focused mentalization in young people with BPD. They hypothesised that 
young people with BPD would have higher affective empathy, which is related to 
more implicit mentalizing, and reduced cognitive empathy, which is associated with 
explicit mentalizing, due to the hypothesis that young people with BPD have more 
difficulties in the domain of explicit mentalizing (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). In an 
inpatient sample, BPD adolescents (n=107) had significantly higher affective 
empathy than non-BPD adolescents (n=145), supporting the theory that young 
people with BPD may have greater levels of affective empathy than those without 
BPD (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Additionally, hypermentalizing was found to be 
related to reduced cognitive empathy in BPD patients, but not in non-BPD patients. 
However, within the BPD group, adolescents were found to in fact have higher 
levels overall of cognitive than affective empathy. How can we make sense of this 
finding, given the previous hypothesis that BPD adolescents would have deficits in 
cognitive empathy? The quality of the study was good; with adequate power and the 
use of standardised assessments of BPD and mentalization measures that have 
been proven reliable and valid. One possibility is that if there are cognitive empathy 
mentalizing deficits in individuals with BPD, that these only become apparent in the 
context of intense emotional arousal such as is seen within intimate relationships 
(Fonagy et al., 2002). Therefore activation of the attachment system and the 
ensuing emotional dysregulation may be required to cause individuals with BPD to 
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drop the more effortful cognitive mentalization and rely upon affective mentalization 
(Sharp, 2014). It is possible that a research setting does not provide a sufficiently 
emotionally arousing environment to disrupt cognitive mentalizing in young people 
with BPD.  
Therefore these findings using measures which assess internal-focused mentalizing 
add support to the theory that young people with BPD utilise unusual mentalizing 
strategies, such as hypermentalizing, rather than no mentalizing at all or the 
suppression of mentalizing. Across these studies, BPD participants were found to 
make errors with mentalizing that were associated with making overly complex 
inferences as to others‟ mental states.   
 
Discussion 
The aim of the current review was to investigate the relationship between BPD in 
young people and mentalizing. It was hoped that this review would provide some 
clarity on the fairly heterogeneous results which have materialised from studies 
within this relatively new area of research. Despite increasing evidence for the 
disruption of mentalizing abilities in young people with BPD, reflecting the findings 
with adults with BPD, the exact nature of these difficulties remains unclear. The 
multi-faceted nature of mentalizing, with differing hypotheses as to the aspects 
which are most affected in BPD, alongside the wide range of various mentalizing 
measures used by the studies, have contributed to the challenges involved in 
reviewing findings in this area. However, the increasing amount of research being 
carried out into mentalizing difficulties in young people with BPD illustrates the 
growing interest in this topic, particularly given the potential clinical implications that 
the research has for the treatment of BPD in adolescence.  
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Summary of Findings 
There were mixed results from studies which investigated mentalizing using 
measures which assess the external-focused aspects of mentalizing. In community 
studies, one study found no differences in emotion recognition between high-BPD 
and low-BPD groups (Fossati et al., 2012). Another study found that although high-
BPD participants were no different than low-BPD participants at recognising neutral 
or positive stimuli, that they were more accurate at recognising stimuli of a negative 
emotional valence (Scott et al., 2011).  
In clinical samples, one study found no significant differences in either accuracy or 
sensitivity in emotion recognition between BPD adolescents and controls (Jovev et 
al., 2011). Similarly, Robin et al. (2012) found showed no differences between BPD 
participants and controls in the accuracy of recognising fully expressed emotions, 
however the BPD group were found to be significantly less sensitive at identifying 
certain emotions. In contrast, Berenschot et al. (2012) found that young people with 
personality pathology showed an enhanced emotion accuracy and sensitivity over 
controls, however, no impact of emotional valence was found.  
Again, mixed results were found when reviewing studies which assessed internal-
focused mentalizing. In a study which assessed internal and self-focused aspects of 
mentalizing in a community sample, Fossati et al. (2011) found that higher number 
of BPD symptoms was significantly associated with lower mentalizing.  
Turning to internal-focused mentalizing in clinical samples, Jennings et al. (2012) 
found that BPD participants had significantly lower social perspective coordination 
scores, which was used to operationalise internal-focused mentalization, than the 
control group. However, Hessels et al. (2016) found no significant correlations 
between severity of BPD pathology and the SIP factor that most resembles 
mentalizing. Kalpakci et al. (2016) looked specifically at the differences in cognitive 
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and affective empathy in adolescents with BPD. It was found BPD participants had 
significantly higher levels of affective empathy than controls, however that within the 
BPD group, adolescents were in fact found to have higher levels overall of cognitive 
than affective empathy. 
Some of the studies reviewed used measures of mentalization (e.g. the MASC), 
which provide a more detailed description of the different types of mentalizing 
difficulties; rather than just identifying the absence or presence of mentalizing, the 
measure is able to identify the use of specific mentalizing strategies, such as 
hypermentalizing. Ha et al. (2013) found that greater number of BPD symptoms was 
associated with poorer reflective functioning and that this poorer reflective function 
suggested mentalizing errors of the hypermentalizing type. Two studies further 
demonstrated that mentalizing in adolescents with BPD seems to reflect 
hypermentalizing (Sharp et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2016). Additionally, Sharp et al. 
(2013) found that BPD inpatient adolescents (n=66) displayed significantly greater 
hypermentalizing than psychiatric controls (n=98) at admission and that following a 
mentalization-based treatment; hypermentalizing reduction was most pronounced in 
the BPD group.  
 
Conclusions relating to findings 
The findings of this review seem to reflect similar findings to those which have 
previously been observed with adults; that research into the relationship between 
mentalizing and BPD symptomology produces varied results. However, in order to 
make meaning from these results, it is necessary for the quality of the studies to be 
reviewed and the mentalizing measures to be inspected. This allows the specific 
aspects of mentalization that are being assessed by these measures to be 
identified, as this seems to have an important effect on findings.  
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Turning back to Sharp‟s (2014) model of mentalizing difficulties in BPD, it is 
proposed that difficulties in mentalizing occur in the context of inter-personal 
situations which lead to arousal of the attachment system. Also, difficulties with 
mentalizing occur in situations where higher-order mentalizing, that is the integration 
of both implicit and explicit mentalizing, is required, as opposed to situations which 
rely solely on implicit mentalizing. Additionally, mentalizing difficulties that do occur 
are of the hypermentalizing type.  
In support of this model, this review found that the majority of mentalizing difficulties 
associated with BPD symptomology in young people were found on tasks which 
assessed explicit and internal-focused mentalizing, as opposed to implicit and 
external-focused mentalizing. This would therefore support the theory that in young 
people with BPD, it is the more explicit and internal-focused aspects of mentalizing 
which are most disrupted (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Studies which assessed explicit 
aspects of mentalizing had more varied results and this may help us to understand 
why some of these studies failed to find any relationship between BPD 
symptomology and mentalizing difficulties. Additionally, studies which used 
measures such as the MASC and RFQY, which are able to identify the use of 
unusual mentalizing strategies, such as hypermentalizing, as opposed to simply 
measuring the degree of mentalizing, were able to identify that the main type of 
mentalizing errors associated in BPD with adolescence was hypermentalizing. 
Again, this provides support for the theory that young people with BPD resort to the 
use of the implicit, impression-driven mentalizing pathway which is dominated by 
reflexive assumptions about internal states and leads to errors of the 
hypermentalizing type (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Sharp, 2014). Such errors are likely 
to only become apparent on tasks such as the MASC, where participants are asked 
to reflect consciously on the internal experiences of themselves and others. Findings 
in support of this hypothesis appear clinically valid; many of the traits associated 
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with BPD, such as hypersensitivity, hypervigilance and a focus on negative stimuli 
can be understood in line with this view of hypermentalizing.  
Additionally, some of the variance between findings may be due to the suggestion 
that in BPD, it is the activation of the attachment system that inhibits explicit 
mentalizing and leads to hypermentalizing (Sharp, 2014). It may be that certain 
mentalizing tasks are more inter-personally stressful in nature and therefore more 
likely to lead to activation of the attachment system, contributing to the ensuing 
difficulties in mentalizing. This relationship between emotional arousal and inhibition 
of explicit mentalizing in individuals with BPD may explain the ability to perform 
certain experimental mentalizing tasks, due to not being highly emotionally aroused 
in such a situation (Arntz et al., 2009). It would be helpful in future research to 
potentially assess the extent to which mentalizing tasks activate the attachment 
system. 
 
Summary of limitations and further recommendations 
Defining and measuring mentalizing 
When considering the findings of the studies reviewed, it is important to examine 
and appraise the limitations of the research. Firstly, the complexities involved in the 
definition and measurement of a multi-faceted and complex concept such as 
mentalizing have become apparent over the course of this review. Of importance, it 
has been observed that the aspect of mentalizing that is assessed by a measure 
has important implications relating to the findings. This differentiation as to which 
aspect of mentalization was being assessed by tasks was not always clear across 
studies.  
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A limitation relating to the assessment of mentalizing in the studies reviewed, 
concerns the lack of ecological validity of the measures; the measures used are 
unable to fully resemble real-life situations. Sharp et al. (2011) concluded that even 
the more advanced tests of mentalization, such as the MASC, still tend to measure 
only singular aspects of mentalization and cannot completely assess the complexity 
of different types of mentalization which fully resemble the demands and 
characteristics of social cognition in everyday life. An issue related to this lack of 
ecological validity is that the mentalization tasks do not account for emotional 
arousal, which it seems may play a key role in the disruption of mentalization 
abilities in adolescents with BPD (Sharp, 2014). It is likely that such highly structured 
research tasks, where participants are asked to explicitly reflect on a hypothetical 
situation, may not activate their attachment system. This provides an obstacle in the 
assessment on mentalizing in young people with BPD.  
 
Study design and sample 
Methodological issues have also limited the conclusions that can be drawn from 
these studies. When considering study design, it must be noted that the majority of 
research has been cross-sectional, which although provides a cost effective and 
relatively straightforward method of investigating associations between BPD and 
mentalizing in young people, means that conclusions about causation cannot be 
drawn. Samples have often been small and in some of the studies were made up of 
non-clinical groups of students, reducing generalisability. None of the studies 
reported power analyses as a statistical method in order to determine sample size. 
Future studies would benefit from larger sample sizes, as this would increase the 
ability to detect small associations. Additionally, not all of the studies utilised a 
clinical comparison group, which is important in this area of research, due to the 
high levels of co-morbidity typical in young people with BPD (Chanen et al., 2008). 
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The review found that the assessment of BPD symptomology varied across studies, 
with different studies using different methods to assess BPD. The validity of self-
report questionnaires, versus the use of semi-structured clinical interviews, versus 
non-standardised clinical decision making has been questioned. The use of semi-
structured interviews to assess BPD symptomology may be helpful in tracking the 
stability of features over time and may further clarify and evaluate the level of 
difficulties the young person is experiencing, however although such interviews may 
assist in increasing inter-rater reliability, they often show poor convergent validity 
and test-retest reliability (Zimmerman, 1994). Additionally, across studies the criteria 
and cut-offs used to define BPD status varied. This meant that the severity of BPD 
symptomology was found to vary across studies. This has implications for the 
findings, as it is likely that BPD severity may play a role in mentalization abilities 
(Jovev et al., 2011).  
 
Clinical Implications 
There are important clinical implications associated with research into the 
relationship between mentalizing and BPD symptomology in young people. The 
developmental nature of BPD means that identifying difficulties that may contribute 
to or maintain BPD, such as mentalizing difficulties, is crucial in both the formulation 
and treatment of BPD. Additionally understanding the nature of the mentalizing 
difficulties experienced is important. As it appears that the findings of this review at 
least partially support Sharp‟s (2014) model of mentalizing difficulties in individuals 
with BPD, this could help to provide direction for intervention with young people with 
BPD. This may include interventions relating to managing arousal of the attachment 
system and formulating specific strategies to recognise and target hypermentalizing. 
Indeed Bateman & Fonagy‟s Mentalization Based Therapy (MBT) aims to reinstate 
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mentalizing when it goes offline and uses strategies to maintain healthy mentalizing 
in circumstances that may lead to the use of unusual mentalizing strategies such as 
hypermentalizing (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). It is also the case that in MBT some 
interventions are specifically designed to create arousal of the attachment system 
and then within this controlled environment, to help patient maintain healthy 
mentalizing strategies, as opposed to moving towards hypermentalizing, for 
example by the therapist and patient together „mentalizing the transference‟ 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). 
 Additionally, when considering the therapeutic relationship, if young people with 
BPD tend to make mentalizing errors of the hypermentalizing type, it is important to 
acknowledge this high sensitivity to social cues. This for example would have 
important implications for therapists when undertaking psychotherapy with young 
people with BPD, not only in recognising that this is a potential area for therapeutic 
intervention, but also when considering how the adolescent with BPD is likely to 
experience the therapeutic relationship. 
 
Conclusions  
Although initial research seemed to provide evidence for a relationship between 
BPD symptomology and deficits in mentalizing in young people, more recently, as 
more complex measures of mentalizing such as the MASC have been developed, 
the relationship between BPD and the use of unusual mentalizing strategies, such 
as hypermentalizing have been found. Hypermentalizing appears to be the result of 
an over-reliance of the automatic and implicit route to mentalizing, when more 
explicit and internal-focused routes to mentalizing are disrupted due to the activation 
of the attachment system (Sharp, 2014). The resultant hypermentalizing and over-
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interpretation of mental states can help us to understand some of the difficulties that 
have been observed clinically in the social relationships of young people with BPD. 
However, further research is needed in order to further clarify these findings and 
hypotheses. Research findings are not consistent and it needs to be clarified as to 
whether these inconsistencies are due to methodological limitations or due to 
theories needing to be further developed. The complex nature of mentalization and 
its multi-faceted structure needs to be acknowledged, as the aspects of 
mentalization assessed during a study are likely to impact on findings. Additionally, 
the challenges associated with measuring such a complex construct should be 
considered. Future research should aim to develop further standardised and 
ecologically valid mentalization tasks, designed to measure different aspects of 
mentalization. It would be beneficial if measures were able to assess activation of 
the attachment system, as this is likely to have an impact on mentalization abilities 
(Fonagy & Bateman, 2008). Additionally, future research should also address the 
methodological limitations highlighted in this review and include larger samples, 
clearer definition of BPD status in young people and the use of clinical control 
groups. 
Currently there is insufficient evidence to determine the precise nature of 
mentalizing deficits in young people with BPD. However, there is a need to achieve 
a greater understanding as to how these difficulties in mentalizing impact on young 
peoples‟ everyday lived experiences. This research has crucial implications 
clinically, in helping to understand the developmental trajectory of BPD and 
determining areas for intervention in the treatment of young people with BPD. Early 
intervention in these areas might be particularly important in determining the 
developmental trajectory of BPD and directing interventions in order to prevent the 
interpersonal difficulties which can become engrained in adult borderline personality 
disorder.  
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Abstract 
 
Aims 
It has been proposed that at the core of the problems experienced by adolescents 
with BPD lies reduced levels of epistemic trust and a stance of epistemic 
hypervigilance. The aim of this study was to explore the relationship between BPD 
symptomology and epistemic trust in adolescents. Additionally, associations 
between epistemic trust, psychopathology and relationship difficulties were also 
investigated. 
Method 
A sample of 79 adolescents completed a battery of measures in order to assess 
BPD symptomology, psychopathology and relationship difficulties. Participants also 
completed two trust tasks in order to assess epistemic trust. 
Results 
Correlational analyses found contrary to prediction, that there was no significant 
relationship between BPD symptomology and epistemic trust. Regression analyses 
provided support for inverse associations between psychopathology and epistemic 
trust and relationship difficulties and epistemic trust. However, these associations 
were only found on one of the two epistemic trust measures used. 
Conclusions 
In contrast to hypotheses, no support was found to support the relationship between 
greater levels of BPD symptomology being related to lower levels of epistemic trust. 
Psychopathology and relationship difficulties may be associated with reduced levels 
of epistemic trust; however this association needs to be further investigated due to 
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this finding only being apparent on one of the measures used. Additionally, further 
research is recommended in order to develop standardised measures to assess 
epistemic trust.  
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Introduction 
 
Borderline Personality Disorder in adolescents 
The long-debated question as to whether Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
should be diagnosed in childhood and adolescence is a controversial one.  
Traditionally, critics have felt that the negative consequences of making such a 
diagnosis, including the associated stigma and concerns relating to the instability of 
symptoms over time, suggested that a BPD diagnosis in childhood was 
contraindicated (Bernstein et al., 1993). However, more recently it has been 
proposed that the features of BPD; which include difficulties with interpersonal 
relationships, emotional dysregulation, behavioural impulsivity and identity 
disturbances can be adequately assessed during childhood and that such a 
diagnosis along with the correct targeted intervention, may help to reduce the 
occurrence of the long-term difficulties associated with adult personality disorder 
(Chanen et al., 2008). 
 
Mentalizing difficulties, epistemic trust and BPD 
Fonagy‟s developmental model of BPD suggests that underlying the symptomology 
observed in BPD are difficulties with mentalizing (Fonagy, 1991). It has additionally 
been proposed that the development of mentalizing abilities, which appears to be 
disrupted in some way in individuals with BPD, may be contingent on epistemic trust 
(Fonagy & Allison, 2014).  
Mentalizing refers to the process by which we are able to identify and reflect on the 
internal mental states, such as beliefs, wishes and emotions, of both oneself and 
others in order to give meaning to and understand the drivers behind behaviour 
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(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). Mentalizing abilities are first developed within the 
attachment relationship through the process of the care-giver accurately mirroring 
the mental states of the child. This experience allows the child to form and 
internalise this second-order representation of the caregiver‟s representation of the 
child‟s mind, allowing the child to start to develop a coherent sense of self, based on 
this marked and contingent mirroring from the caregiver (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & 
Target, 2002).  
Mentalizing helps us to make meaning of human behaviour and consequently is 
important in allowing us to perceive and interpret the behaviour of both ourselves 
and others; which is essential for conducting appropriate social interactions and 
developing interpersonal relationships, as well as moderating our emotional 
responses to such situations; all of which are so often observed to cause difficulties 
for individuals with BPD (Bateman & Fonagy, 2003). Additionally, alongside allowing 
us to be able to understand and tolerate social interaction, mentalizing allows us to 
benefit from these interactions in a meaningful way, through the development of 
rewarding social relationships (Fonagy, Luyten & Allison, 2015). 
Mentalizing is a broad and multi-faceted construct (Fonagy &Luyten, 2009). 
Research into the mentalizing abilities of adolescents with BPD has produced varied 
results, with some studies suggesting reduced mentalizing abilities in adolescents 
with BPD (Robin et al., 2012; Jennings, Hulbert, Jackson & Chanen, 2012), whilst 
others showed enhanced mentalizing abilities (Scott, Levy, Adams & Stevenson, 
2011) . However, most recently it has been suggested that mentalizing difficulties in 
adolescents with BPD seem to be due to the use of unusual mentalizing strategies, 
rather than the loss of mentalizing abilities per se, namely the use of 
hypermentalizing (Dziobek et al., 2006). Hypermentalizing, also known as an 
excessive theory of mind, is a social-cognitive process by which observations about 
other‟s mental states go beyond what is actually observable; leading to the over-
81 
 
attribution of mental states and consequently, their misinterpretation, which then 
negatively impacts the individual and contributes to emotional dysregulation 
(Dziobek et al., 2006). Several studies have now shown this link between 
hypermentalizing and BPD symptomology in adolescents (Sharp et al., 2011; Sharp 
et al., 2013; Sharp et al., 2016). Sharp (2014) produced a model to explain 
mentalizing in individuals with BPD. The model proposes that for individuals with 
BPD, stressful interpersonal interactions lead to activation of the attachment system 
and ensuing emotional arousal, which causes the individual to drop explicit and 
controlled mentalizing and to rely instead on implicit and automatic mentalizing, 
which results in hypermentalizing. Hypermentalizing causes misinterpretation of the 
mental states of others, which in turn can lead to further difficult inter-personal and 
social interactions. 
As described previously, it is hypothesised that the mentalizing difficulties observed 
in BPD may be related to problems with epistemic trust, as epistemic trust is likely to 
be important for the development of mentalizing abilities (Fonagy & Allison, 
2014).Epistemic trust refers to the trust that one has that information being relayed 
to them from others is trustworthy, reliable and should be incorporated (Fonagy & 
Allison, 2014). On the opposite end of the spectrum, „epistemic vigilance‟ is a 
naturally selected stance that individuals may take to protect themselves from being 
misled by unreliable information.  
 
The development of epistemic trust within the attachment relationship 
Attachment is defined as a strong and enduring bond between a child and their 
primary caregiver which starts in infancy and continues to shape interpersonal 
relationships throughout life (Bowlby, 1973). Epistemic trust is first developed within 
the attachment relationship where, with the assistance of the caregiver, the child first 
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starts to discover their own identity and form an understanding of the self, the other 
and the world. Part of this process also involves the development of the ability to 
mentalize.  
The strength and richness of human cognitive abilities makes humans exceptional 
among animals and the greatness of these abilities is partly due to the extent to 
which humans are able to learn from social information which is communicated to 
them directly by others, as opposed to having to learn every new skill or piece of 
knowledge through direct experience (Sperber et al., 2010). In a world where there 
is a constant stream of novel information, epistemic trust permits the recipient to 
know that the information being communicated is reliable, relevant and useful to 
them and therefore is worth integrating into their lives (Sperber et al., 2010). 
Therefore, epistemic trust is requisite for social learning to take place; to allow the 
transmission of knowledge and cultural skills that are passed on between the 
generations, including the development of mentalizing abilities (Fonagy & Allison, 
2014). Fonagy and Allison (2014) propose that it is the attachment relationship that 
is extremely important in creating the appropriate conditions under which epistemic 
trust is able to flourish; optimizing social learning and the transmission of 
generalizable and relevant cultural knowledge. 
Csibra and Gergely (2009) put forward a theory to describe these appropriate 
conditions under which social learning occurs; natural pedagogy.  In terms of 
survival, humans are driven to communicate and pass on information that is 
culturally and personally relevant. Csibra and Gergely (2009) suggest that humans 
use cues called ostensive cues (first described by Russell, 1940) to let the 
addressee know when they are about to be passed such culturally relevant 
information, which needs to be attended to. Ostensive cues may include eye 
contact, mirroring, reactivity or a particular tone of voice. In the attachment 
relationship, this type of communication allows the child to know that the parent is 
attending to them, has the child‟s mind in mind and is acting in their best interest. 
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Therefore ostensive cues, which are an important component of the attachment 
relationship, trigger epistemic trust, which allows the individual to know that the 
forthcoming information should be attended to and incorporated (Fonagy & Allison, 
2014). 
The quality of the attachment relationship is therefore important in the development 
of epistemic trust and thus social learning. Much research has previously looked at 
the relationship between secure attachment and the marked mirroring and 
appropriate responding of care givers to their children, with more secure attachment 
being correlated with a greater amount of marked mirroring and responding 
(Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007). Therefore, when mirroring and the use of 
ostensive cues are in place, which is more likely to occur within a secure attachment 
relationship, epistemic trust ensures that we can open what is referred to as an 
„epistemic superhighway‟ of learning, which signals readiness for new knowledge to 
be acquired through social learning and reduces epistemic vigilance, therefore 
allowing for information to be passed on from generation to generation (Fonagy & 
Allison, 2014).  
However, it may be that in the context of abusive, neglectful or mistuned attachment 
relationships that the child learns that actually the care-giver is not acting in their 
best interests. In such a context, the misuse of ostensive cueing may lead the child 
to expect the transfer of information or knowledge that is personally relevant to 
them, which is then followed instead by the transmission of knowledge that it 
disruptive or even destructive (Fonagy, Luyten & Allison, 2013). It makes sense that 
in such a situation that the epistemic trust mechanism be switched off, and for the 
child to become mistrustful. Indeed, developmental adversity and trauma within the 
attachment relationship have been found to lead to a loss of trust (Allen, 2013). 
Consequently, when an individual is in a state of epistemic mistrust, they are likely 
to view new information with a stance of suspicion and are unlikely to take on this 
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new information (Fonagy & Allison, 2014). Although serving a protective function, 
this epistemic mistrust is likely to also bring with it implications for the individual‟s 
social learning, including the development of mentalizing abilities, in turn having far-
reaching implications for many aspects of life and later relationships. Research by 
Corriveau et al. (2009) demonstrated this link between attachment security and 
epistemic trust, with the more insecure/disorganised the attachment relationship, the 
less likely the child was to trust in information from others. In this longitudinal study, 
which investigated children‟s trust in naming novel stimuli based on guidance 
relayed to them from both their mother and a stranger, it was found that children 
who had been securely attached infants were most likely to trust their mothers, as 
long as their claims were reasonably credible, but also felt able to agree with the 
stranger (and their own perception) when the guidance from their mother was 
counterintuitive. In contrast, children with a disorganised attachment tended to 
mistrust information both from their own experience as well as from the mother‟s 
and the stranger‟s views. This may suggest a lack of trust towards all sources, which 
would be characteristic of a state of epistemic hypervigilance, while at the same time 
having little faith in their own judgements. 
Therefore, in summary, attachment is the condition under which epistemic trust is 
first developed. Ostensive cues are used to trigger epistemic trust, which in turn 
elicits a special kind of attention to social information from the child, allowing social 
learning to occur (Fonagy et al., 2015). Epistemic trust refers to the trust that the 
child has that information relayed to them from the adult is trustworthy (Fonagy & 
Allison, 2014). On the opposite end of the spectrum, „epistemic vigilance‟ is a 
naturally selected stance that individuals may take to protect themselves from being 
misled by unreliable information. It may be advantageous under many 
circumstances to develop mistrust as to the reliability and trustworthiness of the 
information being passed to one, but such an attitude would reduce the likelihood of 
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incorporating new information into semantic or procedural memory (Fonagy & 
Allison, 2014).  
 
Epistemic Mistrust and BPD 
It has been suggested that the psychopathology seen in BPD may be due to 
problems with attachment, mentalizing and epistemic trust (Fonagy et al., 2015). 
There has been considerable research into the attachment difficulties associated 
with BPD and the difficulties observed in mentalizing, however recently it has been 
suggested that epistemic trust may also play an important role in this relationship 
(Fonagy & Allison, 2014). It has been shown that trust may be undermined or 
extinguished by trauma within the attachment relationship (Allen, 2013). Indeed, 
disturbed attachments are central to BPD, with a strong association between BPD 
and insecure and disorganised internal working models of attachment (Agrawal, 
Gunderson, Holmes & Lyons-Ruth, 2004).  
Fonagy et al. (2015) proposed that impairments in epistemic trust, potentially due to 
difficulties with the early attachment relationship, mean that individuals with BPD are 
in a state of epistemic mistrust, which in turn means that the epistemic super-
highway, which is needed for social learning, is closed. This means that individuals 
are less able to benefit and learn from the social environment, including being able 
to develop mentalizing abilities, leading to the instability and rigidity that is frequently 
associated with BPD (Fonagy et al., 2015). Reliance on insufficiently developed 
mentalizing strategies, such as hypermentalizing, can lead to misinterpretations of 
the actions of others as being harmful or malevolent (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). 
These social cognitive impairments and the resultant impact on inter-personal 
interactions further exacerbate mistrust in individuals with BPD (Fonagy et al., 
2015). BPD can therefore be understood as a failure of communication and learning 
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within relationships, with BPD being representative of a state of necessitated social 
isolation, created by epistemic mistrust (Fonagy & Allison, 2014). 
There is a lack of research specifically investigating the association between 
epistemic trust and BPD symptomology in adolescents. A small amount of research 
has been carried out in this area using adult participants, however this has tended to 
focus more on the relationship between BPD symptomology and trust and 
cooperation more generally, rather than epistemic trust specifically. However, these 
findings are still likely to provide us with useful information, due to the overlap 
between the constructs of trust and epistemic trust. Research by  Nicol, Pope, 
Sprengelmeyer, Young, and Hall (2013) used a facial stimuli task to assess trust, 
asking adult BPD participants and control participants to rate the trustworthiness of 
facial stimuli. It was found that BPD participants viewed faces as being less 
trustworthy than the healthy controls did.  
Other studies have used monetary trust game paradigms to assess trust. The Trust 
Game (TG; King-Cassas et al., 2008) is a neuro-economics based task with the aim 
of making as much virtual money as possible through interactions with a partner. In 
the game an investor (the participant) plays several rounds of a task in which on 
each round they are able to give away up to £20 to a trustee partner. The trustee 
can either be played by another participant or computer generated responses can 
be used. On the trustee receiving the money, the amount is tripled, before the 
trustee then decides how much to send back to the investor. The more trusting and 
cooperative the investor is, that is the greater the amount of money they choose to 
send over to the trustee, the greater the monetary gains on both sides. At a point 
during the game, the trustee defects and does not pay back at least the amount of 
money invested by the investor, meaning there has been no benefit for the investor 
in this transaction. It is of interest, once this has occurred, to see whether 
participants attempt to repair the relationship by maintaining high investments, or 
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whether they then become mistrustful, with reduced investments. Using this 
paradigm, King-Casas et al. (2008) investigated the amount of trust that BPD 
participants had in their partners, by examining the amount of money they chose to 
invest, as well as examining the abilities of BPD participants to maintain stable 
relationships throughout the task. It was found that throughout the game, BPD 
participants repeatedly showed a tendency to invest less money than controls. 
Participants with BPD were also observed to be less inclined to repair the broken 
relationship following a defecting experience than controls. Similar findings were 
found by Unoka et al. (2009), also using the Trust Game paradigm, where it was 
found that adults with BPD gave away smaller amounts of money across the game 
when compared to both healthy controls and to a depression control group. 
Additionally, it was found that whereas controls increased their investments over the 
course of the game, that BPD participants failed to develop this trust and 
investments were not found to increase. Again, BPD participants were less likely to 
try and develop and maintain the trusting relationship over the duration of the game. 
These findings were taken to support the theory that patients with BPD exhibit less 
trust during interpersonal interactions than both healthy controls and controls with 
other psychiatric difficulties.  
Bartz et al. (2010) carried out research investigating the effects of oxytocin, a 
neuropeptide which is associated with attachment and trust, as compared to a 
placebo, on trust using the Assurance Game (AG; Kollock, 1998) which is a task 
similar to the Trust Game described previously. It was found that BPD participants in 
the oxytocin condition had significantly lower trust in their partner and were more 
likely to defect and disrupt cooperation as compared to BPD participants in the 
placebo condition. Interestingly, healthy controls showed the opposite effect and 
were more trusting and cooperative in the oxytocin condition.  It was also found that 
BPD patients defected less frequently than controls when they were playing with a 
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partner who they believed was likely to defect, whilst not using the same strategy 
with partners they believe not likely to defect.  This may suggest that BPD 
participants attempt to appease potentially threatening partners (those likely to 
defect). This finding, along with the converse relationship between trust and oxytocin 
to that seen in healthy controls, may reflect the disorganised attachment and 
relationship patterns and the use of unusual relational strategies found in individuals 
with BPD (Holmes, 2004).  
The results from these studies, which were the first to use trust game paradigms in 
order to assess trust in BPD, suggest that mistrust is a typical characteristic of 
patients with BPD. Due to the limited amount of research in this area, it is necessary 
to further test these hypotheses in order to replicate findings in future research. 
 
Measuring epistemic trust 
As epistemic trust is a relatively new and not well researched concept in research 
with adolescents and adults (although there is considerable literature on the concept 
in young children), there are no standardised measures of epistemic trust. Recently, 
a measure designed specifically to assess epistemic trust was developed; the 
Epistemic Trust Instrument (ETI; O‟Connell, 2014). The ETI is a questionnaire based 
measure which provides participants with dilemma situations. In response to these 
dilemmas, the participant is given two conflicting pieces of advice; one from their 
mother, in order to represent the attachment relationships, and one from a stranger 
who is a professional in a job unrelated to the dilemma situation (e.g. a carpenter in 
a medical dilemma). Participants are asked whose advice they are most likely to 
follow, how strongly they trust this person‟s advice and how likely they are to change 
their mind. Therefore this measure provides on overall epistemic trust score in a 
context in which the participant has to learn and make decisions based on advice 
89 
 
from others. The ETI has been used to investigate the relationship between 
epistemic trust and attachment in healthy adults, where it was found that individuals 
with a secure attachment were more likely to choose to follow their mother‟s advice 
than the advice of the stranger (O‟Connell, 2014). Additionally, it was also found that 
those with a secure attachment showed greater trust in their mother‟s advice than 
participants with an insecure attachment. Although the ETI has been used with 
adults and appears to have good face validity as a measure of epistemic trust, it 
needs to be held in mind that the psychometric properties for this measure have not 
yet been formally assessed. 
Additionally, although not specifically designed to assess epistemic trust, due to the 
overlap between the constructs of trust and epistemic trust, it is likely that the Trust 
Game paradigms previously described would provide a good indicator of epistemic 
trust. The Trust Game (King-Casas et al., 2008) has good face validity to act as a 
measure of epistemic trust and has previously been proven to be a reliable and valid 
measure (King-Casas et al., 2008). 
 
Implications 
It is of interest to investigate whether the findings suggesting reduced trust in adults 
with BPD (Nicol et al., 2013; King-Cassas et al., 2008; Unoka et al., 2009) can also 
be extended to adolescents with BPD symptomology. Clinical observations would 
suggest that such a finding may be likely, as trust and cooperation are essential in 
the maintenance of healthy interpersonal relationships, which are so frequently 
disrupted in adolescents with BPD (Miller, Muehlenkamp, & Jacobson, 2008). 
However it is possible that due to the developmental nature of BPD, that difficulties 
in trust may take on a different form in adolescence or may develop later on in the 
course of BPD. Therefore it is important to provide psychological research in order 
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to support such clinical observations and to fully understand the nature of such 
difficulties. It is important to understand the factors that may cause or contribute to a 
disorder; in this case whether epistemic mistrust underlies some of the difficulties 
experienced by adolescents with BPD,in part by limiting the development of 
appropriate mentalizing skills and leading instead to a reliance on hypermentalizing 
(Sharp et al., 2013). Once this has been established, a focus for intervention can 
then start to be developed, for example through targeting epistemic mistrust in 
treatment and intervention.  
Epistemic mistrust also has important implications for the formulation and treatment 
of BPD using psychological therapy. If within a therapeutic environment a client is in 
a state of epistemic mistrust, then social learning through attending to and 
incorporating new information, which is an important component of psychological 
therapy, is unlikely to occur. This increases the likelihood of an unsatisfactory 
therapeutic outcome for the individual, as they are unlikely to be able to incorporate 
the new information and experiences learnt in therapy (Fonagy & Allison, 2014). 
However, if through the experience of being mentalized by the therapist, the client is 
able to feel understood in therapy, this may restore epistemic trust; allowing learning 
about both the self and others from social experience and also regenerating the 
ability to mentalize (Fonagy & Allison, 2014). It has been described that „the 
experience of feeling thought about in therapy makes us feel safe enough to think 
about ourselves in relation to our world, and to learn something new about that 
world and how we operate in it‟ (Fonagy & Allison, 2014, p.375).  
 
Aims and Objectives 
In summary, it has been hypothesised that epistemic trust develops within the 
context of a secure attachment relationship and allows the child to adopt a flexible 
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approach to new information and knowledge. In turn this allows social learning to 
occur, including the passing on and development of mentalizing skills and other 
cultural knowledge. Conversely, an insecure attachment or trauma within the 
attachment relationship, as is often seen in individuals with BPD, is more likely to 
lead to the child developing a stance of epistemic vigilance. Due to this mistrustful 
stance, the child is less likely to take in and incorporate new information during 
social learning, including the development of mentalizing abilities and is likely to 
continue to take on this mistrustful stance in future relationships. 
The present study aims to conduct research for the first time into the relationship 
between BPD symptomology and epistemic trust in adolescents. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) defines adolescence as the transitional stage of growth 
between childhood and adulthood, and as being between the age of 10 and 19 
years (World Health Organisation; WHO, 1986). This study will use an adolescent 
sample rather than a „young people‟ sample, which refers to individuals between the 
age of 10 and 24 years (WHO, 1986), due to wishing to focus specifically on 
adolescents and due to the age parameters of participants at the participating 
clinical sites. 
 This study will build on the previous research which has been conducted into the 
relationship between BPD and trust in adults, which has highlighted a relationship 
between BPD and difficulites with trust. Clinically, it is often observed that 
adolescents with BPD have difficulty trusting others, including their therapists in 
clinical settings, with implications for a wide range of relationships, including the 
therapuetic relationship. It is important to investigate whether these clinical 
observations translate into research findings. The use of tasks such as the Trust 
Game can help this to be achieved and the development of a task specifically 
designed to investigate epistemic trust; the ETI, is likely to be particularly helpful in 
moving research in this area forwards. 
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Based on the hypotheses by Fonagy et al. (2015) that adults with BPD have 
impairments in epistemic trust, as well as findings that adults with BPD have lower 
levels of trust than healthy controls (King-Casas et al., 2008; Unoka et al., 2009) it is 
hypothesised that similar epistemic trust impairments will be related to severity of 
BPD symptomology in adolescents. That is, that greater severity of BPD 
symptomology will be associated with lower levels of epistemic trust. Following on 
from the findings by Unoka et al. (2009), that trust impairements were found in 
individuals with BPD but not in healthy or depressed controls, it is hypothesised that 
any impaiments in epistmic trust will be specifically due to BPD symptomology and 
not to psychopathology in general. Lastly, it appears that it is interpersonal 
relationships that are key when observing these impairments in trust, as all of the 
studies reviewed used a relational paradigm to assessing trust. This coincides with 
clinical observations that individuals with BPD often have difficulties with trust in 
interpersonal relationships. Therefore, it is hypothesised that there will be an 
association between relationship difficulties and impairments in epistemic trust .  
 
Hypotheses 
1. There will be an inverse correlational relationship between BPD 
symptomology and epistemic trust; more severe BPD symptomology will be 
associated with lower levels of epistemic trust. 
2. The relationship between BPD symptomology and epistemic trust will be 
specific to BPD and not due to psychopathology more generally. 
3. There will be an inverse correlational relationship between relationship 
difficulties and epistemic trust; greater relationship difficulties will be 
associated with lower levels of epistemic trust. 
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Method 
 
Research Design 
This study employed a cross-sectional design to assess the relationship between 
epistemic trust and severity of BPD symptoms, psychopathology and extent of 
relationship difficulties in adolescents. Participants completed a battery of self-report 
measures and epistemic trust tasks and correlational and regression analyses were 
used to examine the association between these variables. 
Participants 
This study included 79 adolescent participants with an age range of 12-19 years. In 
order to attempt to ensure that participants with a wide range of BPD symptomology 
were included in the study, adolescents were recruited from both clinical and 
community settings.  
The community recruitment was carried out using opportunity sampling and 
snowballing. Although recruitment was advertised through schools associated with 
the Anna Freud Centre, response to these adverts were poor and initial participants 
were recruited through opportunity sampling as acquaintances of the researchers 
who were interested in participating in the study. Further participants were then 
recruited by snowballing and through word of mouth from volunteers who had 
already agreed to participate in the study. Recruitment occurred across a range of 
areas in the South of England.  
The sample recruited from clinical settings were recruited through two NHS 
specialist adolescent services in England. Young people at both services were 
receiving treatment for a range of mental health difficulties.  
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Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Eligibility criteria included the following; all participants were to be aged 12-19 years 
old, be fluent in written and spoken English and were to be able to attend the 
scheduled assessment sessions. Exclusion criteria included previous diagnosis of 
learning disability, psychotic episode or head injury.  
 
Sample Size and Statistical Power 
Power analysis for this study was informed by prior work by Sharp et al., (2011). In 
this study the authors investigated mentalizing abilities in adolescents with 
borderline traits. This study was used to inform the power analysis as at this stage 
there is no previous research investigating the relationship between epistemic trust 
and BPD in adolescents. However, as the constructs of epistemic trust and 
mentalizing are closely related, it was expected that similar trends would occur in 
the findings. Sharp et al., (2011) used a correlational design to investigate the 
relationship between BPD traits and hypermentalizing in adolescents. A significant 
relationship was found with an effect size of d = 0.41 (medium). A power calculation 
was carried out using the “G*Power 3” computer program (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & 
Buchner, 2007), for a multiple regression analysis examining predictors of epistemic 
trust with 2 predictor variables, which were hypothesised to be BPD symptomology 
& relationship difficulties. With a multiple regression model with an alpha of 0.5, a 
power of 0.8 and specifying a medium effect size of 0.15, the required sample size 
was estimated at 74 participants. 
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Measures 
Epistemic Trust 
The Epistemic Trust Instrument (ETI; O’Connell, 2014).The ETI (Appendix B) is a 
new measure, which has been used for research purposes once previously, 
investigating the relationship between epistemic trust and attachment (O‟Connell, 
2014). The ETI assesses the amount of trust that the participant places in advice 
from either their mother or a stranger in a dilemma situation. The ETI is made up of 
20 dilemma situations, related to various different topics. Following each dilemma, 
participants are provided with two opposing pieces of advice, one from their mother 
and one from a non-informed professional (e.g., a butcher in a medical dilemma 
(see figure 1). Following this information, participants are told to ignore any of their 
own judgements about the situation and to choose to follow one of the two pieces of 
advice by being asked “Which advice do you trust in this situation?” The participant 
is required to decide the person whose advice they would trust and through marking 
the visual analogue scale, to indicate the extent to which they trust this advice, 
ranging from Mildly Trust to Strongly Trust. Participants then move on to another 
question; “How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?” This 
question refers to the likelihood of the participant selecting the other individual‟s 
advice if they were to complete the task again. Therefore from the ETI it can be 
inferred how often the participant chooses to follow their mothers advice versus that 
of the stranger, how great their overall trust is for both their mother and the stranger 
and how likely it is that their trust in the individual‟s advice would change. 
 
Figure 1. An example of a dilemma on the ETI Instrument 
Item 1  
While on vacation, a couple of tourists select out a small speedboat from a variety of 
options. An hour after they set off, a sales assistant in the rental shop says that 
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there is a chance that the boat they are in is prone to mild leaking. Alternatively, 
there is a chance that they are in a different boat that does not leak. The owners are 
unsure whether to spend a lot of money sending out a search team or not.  
 
A butcher advises that they should not send out a search team because in his 
opinion, the boat may hold together until they get back.  
 
Your mother advises that they should send out a search team because in her 
opinion, the boat may not hold together until they get back.  
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation? 
 
Butcher                                                                   Mother 
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------| 
Mildly Trust                       Strongly Trust  Mildly Trust                        Strongly Trust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision? 
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------| 
Very Unlikely                                                                                              Very Likely 
 
 
Trust Game (TG; King-Casas et al., 2008). A ten round version of the Trust Game 
(Appendix C) was used to assess epistemic trust. In this game, participants played 
the role of the investor and were told to imagine that there was an adult in another 
room playing the role of the trustee. All of the rules and instructions of the game 
were made transparent to the participants. The response of the trustee (which was 
primed via an adaptive computer agent) used the „nearest neighbour‟ paradigm as 
described by King-Casas et al., (2008). These responses reflect actual average 
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responses of healthy human participants who have previously played the game in 
the trustee role. The participant (investor) can choose to send up to £20 to the 
trustee per round. This amount is then tripled, before the trustee chooses how much 
to give back to the investor. The greater the amount of money the investor gives to 
the trustee, the more they can potentially earn as long as the trustee reciprocates, 
however there is a risk that the trustee will defect and keep more money for 
themselves. This may to lead to the investor giving away smaller amounts. Trust 
and trustworthiness therefore underlie successful cooperative interactions; 
increased cooperation and trust is associated with increased money exchanged 
across the course of the game. 
 
BPD Symptomology 
The borderline personality disorder features scale for children (BPFSC; Crick, 
Murray-Close & Woods, 2005). The BPFSC (Appendix D)is the only dimensional 
measure to date which was specifically designed to assess borderline personality 
features in children and adolescents, aged 9 and older, and was used to assess 
severity of BPD symptoms. The BPFSC is a 24-item self-report questionnaire with 
responses scored on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 5 
(always true) with higher total scores indicating greater severity of BPD symptoms. 
The measure gives an overall BPD symptomology score, as well as containing 4 
sub-scales; negative relationships, affective instability, self-harm and identity 
problems. Prior research examining the BPFSC with a large community sample (n = 
400) showed high internal consistency (Cronbach α > .76) across 12 months, 
additionally construct validity has been reported (Chang, Sharp & Ha, 2011). In the 
present sample, internal consistency of this measure was good, with a Cronbach‟s 
alpha of .87 for BPFSC total score. Cronbach‟s alpha was also calculated for the 
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subscales; affective instability subscale (α =.76), identity problems (α=.49), negative 
relationships subscale: (α =.73) and self-harm (α =.8). 
 
Psychopathology 
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997). The SDQ 
(Appendix E)is a 25-item brief emotional and behavioural questionnaire for children 
and young people. The SDQ has five behavioural problem sub-scales; emotional 
symptoms, hyperactivity-inattention, conduct problems, peer relationship problems 
and prosocial behaviour. These sub-scales (with prosocial behaviour reversed) can 
then be combined to give a „total difficulties‟ score. The SDQ is a well-established 
measure of psychopathology and has been normed on more than 10,000 subjects, 
with well-constructed norms for both age and gender (Goodman et al., 2003). The 
SDQ has been validated and extensively tested for psychometric properties and 
diagnostic power (Hoelling, Erhart, Ravens-Sieberer & Schlack, 2007). In the 
present sample, internal consistency for the total SDQ score was good with a 
Cronbach‟s alpha of .81. Cronbach‟s alpha was also calculated for the subscales; 
emotional symptoms (α =.65), conduct problems (α=.57), hyperactivity (α =.50), peer 
problematic relationships (α =.69) and prosocial behaviour (α =.65). 
 
Intellectual Ability 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). The WASI 
produces an estimate of general intellectual ability based on two subtests; matrix 
reasoning and vocabulary. The vocabulary subtest consists of 42 items and requires 
individuals to verbally define 4 images and 37 words that are presented to them. 
The Matrix Reasoning subscale consists of 35 items in which the individual is 
presented with an incomplete grid pattern and is asked to choose the correct 
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response to complete the grid from 5 different visual options. The WASI is a tool that 
can provide a quick estimate of an individual's level of intellectual functioning, with 
higher scores indicating higher intellectual ability. The WASI has been normed for 
individuals aged 6 to 89 years. With children, the WASI has shown good reliability 
for the full scale IQ, with α ranging from .95 to .97 (Wechsler, 1999). The WASI has 
also shown good validity; the correlation between the WASI and the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III) is .81 for full scale IQ. 
 
Socio-Economic Status 
Socio-economic status (SES) was assessed based on parental income. SES was 
classified as high or low based on the National Statistics Socio-economic 
Classification (NS-SEC; David & David, 2003). 
 
Procedure 
The recruitment of participants from community settings was granted ethical 
approval by UCL Ethics Committee (Appendix F) and the recruitment of participants 
from clinical settings was granted ethical approval by The National Research Ethics 
Service Committee London - Bloomsbury (Appendix G). Multi-site ethical permission 
to recruit across sites was obtained and local R&D procedures were completed and 
followed.  
Potential participants were identified either by their treating clinician (for participants 
recruited from clinical settings) or through opportunity sampling (for participants 
recruited from community settings). Once a potential participant had expressed an 
interest in taking part in the study, the researchers provided the participant and their 
parents, if the participant was under16 years old, with an information sheet detailing 
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the study aims and procedures (Appendix H). Potential participants were given at 
least 48 hours to consider whether they would like to participate and the researchers 
were contactable in order to discuss this information and to answer any further 
questions or queries. If, having considered the information, the young person still 
wished to participate, the consent procedure was followed. For participants aged 
over 16 years, full informed consent was obtained from the young person (Appendix 
I). For participants younger than 16 years, parental consent (Appendix J) and assent 
from the adolescent (Appendix K) were obtained. 
Testing sessions were conducted either in the participant‟s home (for participants 
from community settings) or within the NHS site in which they were receiving 
treatment (for participants from clinical settings). After meeting the researcher and 
having a chance to ask any further questions, participants completed the battery of 
measures. The testing session took between two and three hours on average, 
including breaks. Participants received a £30 voucher for their time. 
 
Joint project  
In order to maximise recruitment, this study was conducted alongside projects 
conducted by two other trainees investigating the relationship between epistemic 
trust and trauma (Greisbach, 2017) and the relationship between epistemic trust and 
therapy expectations (Reches, 2017). Participants therefore also completed 
questionnaires related to traumatic experiences in childhood and therapy 
expectations as part of the battery of measures. 
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Data Analysis 
Participants‟ scores on the BPFSC, SDQ, WASI and ETI were entered manually into 
an SPSS 22 database along with the participant demographic information that had 
been collected. Data from the Trust Game was automatically collated on MatLab 
and then transferred onto the SPSS database by hand. 
Missing data were identified on the following measures: Trust Game (three 
corrupted files) and SDQ (3 missing data scores). Little‟s MCAR test confirmed that 
all missing values were missing at random (Little, 1988). Therefore, missing values 
were replaced using the expectation maximisation method for the SDQ (Schafer & 
Olson, 1998). Data missing on the Trust Game due to the corrupted files were 
excluded from the analysis. 
Outliers were identified on the following measures: SDQ (1 outlier) and BPFSC 
(1outlier), by examining z-scores and identifying those which were greater than 
three standard deviations from the mean. Outliers were then replaced using 
Winsorizing (Dixon, 196). 
All variables were checked for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, as well 
as by visually inspecting histograms and looking at skewness and kurtosis statistics. 
Although the majority of the data was found to be normally distributed, total scores 
on the SDQ and on one of the SDQ subscales; SDQ peer relationships, were found 
to violate the assumptions of normality: SDQ total (z=.109, p=.025) and SDQ peer 
relationships (z=.144, p=0.001). Due to the non-linear nature of this data, it was 
decided that a transformation of the data would not be the most appropriate option, 
as this would prevent comparison with the original scale. However, the non-
normality of the data was considered when carrying out later analyses.  
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Factor analyses was carried out for both of the epistemic trust measures used in 
order to establish underlying dimensions between measured variables and to reduce 
the number of outcome variables. 
 
Correlational and regression analyses were used to test the study hypotheses in the 
following steps:  
Step 1: A bivariate correlation analysis was conducted between BPD symptomology, 
as measured by BPFSC scores, and epistemic trust, as measured by scores on 
both of the epistemic trust measures.  
Step 2: Significant associations between BPD symptomology and epistemic trust 
were reconsidered whilst controlling for the possible influence of psychopathology, 
as measured by SDQ scores. 
Step 3: A bivariate correlation was carried out between relationship difficulties, as 
assessed by the relationships scores, and epistemic trust, as measured by scores 
on both epistemic trust measures. 
Step 4: With all the above analyses, significant associations were reconsidered 
whilst controlling for possible influence from variables such as age, IQ, SES, gender 
and ethnic origin.  
Step 5: A Multiple hierarchical regression was then carried out to consider the 
unique contributions that both BPFSC relationships difficulty scores and the SDQ 
negative peer relationships scores contributed to epistemic trust as measured by the 
ETI factor. 
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Results 
 
Demographic characteristics 
Table 1 presents demographic information about the participants. The participants 
had a mean age of 15.87 years (SD = 1.95). There were slightly more female 
participants (53%) than male (47%) and the majority of participants were White 
British (85%). More participants were recruited from community (81%) than from 
clinical settings (19%). There were more participants of low SES (73%) than high 
SES (27%). The average IQ of participants was 106.46 (SD = 14.23).  
 
Table 1. Participant demographic information 
 N 
(N=79) 
% 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
 
 
42 
37 
 
53 
47 
Ethnicity 
Minority 
Majority 
 
 
12 
67 
 
15 
85 
SES 
Low 
High 
 
 
58 
21 
 
73 
27 
Recruitment Setting 
Community 
Clinical 
 
64 
15 
 
81 
19 
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Factor Analysis 
Trust Game 
A factor analysis was carried out on the variables produced by the Trust Game. Four 
variables relating to trust were analysed using principal component analysis (see 
Table 2). The analysis yielded one factor explaining a total of 59.89% of the 
variance for the entire set of variables. The Trust Game factor had high loadings of 
the following items; initial investment, second round investment, total investment 
and total earnings. The communalities of the variables included are moderate; initial 
investment (55.9%), second round investment (42.4%), total investment (79.9%) 
and total earnings (61.3%). The KMO measure of sampling adequacy (.688) and the 
Bartlett‟s Test of Sphericity (p<0.01) both indicate that the set of variables are at 
least adequately related for factor analysis. 
 
Table 2. Factor Analysis for Trust Game 
 Loadings Communality 
Initial investment  
Second round investment  
Total investment 
Total earnings 
.748 
.651 
.894 
.783 
.559 
.424 
.799 
.613 
 
Eigenvalue 
Total variance 
 
2.396 
59.891% 
 
 
 
The Trust Game Factor was checked for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test, as well as by visually inspecting histograms and looking at skewness and 
kurtosis statistics. The trust Game factor was found to violate assumptions of 
normality on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (z=.148, p=<0.01) and inspection of the 
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histogram found the data to be slightly negatively skewed. Due to the nature of this 
data, it was decided that a transformation of the data would not be suitable; 
however, the non-normality of the data would be taken into consideration when 
carrying out later analysis. 
 
ETI 
A factor analysis was carried out on the outcome variables produced by the ETI. 
Three scores relating to trust were analysed using principal component analysis 
(see Table 3). The analysis yielded one factor explaining a total of 71.29% of the 
variance for the entire set of variables. The ETI factor had high loadings by the 
following items; mean maternal trust, mean stranger trust and frequency mother 
chosen. The communalities of the variables included are at least moderate; mean 
maternal trust (59%), mean stranger trust (62%) and frequency mother chosen 
(93%). This indicates that the variables chosen for this analysis are at least 
moderately related to each other. Although the KMO measure of sampling adequacy 
is slightly lower than the recommended 0.6 at 0.439, the Bartlett‟s Test of Sphericity 
(p<0.01) and the high total variance explained by the factor (71.29%) indicates that 
the set of variables are at least adequately related for factor analysis. The ETI factor 
data was found to be normally distributed. 
Table 3. Factor Analysis for ETI 
 Loadings Communality 
Mean maternal trust 
Mean stranger trust 
Frequency mother chosen 
 
769 
-.786 
.963 
 
.591 
.617 
.928 
 
Eigenvalue 
Total variance 
2.137 
71.229% 
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Relationships score 
As one of the study hypotheses concerned the capacity to develop trust in the 
context of social relationships and whether relationship difficulties are related to 
lower levels of epistemic trust, two questionnaire subscales, BPFSC negative 
relationships and SDQ problematic peer relationships were combined in order to 
give an overall index of the capacity to create relationships, or a quality relationships 
score. As these two questionnaire subscales used different scales, this was 
achieved by standardizing both variables prior to combining them. These combined 
scales gave an overall relationships score, scores on which were found to be 
normally distributed. 
 
Initial Correlations 
Pearson‟s correlations were run to examine the bivariate correlations between the 
dependent variables; scores on the ETI factor and Trust Game factor and 
independent variables; scores on the BPFSC, SDQ and relationships score 
(Appendix L). Bivariate correlations were also performed to examine the 
associations between the dependent variables and demographic variables; gender, 
age, IQ and SES, in order to determine covariates that would need to be controlled 
for in later multiple regressions (Appendix M). 
No significant correlations were found between the Trust Game factor and any of the 
independent variables. A significant correlation was found between Trust Game 
scores and age (r = .26, p = .022) and a significant correlation was found between 
Trust Game scores and SES (r = -.235, p = .041). Due to the lack of correlation with 
any of the clinical variables, no further analyses were carried out with the trust game 
factor. If there had of been any significant correlations, it would have been important 
to control for these two variables in any further analyses. 
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The correlation matrix identified significant correlations between the ETI factor and 
some of the clinical variables. The ETI factor was found to be significantly negatively 
correlated with the BPFSC relationship problems subscale (r = -.251, p =.026), 
significantly negatively correlated with SDQ emotional problems subscale (r = -.262, 
p =.020), significantly negatively correlated with SDQ peer problematic relationships 
(r = -.438, p< 0.01), significantly negatively correlated with SDQ total (r= .251, p = 
.026) and significantly negatively correlated with the relationships score (r=-.317, 
p=.004). These correlations were further investigated in relation to the study 
hypotheses. The ETI was not found to be correlated with any of the demographic 
variables and therefore it was not necessary to control for any demographic 
variables in later analyses. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis 1: There will be an inverse correlational relationship between BPD 
symptomology and epistemic trust; more severe BPD symptomology will be 
associated with lower levels of epistemic trust. 
A bivariate correlational analysis was conducted between BPD symptomology and 
epistemic trust, once preliminary analyses had been performed to ensure that the 
data did not violate the test‟s assumptions of normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity.  The results from the correlational analysis can be found in Table 
4. There was no significant correlation between BPFSC total scores and the Trust 
Game (r=-.041, p=.727), or between the Trust Game and any of the BPFSC 
subscales. There was also no significant correlation between total BPFSC scores 
and ETI scores (r=-.164, p=.149), or with the three of the BPFSC subscales; 
affective instability, self-control difficulties and self-harm. However, there was found 
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to be a significant and negative correlation between scores on the BPFSC 
relationship difficulties subscale and ETI scores (r = -.251, p= 0.026).  
Therefore, overall, there was found to be no association between BPD 
symptomology as assessed by the BPFSC total score, and epistemic trust. It was 
only on the BPFSC relationships subscale that a finding of any significance was 
found and this was only on one of the of the epistemic trust measures; the ETI. This 
inverse correlation on the BPFSC relationship difficulties subscale suggested that as 
relationships difficulties increase, epistemic trust decreases. This finding was further 
explored in relation to hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 4.Correlations between BPFSC scores and epistemic trust scores. 
  Trust Game ETI 
BPFSC 
Total 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.041 
.727 
76 
-.164 
.149 
79 
Affective  
Instability 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.106 
.363 
76 
-.109 
.338 
79 
Self-control 
Difficulties 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.069 
.554 
76 
-.071 
.533 
79 
Negative 
Relationships 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.143 
.219 
76 
-.251* 
.026 
79 
Identity 
Problems 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.024 
.838 
76 
-.090 
.430 
79 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Pearson‟s Correlation was used for all variables. 
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Hypothesis 2:The relationship between BPD symptomology and epistemic trust will 
be specific to BPD and not due to psychopathology more generally. 
As no association had been found between BPD symptomology and epistemic trust, 
other than on the relationships subscale of the BPFSC, this hypothesis was 
changed slightly in order to assess the relationship between psychopathology and 
epistemic trust more generally and not just in the context of BPD symptomology. In 
order to investigate this hypothesis, SDQ scores were used as a measure of general 
psychopathology. A bivariate correlation was carried out to look at the relationship 
between SDQ scores and performance on the Trust Game and the ETI (Table 5). 
There was no significant correlation between SDQ scores and Trust Game scores. 
However, there was a significant inverse correlation between SDQ total scores and 
ETI scores (r = -.251, p = .026). This finding suggests that as psychopathology 
increases, epistemic trust decreases.  
Significant inverse correlations were also found between ETI scores and the 
following SDQ subscales; emotional symptoms (r=-.262, p = .020) and peer 
relationship problems (r= -.438, p<0.001). However to control for inflation of Type 1 
error, due to multiple comparisons, Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels were used. 
Alpha was adjusted by the number of comparisons (5) and therefore the adjusted 
alpha level was 0.01, meaning that the correlation between ETI score and emotional 
symptoms was not significant (r= -.438, p>0.01). However, the significant inverse 
correlation between peer relationship problems was of interest due to hypotheses 
made regarding an association between relationship problems being associated with 
epistemic trust. Therefore, these findings were further investigated in relation to 
hypothesis 3. 
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Table 5: Correlations between SDQ scores and epistemic trust task scores. 
  Trust Game 
Scores 
ETI Scores 
 
SDQ  
Total 
 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
 
-.056 
.633 
76 
 
-.251* 
.026 
79 
 
Emotional  
Symptoms 
 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.052 
.655 
76 
-.262* 
.020 
79 
 
Conduct 
Problems 
 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.037 
.751 
76 
-.004 
.969 
79 
 
Hyperactivity Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.016 
.889 
76 
.023 
.843 
79 
 
Peer relationships 
Problems 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.109 
.351 
76 
-.438** 
.000 
79 
 
Prosocial 
Behaviour 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.036 
.755 
76 
.092 
.420 
79 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Pearson’s Correlation was used for all variables. 
 
In order to determine the extent of the relationship between psychopathology and 
trust, a linear regression was then carried out to examine the effect of SDQ total 
scores on ETI trust scores (Table 6). It was found that for every 1 point increase on 
the SDQ, trust decreased by .063,F(1,77) = 5.157, p= .026.  
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Table 6: Linear regression for SDQ total and ETI scores. 
Outcome 
Variable 
Predictor B Seβ β t p 
ETI 
Score 
SDQ 
Total 
 
-.042 .018 -.251 -2.271 
 
 
.026 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: There will be an inverse relationship between relationship difficulties 
and epistemic trust; greater relationship difficulties will be associated with lower 
levels of epistemic trust. 
 
In order to explore the relationship between relationship difficulties and epistemic 
trust, a correlation was carried out between the composite relationships score and 
epistemic trust as measured by scores on the two epistemic trust tasks (Table 7). 
There was no significant correlation between the relationships score and the Trust 
Game scores (r=-.110, p <.05). However, there was found to be a significant inverse 
correlation between the relationships factor and ETI scores (r = -.327, p = .004), 
suggesting that as relationship difficulties increase, epistemic trust decreases. 
 
Table 7. Correlation between relationship score and ETI scores 
  Trust Game 
Scores 
ETI  
Scores 
 
Relationship 
Score 
 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
 
-.110 
.343 
76 
 
-.317** 
.004 
79 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Pearson’s Correlation was used for all variables. 
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In order to examine the relationship between relationship difficulties and epistemic 
trust on the ETI measure, a linear regression was carried out between relationships 
score and ETI scores. In this model, ETI score was the outcome variable and 
relationships score was the predictor variable. Table 8 shows the results of the 
linear regression. The prediction model was statistically significant F (1,77) = 8.586, 
p = .004, and accounted for 8.9 % of the variance of trust score (R2 =.100, Adjusted 
R2 = .089). 
 
Table 8: Linear regression for relationships score and ETI scores. 
Outcome 
Variable 
Predictors B SEβ Β t p 
ETI 
Factor 
Relationships 
score 
-.394 
 
.135 
 
-.317 
 
-2.930 .004 
 
 
A Multiple hierarchical regression were then carried out to consider the unique 
contributions that both the BPFSC relationship difficulties variable and the SDQ 
negative peer relationships variable contributed to epistemic trust as measured by 
the ETI factor. In this model, ETI score was the outcome variable and the BPFSC 
relationship difficulties variable and the SDQ negative peer relationships variable 
were the predictor variables. 
As previously described, the SDQ negative peer relationships data was slightly 
skewed and therefore not normally distributed. Therefore, it was important to ensure 
that the assumptions of the multiple hierarchical regression would not be violated 
due to the use of such data. The residuals were plotted in order to check for the 
regression model‟s assumptions of independence and constant variance; 
examination of the scatter plot confirmed that these assumptions was met.  The 
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assumptions of normality of residuals and multi-colinearity were sufficiently met in 
order not to contradict the use of the regression model in this case. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was carried out to assess the contributions that 
BPFSC relationship difficulties and SDQ peer relationship problems made to 
epistemic trust as measured by the ETI. The prediction model was statistically 
significant F (2, 76) = 9.007, p = <0.001, and accounted for 17% of the variance of 
trust (R2 =.192, Adjusted R2 = .170). Trust scores were primarily predicted by SDQ 
peer relationship problem scores, which received the strongest weight in the model 
and no other predictors made a significant contribution to the model (see Table 9). 
Table 9 lists the raw and standardised regression coefficients of the predictors, 
alongside their correlations with trust, their t-score and their effect sizes. The overall 
contribution of SDQ relationships to the prediction of trust accounted for a small 
variance, but was nevertheless significant.  
 
Table 9: Multiple hierarchical regression for ETI scores as predicted by SDQ peer 
relationship scores and BPFSC difficult relationship scores. 
Outcome 
Variable 
Predictors B Seβ β T p 
ETI 
Trust  
Score 
SDQ relationships 
BPFSC 
relationships 
-.204 
-.003 
.059 
.029 
-.431 
-.001 
-3.478 
-.093 
.001 
.926 
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Discussion 
 
This study aimed to explore the relationship between epistemic trust and BPD 
symptomology, psychopathology and relationship difficulties in adolescents. Based 
on previous research with adults (King-Casas et al., 2008; Unoka et al., 2009) it was 
hypothesised that in adolescent participants, greater severity of BPD symptomology 
would be associated with reduced levels of epistemic trust. It was also hypothesised 
that this relationship would be specific to BPD and not to psychopathology more 
generally. Finally it was hypothesised that due to the relational context in which 
epistemic trust exists, that relationship difficulties would have an inverse relationship 
with epistemic trust, with greater number of relationship difficulties associated with 
lower levels of epistemic trust. Contrary to prediction, no correlation was found 
between BPD symptomology and epistemic trust on either of the trust measures 
used. Due to this finding, the second hypothesis became redundant, although when 
the relationship between psychopathology and epistemic trust was explored, 
psychopathology was found to be negatively correlated with epistemic trust on one 
of the measures; the ETI, although similar findings were not found for the Trust 
Game. Lastly, relationship difficulties were found to be significantly correlated with 
epistemic trust on one of the measures; the ETI, although similar findings were not 
replicated for the Trust Game. Before making any conclusions related to these 
results, it must be highlighted that the analysis used was of a correlational nature 
and that therefore causality cannot be inferred. 
 
Epistemic trust and BPD symptomology 
Firstly, it was hypothesised that there would be an inverse correlational relationship 
between BPD symptomology and epistemic trust. This hypothesis had been based 
on the findings of King-Casas et al. (2008) and Unoka et al. (2009) that had found 
significant relationships between BPD symptomology and trust in adults using the 
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Trust Game paradigm. This finding was not replicated in the current sample on 
either the Trust Game or the ETI, as trust scores and BPD total symptomology were 
not found to be significantly correlated. This finding was somewhat surprising, given 
the previous association found between BPD and trust difficulties in adults. There 
could be several explanations that may help us to understand why the findings of 
the present study varied from those on which the hypothesis was based which are 
explored below. 
 
Study samples 
One possible area of speculation is that the difference in samples across studies 
may have contributed to these varying findings. Firstly it should be noted that both 
King-Casas et al. (2008) and Unoka et al. (2009) used an adult sample to 
investigate the relationship between BPD and trust, whereas the aim of this study 
was to examine trust in adolescents and therefore an adolescent sample was 
employed. Due to the developmental nature of BPD, it may be that any difficulties in 
trust, as demonstrated in these previous studies, may only become apparent later 
on in the developmental course of BPD or take on a different form in adolescents 
which is not captured by the trust measures used, and were therefore not found in 
the present adolescent sample. However, longitudinal data has previously been 
found to support the notion that the difficulties and symptoms of BPD in adulthood 
can usually be traced back to childhood and adolescence (Chanen & Kaess, 2012). 
Therefore it is not unreasonable to expect that similar findings related to trust and 
BPD would occur across both adult and adolescent samples. 
It is possible that there are other contributory factors related to the sample which 
may have impacted on the findings. Both King-Casas et al. (2008) and Unoka et al. 
(2009) used a between-participants design, comparing the performance of adults 
with BPD as compared to healthy controls on the Trust Game. The studies vary in 
the methods used to assess BPD symptomology. The BPD participants in the King-
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Casas et al. (2008) study already had a BPD diagnosis at the point of recruitment 
and BPD symptomology was then further assessed using a structured clinical 
interview. Similarly, in the Unoka et al. (2009) study, BPD status was assessed 
based on the DSM-IV criteria for BPD as revealed by the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV axis I and II disorders (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 
1997). In comparison, this study used a self-report questionnaire, the BPFSC, to 
assess BPD symptomology. Although self-report measures are generally felt to be 
less-intrusive to participants, as well as being economically attractive and easy to 
administer, it is also acknowledged that self-report measures tend to be over-
inclusive and are dependent upon respondent‟s awareness and comprehension of 
the items, as well as being reliant on the ability to self-reflect (Sanson, Wiederman, 
& Sandsone, 1998). These requirements create a limitation regarding the use of 
self-report measures, as not all individuals possess such skills. This seems 
particularly important within this research context, due to the hypothesis that 
individuals with BPD have disrupted reflective function and mentalizing abilities 
(Fonagy, 1991). Therefore, disrupted reflective abilities may further reduce the 
reliability of a self-report measure to accurately and reliably assess BPD 
symptomology. 
 
Trust Measures 
Methodological differences between the studies may also help us to understand the 
differences in results. Slightly different versions of the Trust Game paradigm were 
used in both the King-Casas et al. (2008) and Unoka et al. (2009) studies, as well as 
in the current study. An interesting difference between the paradigms used relates to 
whether or not participants were playing against other real people, or were on the 
receiving end of a computer-generated response. In the King-Casas et al. (2008) 
study, participants were partnered to play against healthy controls who took on the 
trustee role. In the Unoka et al. (2009) study, participants believed that they were 
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playing against real people over the internet, however this was actually a deception 
and they were playing against a computer-generated response. Therefore in both of 
these studies participants believed that they were taking part in a real-life human 
interaction. In the current study, due to the constraints of the research methodology, 
participants were explicitly informed that they were playing against a computer, 
although were asked to imagine that they were playing against a real person. It was 
hypothesised that asking participants to imagine they were playing against a real 
person would increase the inter-personal experience of the game, although it must 
be acknowledged that imagining a situation and actually experiencing a situation are 
two very different things. As has previously been described, BPD is associated with 
difficulties in relationships and interpersonal interactions (Lieb et al., 2004). It has 
also been hypothesised that individuals with BPD experience difficulties in 
mentalizing, a construct closely related to epistemic trust, only when the attachment 
system is activated, which usually occurs in the context of inter-personal interactions 
(Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that epistemic trust may be 
affected in a similar way. It may be that individuals only take on a stance of 
epistemic vigilance when they are in an interpersonal context that activates the 
attachment system. Therefore it could be hypothesised that the current experimental 
paradigm utilised in this study, in which participants knew they were playing against 
a computer, may not have been the most appropriate to trigger the epistemic 
mistrust associated with BPD.  
 
Epistemic trust and psychopathology 
Secondly, it was hypothesised that the relationship between BPD symptomology 
and epistemic trust would be specific to BPD and not mediated by other 
psychopathology. As there was found to be no initial significant correlation between 
BPD symptomology and epistemic trust, it was not possible to explore this 
hypothesis further. However, when examining the relationship between 
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psychopathology and epistemic trust, an inverse negative relationship was found 
when examining the relationship between SDQ total scores and scores on the ETI, 
as well as inverse relationship between difficult peer relationships subscale and ETI 
scores. The association between peer relationship difficulties and epistemic trust is 
considered in relation to the next hypothesis. Additionally, it should be noted that 
similar findings were not replicated on the Trust Game.  
There are many potential reasons that may help us to understand this correlational 
finding that increased psychopathology is related to lower levels of epistemic trust in 
adolescents. It may be that the measurement of psychopathology assesses a wide 
range of constructs which have been found to be associated with reduced levels of 
epistemic trust. For example, high levels of anxiety and depression in adolescents 
have previously been shown to be significantly related to lower levels of trust (Muris, 
Meesters, van Melick & Zwambag, 2001). Therefore, it may be that is it this 
relationship between anxiety, depression and trust that the psychopathology 
measure is assessing. Additionally, the relationship between psychopathology and 
attachment security is well defined, with greater levels of psychopathology inversely 
associated with attachment security (Allen, Hauser and Borman-Spurrell, 1996).  As 
Corriveau et al. (2009) have previously demonstrated the link between attachment 
security and epistemic trust, it is possible that the observed relationship between 
psychopathology and reduced epistemic trust is reflective of the inverse relationship 
between attachment security and trust. 
It is also possible that epistemic mistrust is a general problem in psychopathology. 
For example, Caspi et al.‟s (2013) theory posits that there is a „general 
psychopathology factor‟, also known as the p-factor, in the structure of all psychiatric 
disorders. This theory was developed from the hypothesis by Caspi et al. (2013) that 
the symptom-defined diagnostic categories of psychiatric conditions are not helpful 
when trying to understand individual variations amongst mental health problems, 
including co-morbidities, the movement between recurrent or chronic difficulties and 
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those which exist on a continuum. Therefore it was proposed that psychiatric 
disorders are better explained instead by one „general psychopathology factor‟ 
which is dimensional. Therefore the p-factor is an overall dimensional measure of 
psychopathology. Higher p-scores are associated with more difficulties in 
individual‟s development history, greater biological risk and greater life impairment 
(Caspi et al., 2013). Fonagy, Luyten, Campbell & Allison (2014) proposed that the p-
factor may in fact be a proxy for impairments in epistemic trust. They suggested that 
an individual who has a high p-score, due to some type of developmental adversity 
(which could have either social or biological roots or a combination of both) is in a 
state of epistemic mis-trust. Therefore this model may help us to make sense of the 
findings in the study, suggesting that increased levels of psychopathology could 
potentially be associated with decreased levels of epistemic trust. 
 
Epistemic trust and relationship difficulties 
Lastly, it was hypothesised that there would be an inverse correlational relationship 
between relationship difficulties and impairments in epistemic trust, with greater 
relationship difficulties associated with lower epistemic trust in adolescents. This 
hypothesis was based on the previous findings of Unoka et al. (2009) and King-
Casas et al. (2008), that the difficulties with trust that individuals with BPD exhibited 
occurred in the context of inter-personal relationships (i.e. during the Trust Game). 
BPD participants had also been shown to be less inclined to try and repair broken 
relationships following a defecting experience on the Trust Game, than were healthy 
controls (King-Casas et al., 2008). This suggests that once a difficult experience 
occurs within the relationship that individuals with BPD struggle to regain trust, 
resulting in further difficulties within the relationship. Additionally, the hypothesis was 
based on clinical observations that adults and adolescents with BPD often report 
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experiencing relationship difficulties and difficulty developing trust in the context of 
relationships.  
In the current study, this hypothesis was supported by the finding that relationship 
difficulties were associated with reduced levels of trust on the ETI, although similar 
findings were not replicated on the Trust Game. This finding adds support to the 
hypothesis that adolescents who have problematic relationships, have lower levels 
of epistemic trust. Although due to the correlational nature of this research, causality 
cannot be inferred, it could be hypothesised that it is likely that these difficulties with 
trust may then in turn contribute to the maintenance of relationship difficulties. The 
relationships score used in the analysis was created using subscales which 
assessed both peer relationship difficulties (SDQ) and general relationship 
difficulties (BPFSC), in order to assess functioning across a range of relationships. 
The results from the multiple hierarchical regression suggested that difficulties in 
peer relationships seemed to make the greatest contribution to the model. The 
difficult peer relationships subscale of the SDQ is a separately scored scale from the 
SDQ total score, and is a subscale that is important in assessing social adjustment. 
Statements that make up the SDQ subscale include items such as; „I am normally 
on my own‟, „other people my age generally don‟t like me‟ and „other people my age 
generally pick on me or bully me‟. Therefore it appears that such a scale assesses 
difficult interpersonal peer experiences that have occurred, such as bullying, and 
feelings of being excluded or disliked by others. It could therefore make sense that if 
these are a young person‟s experiences of the world and others that they become 
lacking in trust as a form of self-protection. As described previously, if the 
information or knowledge that is transmitted from another is harmful to one‟s sense 
of self, it makes sense to become mistrustful in such a situation and to adopt a 
stance of epistemic vigilance, in order to protect oneself from potential harm 
(Fonagy, Luyten & Allison, 2013). It is also understandable that the peer 
relationships subscale made the greatest contribution to the model, as the 
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importance of peer relationships during adolescence has long been recognised. 
Therefore, it appears that there is an association between relationship difficulties 
and epistemic mistrust in adolescents.  
 
Limitations 
This study has several limitations. Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that the 
significant relationships found between epistemic trust, psychopathology and 
relationship difficulties only occurred on one of the two trust measures used; the 
ETI. None of these findings were replicated on the Trust Game. As significant 
relationships have been found between BPD and trust on the Trust Game in adults 
(King-Casas et al., 2008; Unoka et al., 2009), similar findings were expected to be 
found in adolescents. Some of the methodological issues relating to the Trust Game 
paradigm used in this study have already been detailed above. 
However, the lack of any correlation between performance on the ETI and 
performance on the Trust Game may show that the two tasks are examining 
different constructs; it may be that the Trust Game and the ETI actually assess 
different aspects of trust, especially given that the Trust Game was developed to 
measure trust and cooperation and was not developed specifically to measure 
epistemic trust. Therefore it is possible that the ETI picked up on epistemic trust 
deficits that are not assessed by the Trust Game. Additionally, it may be that the 
Trust Game, which has previously been used to measure trust in adults, assesses 
certain aspects of trust that only become of significant in adulthood and are not yet 
developed in adolescence.  
Continuing to examine the methodology of this study, the quality of the ETI as a 
measure needs to be considered. The ETI has only previously been used in one 
previous study with adults and therefore this was the first time that the measure had 
been used with adolescents. Although the ETI has good face validity as a measure 
of epistemic trust, and feedback from participants about their experience of using 
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the measure was generally positive, the psychometric properties of the ETI have not 
yet been established, which means that the reliability and validity of the measure 
has not yet been formally assessed. Future research into developing valid and 
reliable tools to assess epistemic trust would be extremely valuable in allowing us to 
understand further the association between epistemic trust and BPD symptomology 
in adolescents.  
Another potential limitation corresponds to the recruitment method that was utilised 
in this study which may have contributed to a sample bias. Participant recruitment 
was carried out by providing young people with information about the study, either 
through word of mouth in the community settings, or through key workers in clinical 
settings, and then waiting for them to seek further information and volunteer their 
interest in regards to participating in the study. It is acknowledged that the gold-
standard sampling method of random sampling is not always achievable within 
research, however it can be hypothesised that in a study such as this, where the 
construct under investigation (i.e. trust) is likely to impact on participants even 
volunteering to participate, that the sampling procedure needs to be given some 
consideration. It is likely that from the outset, young people with the greatest 
difficulties with epistemic trust are unlikely to wish to participate, immediately 
creating a sampling bias. It is difficult to know the best way to overcome this 
difficulty, however, it is important to hold this potential sampling bias in mind when 
reflecting on the sample used and considering the meaning of the results found in 
the study. 
Additionally as previously mentioned, when examining the assessment of BPD 
symptomology in this study as compared to previous studies, the current study 
relied solely on self-report measures in the assessment of BPD symptomology. 
Although the BPFSC is known to be an acceptable measure of BPD symptomology 
in adolescents, self-report questionnaires have been criticised as being unreliable, 
due to potential difficulties with participants responding in a socially desirable way or 
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being unable to accurately reflect on their experiences (Austin, Gibson, Deary, 
McGregor & Dent, 1998). It may have been that the inclusion of a semi-structured 
interview to assess BPD symptomology would have allowed a more balanced 
assessment of BPD. However if in future this was not possible due to practical 
limitations, it may be worth considering the use of the parent-report version of the 
BPFS-C as an additional measure (Sharp, Mosko, Chang, & Ha, 2010). This may 
help to gather a more holistic assessment of the young person‟s BPD 
symptomology. 
A final methodological limitation relates to the potential lack of ecological validity of 
the measures utilised to assess epistemic trust. Epistemic trust is such a complex 
construct that it is unlikely that a computer or paper based task would be able to fully 
capture these complexities. Additionally, it may be that adolescents perform 
differently in a research setting than they would in the context of a real-life 
interpersonal relationship. It has been suggested that most social-cognitive tasks 
are characterised by participants eliciting socially desirable responses and that they 
do not reflect actual social interactions and are therefore not likely to lead to 
complete emotional or behavioural engagement (Mize & Pettit, 2008). Therefore, the 
development of measures which can more greatly reflect these real-life situations 
would be helpful in contributing to the assessment of epistemic trust. 
 
Research and clinical implications  
Despite the limitations outlined above, the current study has been one of the first to 
investigate the relationship between BPD symptomology, psychopathology, 
relationship difficulties and epistemic trust in adolescents. Future research that 
addresses these limitations is likely to help further clarify the relationship between 
these constructs. A more thorough assessment of BPD symptomology in 
adolescents as well as the use of standardised measure of epistemic trust, in order 
to increase the validity and reliability when measuring this complex construct, would 
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be important in furthering research into the relationship between BPD and epistemic 
trust in adolescents. Additionally, further research into how psychopathology and 
relationship difficulties are related to epistemic trust is required, in order to 
corroborate the results found in this study.  
In terms of clinical implications, the current findings at least partially support the 
notion that relationship difficulties and psychopathology are associated with reduced 
epistemic trust in adolescents. The correlational design cannot infer the direction of 
relationships and therefore conclusions about causality are unable to be made, 
however, it makes sense clinically that young people who experience difficulties in 
relationships are likely to be less trusting and also that those who are less trusting, 
may experience greater relationship difficulties. This can be linked to clinical 
observations with adolescents with BPD, whom have been hypothesised as being 
„hard to reach‟ due to hypervigilance and epistemic mistrust (Fonagy & Allison, 
2014). Although this study was unable to find a significant relationship between BPD 
symptomology and epistemic trust, clinical observations and findings with adults 
should not be overlooked and this hypothesis should be re-tested, given the 
limitations of this study. 
Additionally, it makes sense that adolescents who have greater levels of 
psychopathology are likely to find it more difficult to trust in others. This appears to 
be an interesting preliminary finding, as it is likely that young people with greater 
relationship difficulties and greater levels of psychopathology are more likely to 
require psychological therapy than those with fewer relationship difficulties or less 
psychopathology. Therefore this has important implications for formulation and 
treatment. If, within a therapeutic environment, a client is in a state of epistemic 
mistrust, possibly due to previous difficulties forming trusting relationships; social 
learning and the taking in and incorporating of new information is unlikely to occur 
(Fonagy & Allison, 2014). This therefore is likely to affect the therapeutic outcome 
for the individual, as they are unlikely to be able to incorporate the new information 
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and experiences learnt during therapy (Fonagy & Allison, 2014). However if the 
relationship is able to be developed and a trusting therapeutic relationship is able to 
be formed, then through the experience of being mentalized by the therapist, the 
client is able to feel understood. This may restore epistemic trust, allowing learning 
about both the self and others from social experience to occur (Fonagy & Allison, 
2014). It may be that for adolescents with relationship difficulties, the experience of 
a trusting therapeutic relationship may be an important step towards recovery.  
 
Conclusions  
In conclusion this study used a battery of epistemic trust measures to explore the 
relationship between epistemic trust, BPD symptomology, psychopathology and 
relationship difficulties in a sample of adolescents. No association between 
epistemic trust and severity of BPD symptomology in adolescents was found. 
However, the results did suggest that there was an association between 
psychopathology and epistemic trust; with greater levels of psychopathology related 
to decreased levels of trust. Additionally an association was found between 
relationship difficulties and epistemic trust; with greater degree of relationship 
difficulties related to lower levels of epistemic trust. However, given the limitations 
described these findings should be viewed only as preliminary findings. Future 
research is required to develop standardised measures of epistemic trust and once 
this has been achieved, it is necessary for the research to be replicated in order to 
corroborate and extend these findings.  
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Introduction 
 
This appraisal examines my experiences of the process of developing and 
conducting my major research project and the reflections that I have about the 
project now that it has come to an end. Firstly, I reflect on my thoughts around the 
diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) in adolescents and the 
difficulties and benefits that may come with such a diagnosis. Then, as an extension 
of reflecting on the limitations of this study, I focus on the methodological issues that 
became apparent over the course of the research. This includes barriers that were 
faced, including the difficulties of applying for NHS ethics, as well as the difficulties 
associated with measuring complex psychological constructs such as mentalizing 
and epistemic trust. Finally, I consider my experiences of working with this target 
population of adolescents, who are often felt to be hard to engage both clinically and 
in research settings. Personal reflections on the research process will be shared 
throughout.  
 
The Diagnosis of BPD in Adolescence 
 
Problems with the diagnosis 
I feel that firstly, it is important to comment on the use of the term Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD), which is an expression that I have used throughout this 
thesis. When the psychoanalyst Adolph Stern in 1938 first described a group of 
patients who were classified as lying on the „border line‟ between psychosis and 
neurosis, the belief then and for many years was that these patients were near 
impossible to treat. Although this belief of „untreatability‟ has now been disproven 
clinically, this narrative around personality disorders persists. This in turn contributes 
to the stigma and controversy that is often associated with the diagnosis of 
personality disorder.  
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A stigma refers to the perception of a particular negative attribute that becomes 
associated with a certain person or group and leads to the global devaluation of that 
individual (Katz, 1981). As a consequence, individuals who are members of this 
group are perceived as having less intrinsic value and may become marginalised in 
society (Katz, 1981). BPD has been noted to have a stigma associated with it that 
appears to go beyond that which is associated with other mental health problems 
(Aviram, Brodsky & Stanley, 2006). Indeed, the very words „personality disorder‟ 
bring with it connotations that the entire personality is disordered or damaged in 
some way. Those with a diagnosis of BPD have reported feeling stigmatised by the 
diagnosis, as well as frequently finding that they are treated differently by healthcare 
professionals, for example that any co-morbid mental health difficulties are 
overlooked and overshadowed by their BPD diagnosis (Haigh, 2002). The fact that 
the difficulties of those with BPD are often triggered by interpersonal situations can 
lead to clinicians finding it difficult to work with these clients, which is often 
exacerbated by the perception that individuals with BPD have control over their 
behaviour; maintaining the stigma related to BPD (Aviram et al., 2006). Similar 
findings are discovered when investigating the narratives and discourse that exists 
around BPD in society more generally, with individuals with BPD often being 
presented and viewed in a negative way (Bjokrlund, 2006).  
Therefore, given these narratives that are associated with the term BPD and the 
difficulties that individuals often face when being given such a diagnosis, the use of 
this term, either clinically or within a research setting, needs to be done so with care 
and with an awareness of the implications that come with it. This seems especially 
important when working with adolescents, as adolescence is known to typically be a 
tumultuous time, associated with the development of a sense of identity and self 
(Chanen et al., 2008). Therefore the concerns relating to the diagnosis of BPD in 
adolescents has been commented on throughout this thesis and still holds a place of 
importance in my mind as this project comes to a close.  
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Benefits of the diagnosis 
It has been found that clinicians are often reluctant to diagnose BPD in adolescents, 
due to concerns relating to the „medicalising‟ of young peoples‟ difficulties 
(Baverstock & Wright, 2015). However, despite the difficulties associated with a 
BPD diagnosis, considerable evidence now exists to suggest that BPD can be 
accurately diagnosed in childhood and adolescence and that in some 
circumstances, such a diagnosis may be in fact be helpful (Chanen et al., 2008). It 
has been shown that adults with a diagnosis of BPD exhibited certain symptoms 
during childhood; mainly symptoms of internalising and externalising disorders, that 
preceded their adult BPD diagnosis (Stepp et al., 2013). One of the benefits to 
understanding the developmental trajectory of BPD in childhood and adolescence is 
that once vulnerabilities to BPD have been identified, young people who are at risk 
of going on to develop BPD are able to be targeted for intervention (Kernberg, 
Weiner & Bardenstein, 2000). This early intervention may help to prevent some of 
the difficulties that are so often seen in adults with a diagnosis of BPD, including 
emotional, inter-personal and functional problems (Kernberg et al, 2000). If stigma 
around the diagnosis of BPD was to reduce, a diagnosis early on may mean that 
young people would be able to achieve greater understanding of their difficulties, 
both for themselves and their families, as well as having greater access to treatment 
options and strategies to help to build on their strengths (Baverstock & Wright, 
2015). 
 
What a BPD diagnosis misses: strengths and abilities 
Something that really struck me when starting to review the literature into BPD and 
as I progressed over the course of this research, was how great an emphasis is 
placed on psychopathology, risk factors and deficits when thinking about BPD in 
young people. During testing of participants who had been recruited from the clinical 
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sample, some of the young people involved had diagnoses of emerging personality 
disorders. I noticed when talking to these young people, that despite some of them 
having difficulties, that they all also had skills, strengths and talents. I felt that these 
strengths were not really able to be captured by either the personality disorder 
diagnosis or the measures used within this study.  
Rutter (1993) commented that in order to gain a true understanding of adolescent 
development, both strengths and resilience as well as maladaptive psychopathology 
need to be considered. This made me think back to my own time on placement in 
CAMHS, where a more systemic approach was used to approaching mental health 
difficulties in children and adolescents. For example, in solution-focused 
approaches, although developing an understanding of the young person‟s difficulties 
and problems remains important, the main focus belongs to understanding the 
young person‟s goals and where they would like to be in relation to these (Berg, 
1994). Solution-focused approaches work to develop strategies as to how to move 
closer towards these goals; the client‟s previous experiences are used to discover 
times when there have been „exceptions‟ to the problem and to notice when the 
client has developed skills and strengths, with the aim of utilising such strengths to 
help solve the current problem (Berg, 1994).  This approach appealed to me as I felt 
that it was helpful to incorporate and reflect on the strengths and resilience that 
young people already have, providing a more rounded picture of the young person. 
This was something that was not included when designing this project. This may be 
because the problem-saturated narrative surrounding BPD did not lead me to 
consider that strengths and abilities may also be important in contributing to levels of 
epistemic trust in young people. In future research it may be interesting to consider 
the role that resilience plays in epistemic trust, for example whether it may have a 
protective effect against other psychopathology.  
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A more helpful way of conceptualising BPD 
It has been questioned as to whether there could be a more helpful way of 
conceptualising BPD in young people, such as viewing BPD symptomology as a 
global dimension, as opposed to a categorical diagnosis (Hawes, 2014). Currently, 
the criteria used to make a diagnosis of BPD in adolescence using the DSM-5 is 
based on exactly the same criteria as those used to make the adult diagnosis, albeit 
with symptoms needing to be present for longer in young people (DSM-5; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Therefore, this makes the assumption that BPD in 
childhood and adolescence has the same structure as BPD in adulthood (Hawes, 
2014). The natural fluctuations of BPD symptoms over time in adolescents means 
that the stability of a categorical BPD diagnosis has been demonstrated to be fairly 
low, however this stability is significantly higher when BPD is measured 
dimensionally (Chanen et al., 2004). Additionally, it has been suggested that a 
categorical diagnosis may lead to adolescents easily switching from subclinical 
levels of symptoms, to being just above the threshold for diagnosis, whereas a more 
dimensional approach would allow for variations in the level of symptoms (Larrivée, 
2013). Miller, Muehlenkamp and Jacobson (2008) describe that a dimensional 
approach may be able to better account for the developmental heterogeneity and 
variability that is seen among adolescents. As this topic has become increasingly 
debated both among clinicians and researchers, it will be of interest in the future to 
observe whether a move towards a more dimensional diagnosis takes place. 
 
 
Methodological Issues 
 
Applying for NHS ethics 
One of the main difficulties faced in carrying out this research was in obtaining NHS 
ethical approval. My reflections on this process are mostly over-shadowed by how 
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time-consuming and lengthy the ethical application process was. There are potential 
risks in any research procedure that involves human participants and therefore it is 
vital that any proposals for research activity are scrutinised and monitored. 
However, the bureaucracy of the process was something that I found to be quite 
frustrating. My main reflection on the process relates to the amount of time that was 
required to achieve ethical approval; in this case over a year from start to finish, 
which is something that I would definitely consider when applying for NHS ethics in 
future and that is important for other researchers to also hold in mind.  
When reflecting on why the process took so long, I think that this is probably due to 
the time that each stage of the process takes. In regards to this study in particular, 
extra time was added due to ethical approval not being granted at the first NHS 
ethics research panel that was attended, which added a considerable time delay to 
the project. Unfortunately at the first NHS ethics research panel, it was found that no 
member of the panel was either a mental health expert or a child safe guarding 
expert. This unfortunately meant that the members of the panel did not feel 
confident in making a decision relating to our study which involved both mental 
health difficulties and adolescents. Therefore the panel decided that they would 
defer the final decision regarding ethical approval to an external expert, who we 
were unable to converse with, leading to ethical approval being denied. On reflection 
this initial lack of ethical approval had a significant impact on the project. Firstly, 
after such a long process, it was a very demoralising experience for me and the two 
other trainees involved in this joint project. Additionally, having to re-apply for ethical 
approval from scratch was time consuming and led to a delay in starting participant 
recruitment. Thankfully, attendance at a different panel for the second application 
proved much more successful and ethical approval was achieved. However, I feel 
that a lesson learnt from this experience would be to ensure that the NHS ethics 
committee which is being attended has people sitting on the panel who have 
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expertise in the area in which ethical approval is being sought and for ethical 
approval to be sought as early on as is possible. 
 
Measuring complex psychological constructs 
Another methodological limitation that became apparent over the course of this 
project related to the difficulties involved in measuring complex psychological 
constructs, including both mentalizing and epistemic trust. The literature review 
involved comparing findings relating to mentalizing abilities in adolescents across a 
range of studies. I was struck by how complex and multi-faceted a psychological 
construct mentalization actually is. This complexity became clear as I discovered 
that as opposed to just being a homogenous construct, that in fact mentalizing can 
be divided along four polarities: self/other focused, cognitive/affective, 
internal/external focused and implicit/explicit (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). As 
mentalizing difficulties in adolescents are posited to exist in specific domains of 
mentalizing, the challenge then is to find measures that tap into these specific 
domains. As the studies reviewed had used several different measures when 
investigating mentalizing, I found it particularly difficult to make comparisons across 
these, as much of the time the results, i.e. whether deficits, enhanced abilities or the 
use of unusual strategies in mentalizing were found, appeared to be directly related 
to the chosen measure. 
 Additionally, when investigating epistemic trust in the main research project similar 
difficulties in the assessment of epistemic trust became apparent. As the 
assessment of epistemic trust in adolescents and adults is a relatively new area of 
interest, this meant that there was a lack of measures to choose from. The Trust 
Game (King-Casas et al, 2008) was used as a measure in the study due to having 
previously been used to assess trust and cooperation in adults and due to having 
reasonable face validity in terms of being able to assess epistemic trust. However, 
this measure was specifically created to assess trust and cooperation, which is not 
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entirely the same construct as epistemic trust. During the administration of the task, 
during the testing phase of the study, some participants reported finding the task 
boring and appeared to rush through it, potentially impacting on results. Additionally, 
I felt that as the participants were aware that they were playing against a computer 
and not a real human partner, this meant that the measure did lack some ecological 
validity.  
Additionally, before the Epistemic Trust Instrument can be considered a reliable and 
valid measure of epistemic trust, the psychometric properties of the measure need 
to be evaluated. The gold standard for determining this is the test-retest reliability 
method, which will allow the reliability of the ETI over time to be determined 
(Hilsenroth, Segal, & Hersen, 2004). This method involves the measure being used 
at least twice and the scores on the measure being correlated. A high test-retest 
reliability coefficient (r>.8) indicates that the measure is likely to be reliable 
(Hilsenroth et al., 2004). Once the reliability of the measure has been shown, then 
its validity can also be formally assessed. Construct validity can be assessed by 
comparing the measure with other tasks that measure the same construct 
(Embretson & Gorin, 2001).The ETI was used in this study as it was felt to have 
good face validity and due to a lack of other measures, however it is important that 
its validity is also assessed formally. As the ETI is the first measure designed 
specifically to assess epistemic trust, this may have to be against other 
interpersonal trust tasks such as the Trust Game (King-Cases et al., 2008).  
 
Working with Adolescents 
 
Difficulties with recruitment 
One of the challenges that became apparent during this research project was 
related to the recruitment of adolescents. Throughout, recruitment seemed to be an 
area that was particularly difficult, with a high attrition rate and potential participants 
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dropping out at various stages of the recruitment process. This ranged from young 
people saying they were not interested in participating right from the start, through to 
one participant choosing to stop halfway through testing due to feeling tired and not 
wishing to continue with the study. Obviously, an important part of the research 
process is allowing participants the opportunity to withdraw from at any time they 
wish, however I was left wondering why it was that recruitment with young people 
appeared to be so challenging. 
 It has been proposed that often adolescents are unwilling to engage with mental 
health services, including for both clinical and research purposes, due to issues 
around stigma (Bolton-Oetsel & Scherer, 2003). This therefore links with the 
concerns about stigma that I have mentioned previously related to diagnosing BPD 
in young people and it appears that stigma is obviously of importance to 
adolescents. I spent some time reflecting on what it was that may have made some 
adolescents reluctant to participate in this study. Although most adolescents I met at 
the testing phase were willing to take part in the study, some voiced concerns. 
These included worries about the study being a „test‟ and the implications of „doing 
badly‟. Additionally, some young people were concerned about whether information 
about them would be shared with their parents or clinicians with concerns relating to 
what others would think of them. Therefore, I felt it was particularly important to 
understand where the adolescents‟ concerns were coming from and to take the time 
to discuss and explore this with them, before potentially going on to participate in the 
study. I also made sure to allocate enough time to explaining the confidentiality 
process to the young people, in order for them to have a sufficient and thorough 
understanding of this. Additionally, when thinking about carrying out research or 
working clinically with adolescents, it is important to give consideration to 
developmental factors. Adolescence is known to be a time of great developmental 
change, involving physiological, cognitive, emotional and social shifts (Weisz 
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&Hawley, 2002). Therefore it is important to take these developmental factors into 
consideration when working with an adolescent population. 
 
Engaging participants  
Although engaging adolescents in research is a different process to engaging 
adolescents in clinical work, I felt that there were some similarities between the two 
and I found it useful to draw on some of the skills I had developed on clinical 
placement within CAMHS when trying to engage adolescents in the research 
process. As I met more young people for testing I realised that for some of the 
adolescents, it was of particular importance for me to spend a little time getting to 
know the young person before jumping straight in with the research tasks. This was 
generally only a brief interaction, such as hearing a little about their interests or what 
it was that had prompted them to take part in the research. I was struck by how 
willing the young people were to be open with me. I felt it was important for me to 
consider the way that I engaged with the adolescents participating in the study; 
while I wanted to engage the young people and help them to feel at ease, at the 
same time I had to hold the frame of the research in mind as well as maintaining 
boundaries in order to help this be a positive research experience for the young 
person. Karver, Handelsman, Fields and Bickman (2006) describe the importance of 
interpersonal skills when working clinically with adolescents including empathy, 
alliance building, positive regard, trust and engagement and it is likely that such 
skills are also important when engaging young people in psychological research. 
These are all skills that trainee clinical psychologists are likely to be developing over 
the course of clinical placements and therefore it appears to be a case of also 
learning how to apply such skills in a research setting. Rubenstein (1996) spoke of 
the importance of extending non-judgemental acceptance towards adolescents and 
of respecting and attempting to understand their perspectives, which I feel is a 
helpful approach when trying to engage young people. 
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Concluding remarks 
On reflection, throughout the course of this research there were many issues that 
arose. It seems important for these issues to be considered, both when making any 
conclusions about the findings of either the literature review or the main research 
project and additionally with regards to any future research. Taking on a research 
role for this project was something that was new to me and seemed very different to 
my other work as a trainee clinical psychologist. However, I feel that having the 
opportunity to take on this role has really developed my interest in the field of 
research. It has also highlighted to me that the skills I had developed over the rest of 
my training including an ability to empathise, contain and reflect, as well as an ability 
to think critically, were extremely important in this setting, especially when 
attempting to engage young people in the research process.  
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Appendix A: Assessment criteria of Quality Assurance Checklist (Kmet, Lee & Cook, 2004) 
 
Item 
Number 
Criteria 
1 Question / objective sufficiently described? 
2 Study design evident and appropriate? 
3 Method of subject/comparison group selection or source of information/input 
variables described and appropriate? 
4 Subject (and comparison group, if applicable) characteristics sufficiently 
described? 
5 If interventional and random allocation was possible, was it described? 
6 If interventional and blinding of investigators was possible, was it reported? 
7 If interventional and blinding of subjects was possible, was it reported? 
8 Outcome and (if applicable) exposure measure(s) well defined and robust to 
measurement / misclassification bias? Means of assessment reported? 
9 Sample size appropriate? 
10 Analytic methods described/justified and appropriate? 
11 Some estimate of variance is reported for the main results? 
12 Controlled for confounding? 
13 Results reported in sufficient detail? 
14 Conclusions supported by the results? 
Scoring: Yes = 2; Partial = 1; No = 0 
Note: Coding: 2= all specified criteria are met, 1= specified criteria are partially met, 
0= none of the specified criteria was met 
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Appendix B: Epistemic Trust Instrument (ETI) 
 
Instructions 
The purpose of this task is to look at how people make decisions in a dilemma situation. 
There will be 20 questions containing a mixture of moral and amoral situations.  
Although you will have your own opinions about what you think is right and wrong in these 
moral dilemma questions, you must ignore your own opinions and assume that you are a 
blank slate with no clue about what is considered right and wrong by society. 
 
There are four rules for the dilemma task: 
1. Put aside your own opinions of what you think the answer should be. Imagine that 
you are very naïve and have no clue about what is right and wrong. 
2. Ask yourself, what would the “professional” (e.g., masseuse, butcher, etc.) know 
about this situation, given the stereotypical information you know about their job. 
3. Ask yourself, what would YOUR own mother know about this situation, given the 
stereotypical information you know about her job. 
4. If neither person (i.e., professional or your mother) would know anything about the 
situation from their jobs (and jobs alone), ask yourself, which of these two people am 
I most likely to trust or to take advice from in a general situation, independent of the 
this dilemma task.  
 
First you will receive a dilemma situation and advice from two people, one of which will 
always be your mother, the other will be a professional. 
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You will then be asked to rate which persons advice you are more likely to trust on a scale 
ranging from mildly to strongly trust. 
For example, if you trust the masseuse in this case more than your mother, you would focus 
only on the left side of the scale. You will then indicate the strength of this trust. 
However, if you trust your mother more than the masseuse, you would focus only on the 
right side of the scale. You will then indicate the strength of this trust. 
Next, you will be asked how likely are you to change your mind on the person who‟s advice 
you selected, on a scale ranging from very unlikely to very likely. 
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Instrument Items 
 
Item 1      
 
While on vacation, a couple of tourists select out a small speedboat from a variety of options. 
An hour after they set off, a sales assistant in the rental shop says that there is a chance that 
the boat they are in is prone to mild leaking. Alternatively, there is a chance that they are in a 
different boat that does not leak. The owners are unsure whether to spend a lot of money 
sending out a search team or not. 
A butcher advises that they should not send out a search team because in his opinion, the 
boat may hold together until they get back. 
Your mother advises that they should send out a search team because in her opinion, the 
boat may not hold together until they get back. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation? 
 
Butcher      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 2  
Mrs Bennett has cancer. She asks the cashier working in the pharmacy to give her more 
painkillers than her prescription states. No harm will come to Mrs Bennett if she takes this 
additional medication and it would help to ease her pain. There is a chance that the cashier 
will get away with giving the additional medication. Alternatively, there is a chance that he 
will get caught. 
A plumber advises that he should not give the additional medication because in his opinion it 
is probably noticeable when medication goes missing in a pharmacy. 
Your mother advises that he should give the additional medication because in her opinion it 
is probably not noticeable when medication goes missing in a pharmacy. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation? 
 
Plumber      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
 
 
 
160 
 
Item 3  
Sherry is certain that her ruthless boss Bryan overheard her criticise his unethical 
management practices. There is a chance that she will keep her job if she apologises. 
Alternatively, there is a chance that he will not accept her apology and that she could lose 
her job for criticising his practices. If Sherry decides not to apologise to Bryan she is unsure 
what will happen. 
A painter advises that she should not apologise because it is possible that he may have 
forgotten about it. 
Your mother advises that she should apologise because it is possible that he won‟t have 
forgotten about it. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation? 
 
Mother      Painter 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 4  
Una is walking down a street when she comes across a wallet on the ground. She opens the 
wallet and finds that it contains several hundred pounds in cash but no identification. There 
is a chance that Una will not be seen taking the wallet and will get to keep the money. There 
is also a chance that someone will witness her taking the wallet and she will be reported to 
the police. 
A postman advises that she should not take it because from his experience the police 
usually take these types of thefts very seriously. 
Your mother advises that she should take it because from her experience the police do not 
usually take these types of thefts very seriously. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Postman      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 5  
Laura has signed a contract with a sales company stating that she will not work any other 
jobs while employed with them. She currently has an evening job in a restaurant from which 
she gets paid cash-in-hand. If Laura gets caught she will lose her job with the company. 
There is a chance that a co-worker will come into the restaurant, see Laura working, and tell 
her boss. Alternatively, there is a chance that no one from work will ever come into the 
restaurant and see her. 
An electrician advises that she should not keep working in the restaurant because he knows 
from experience that not that many people working in sales have two jobs. 
Your mother advises that she should keep working in the restaurant because she knows 
from experience that many people working in sales have two jobs. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Electrician      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| 
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| 
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 6  
Jim, an owner of a small business, is struggling to make ends meet. It occurs to him that he 
could lower his taxes by pretending that some of his personal expenses are business 
expenses. There is a chance that Jim will get away with this and save money. Alternatively, 
there is a chance that he will get caught and receive a fine. 
Your mother advises that he should not lie about his expenses because she knows from 
experience that there are not many small businesses that generally get away with this. 
A lifeguard advises that he should lie about his expenses because he knows from 
experience that there are many small businesses that generally get away with this. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Mother      Lifeguard 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Item 7  
Tom goes to the pharmacy with the intention of buying a particular brand name medicine. 
When he gets there, he discovers that the pharmacy is out of the brand that he is looking for. 
Tom is unsure whether a cheaper similar medicine will be as effective as the brand name for 
his complaint. 
A bartender advises that he should not get the cheaper one because in his opinion there is a 
difference between the effectiveness of this medicine and the brand name one. 
Your mother advises that he should get the cheaper one because in her opinion there is no 
difference between the effectiveness of this medicine and the brand name one. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Mother      Bartender 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
Item 8  
There is a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending 
to the left is a group of workmen. The tracks extending to the right are clear. It is not known 
which path the trolley will take on its own. If an eyewitness pulls a lever there is a chance 
that the trolley will go right and avoid the workmen. Alternatively, there is a chance that the 
trolley will go left and kill the workmen. The eyewitness can do nothing or pull the lever. 
Your mother advises that they should not pull the lever because in her opinion it may not turn 
the trolley to the right, killing the workmen. 
A shop assistant advises that they should pull the lever because in her opinion it may turn 
the trolley to the right, saving the workmen. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation? 
 
 Mother      Shop Assistant 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 9  
Helen forgot to submit an essay for her French elective. However, when she checked the 
results online there was a grade beside her name. Helen is not sure whether the professors 
in her university will ever notice this error. If Helen remains quiet, she will have a great grade 
but if she gets caught there are serious consequences for indirectly cheating. 
A janitor advises that she should not remain quiet because in his opinion it likely that 
student‟s grades will be reassessed once they are posted online. 
Your mother advises that she should remain quiet because in her opinion it is unlikely that 
student‟s grades will be reassessed once they are posted online. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Mother      Janitor 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 10  
A health care agency is deciding whether to promote the use of a newly developed vaccine 
designed to permanently cure a deadly disease that is quickly spreading around the country. 
There is a chance that those who take the vaccine will develop immunity to the deadly 
disease forever. Alternatively, there is a chance that those who take the vaccine will contract 
the disease instead. 
A computer technician advises that they should not promote the vaccine because in his 
opinion it may not help to prevent death or cure people. 
Your mother advises that they should promote the vaccine because in her opinion it may 
help to prevent death and cure people. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Computer technician      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 11 
Jane received an email from a close colleague at work. The email asked her to make an 
anonymous online donation for him to partake in a charity sky dive. Jane does not want to 
give a lot of money but she does not want her colleague to find out that she gave a very very 
small donation. Jane is unsure whether it is truly anonymous or not. 
Your mother advises that she should not give a very small donation because she knows from 
experience that there is often ways of detecting who sent an anonymous donation online. 
A waitress advises that they should give a very small donation because she knows from 
experience that there is often no way of detecting who sent an anonymous donation online. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Mother      Waitress 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| 
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| Very Unlikely                                                                      
Very Likely 
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Item 12  
Mr. Johnson is a young man in hospital with a chronic disease. There is a chance that 
administering a particular drug could cure him of his illness forever. Alternatively, there is a 
chance that it could end his life faster. 
Your mother advises that the drug should not be administered because in her opinion it does 
not work out safe when doctors take these types of risks. 
A farmer advises that the drug should be administered because in his opinion it works out 
safe when doctors take these types of risks. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Mother      Farmer 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 13  
Paula has decided to make a batch of brownies for herself. The recipe calls for a measure of 
chopped walnuts. A bag of walnuts on her shelf has exceeded their expiration date. There is 
a chance that these walnuts will make Paula very ill if she consumes them. Alternatively, 
there is a chance that she will feel fine. 
A construction worker advises that she should not use the walnuts because in his opinion 
they usually do not last beyond their expiration date so they may not be safe to consume. 
Your mother advises that she should use the walnuts because in her opinion they usually 
last beyond their expiration date so they may be safe to consume. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Construction worker      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 14  
David is a lawyer working on a big case. The judge presiding over the trial happens to be 
someone he knew from law school. If David were to talk to him over lunch it would be very 
good for his work on the case. If they meet for lunch, there is a chance that someone will find 
out and it may slightly impede the case. Alternatively, there is a chance that no one will find 
out and it could help David to win his case. 
Your mother advises that they should not meet for lunch because she knows from 
experience that there are not many judges and lawyers who socialise when working on the 
same case. 
A hairdresser advises that they should meet for lunch because she knows from experience 
that there are many there are many judges and lawyers who socialise when working on the 
same case. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Mother      Hairdresser 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 15  
There is a fire in the building next door and deadly fumes are rising up through the ventilation 
system. There is a dog trapped in an office. An eyewitness can do something. By saving the 
dog there is a chance that the eyewitness could get injured. Alternatively, there is a chance 
that the eyewitness will not get injured. 
A cleaner advises they should not save the dog because in her opinion the fire looks 
dangerous. 
Your mother advises that they should save the dog because in her opinion, the fire does not 
look dangerous. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Cleaner      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 16  
There is a famine and Mustaq‟s family is unsure whether they will have enough food to 
survive the winter. There is a chance that stealing food from a neighbour in the village will 
provide him with enough food to save his family‟s life. There is also a chance that if he is 
caught stealing the neighbour may take matters into his own hands. 
A hotel receptionist advises he should not steal the food because in her opinion the 
neighbour will probably notice the missing food. 
Your mother advises that he should steal the food because in her opinion the neighbour will 
probably not notice the missing food. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Hotel receptionist      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 17  
A lifeboat is sitting dangerously low in the water. If the weight is not reduced the boat will 
sink and there is a chance that the people on board will all drown. If someone volunteers to 
jump into the sea to reduce the weight, there is a chance that this person will be saved by 
the rescue boat. Alternatively, there is a chance that this person will drown before the rescue 
boat reaches them. 
Your mother advises someone should not jump out of the boat because in her opinion it will 
not be possible for the volunteer to tread water until the rescue-boat arrives. 
A tile-layer advises that someone should jump out of the boat because in his opinion it will be 
possible for the volunteer to tread water until the rescue-boat arrives. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Mother      Tile-layer 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 18  
Harry is driving when he sees an injured man thumbing a lift at the side of the road. He has 
never picked up a hitchhiker before and he does not know whether it is safe to do so, but this 
man needs medical attention. Harry could take a chance that it is safe and allow him into the 
car, or he could drive past him. 
Your mother advises he should not give the man a lift because she knows 4from experience 
that it is generally not safe to pick up hitchhikers. 
A florist advises that he should give the man a lift because she knows from experience that it 
is generally safe to pick up hitchhikers. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Mother      Florist 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 19  
There is a chance that a new environmental policy could save many animal species. There is 
also a chance that it could backfire and put one specific category of species in danger. 
Someone must make a decision on whether to sign the policy or not. 
A babysitter advises that this policy should not be signed because in her opinion this one 
specific category of species concerned is very important for the ecology. 
Your mother advises that this policy should be signed because in her opinion this one 
specific category of species concerned is not very important for the ecology. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Babysitter      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Item 20  
Matthew has been trying to get an interview for his dream job. He figures that if he could 
leave out a period of unemployment from his CV he could make it more impressive. If 
Matthew does this, there is a chance that he could get hired, improving his reputation. 
Alternatively, there is a chance that he could get caught, damaging his reputation. 
A carpenter advises that he should not omit the employment gap from his CV because he 
knows from experience that it is very obvious when someone is giving selective information 
on a CV. 
Your mother advises that he should omit the employment gap from his CV because she 
knows from experience that it is not very obvious when someone is giving selective 
information on a CV. 
 
Which advice do you trust in this situation?  
 
Carpenter      Mother 
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
MildlyTrust                 StronglyTrust MildlyTrust           StronglyTrust 
 
How likely are you to change your mind regarding this decision?  
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|  
Very Unlikely                                                                      Very Likely 
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Appendix C:Trust Game 
 
The Trust Game: A 10 round version of the trust game was used. Participants are initially 
provided with instructions as to the aim of the game. 
 
The participant is then asked to practice using the arrow keys so they learn how to 
manipulate the amount of coins they would like to keep and send.  Following this, round 1 
begins and the participant is presented with the screen below. 
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Once the participant chooses the amount that they want to keep and the amount they 
want to give away, they confirm their choice by pressing the space bar. A pause is created 
while a message appears on the screen stating “Please wait for the response of the grown-
up”.  
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The participant then receives money back from the grown-up. This process is repeated until 
ten rounds have been completed. 
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Appendix D: The Borderline Personality Disorder Features Scale for Children (BPFSC) 
 
 
How I Feel About Myself and Others 
 
Instructions:  Here are some statements about the way you feel about yourself and 
other people.   Put an X in the box that tells how true each statement is about you. 
 
1.  I'm a pretty happy person. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
2.  I feel very lonely. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
3.  I get upset when my parents or friends leave town for a few days. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
4.  I do things that other people consider wild or out of control. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
5.  I feel pretty much the same way all the time.  My feelings don't change very often. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
6.  I want to let some people know how much they've hurt me. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
7.  I do things without thinking. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
8.  My feelings are very strong.  For instance, when I get mad, I get really really mad.  When 
I get happy, I get really really happy. 
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Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
9.  I feel that there is something important missing about me, but I don’t know what it is. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
10.  I've picked friends who have treated me badly. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
11.  I'm careless with things that are important to me. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
12.  I change my mind almost every day about what I should do when I grow up. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
13.  People who were close to me have let me down. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
14.  I go back  and forth between different feelings, like being mad or  sad or happy. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
15.  I get into trouble because I do things without thinking. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
16.  I worry that people I care about will leave and not come back. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
17.  When I'm mad, I can't control what I do. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
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18.  How I feel about myself changes a lot. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
19.  When I get upset, I do things that aren't good for me. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
20.  Lots of times, my friends and I are really mean to each other. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
21.  I get so mad I can't let all my anger out. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
22.  I get bored very easily. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
23.  I take good care of things that are mine. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
 
 
24.  Once someone is my friend, we stay friends. 
 
Not at All 
True 
Hardly Ever 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Always 
True 
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Appendix E: The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) 
 
For each item, please mark the box for Not True, Somewhat True or Certainly True. It 
would help us if you answered all items as best you can even if you are not absolutely 
certain or the item seems daft! Please give your answers on the basis of how things 
have been for you over thelast six months. 
 
 
Do you 
have 
any 
other 
comme
nts or 
concer
ns? 
Overall
, do you think 
you have 
difficulties in 
one or more 
of the 
following 
areas: 
emotio
ns, 
concentration
, behaviour or 
being able to 
get on with 
other people? 
 
 
 
 
 
 Yes - 
 
 
 Yes - 
 
 Yes –  
 
 
 
 
 minor
 
 
 definite 
 
 severe 
 
 No
 
 
 difficulties  difficulties difficulties        
 Not 
True 
Somewhat 
True 
Certainly 
True 
I try to be nice to other people. I care about their feelings 
 
□ □ □ 
I am restless, I cannot stay still for long 
 
□ □ □ 
I get a lot of headaches, stomach-aches or sickness 
 
□ □ □ 
I usually share with others (food, games, pens etc) 
 
□ □ □ 
I get very angry and often lose my temper 
 
□ □ □ 
I am usually on my own. I generally play alone or keep 
myself to myself. 
 
□ □ □ 
I usually do as I am told 
 
□ □ □ 
I worry a lot 
 
□ □ □ 
I am helpful if someone is hurt, upset or feeling ill 
 
□ □ □ 
I am constantly fidgeting or squirming 
 
□ □ □ 
I have one good friend or more 
 
□ □ □ 
I fight a lot. I can make other people do what I want 
 
□ □ □ 
I am often unhappy, down hearted or tearful 
 
□ □ □ 
Other people my age generally like me 
 
□ □ □ 
I am easily distracted, I find it difficult to concentrate 
 
□ □ □ 
I am nervous in new situations. I easily lose confidence 
 
□ □ □ 
I am kind to younger children 
 
□ □ □ 
I am often accused of lying or cheating 
 
□ □ □ 
Other children or young people pick on me or bully me  
 
 
□ □ □ 
I often volunteer to help other (parents, teachers, children) 
 
 
□ □ □ 
I think before I do things 
 
□ □ □ 
I take things that are not mine from home, school or 
elsewhere 
 
□ □ □ 
I get on better with adults that with people my own age 
 
□ □ □ 
I have many fears, I am easily scared 
 
□ □ □ 
I finish the work I‟m doing. My attention is good 
 
□ □ □ 
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If you have answered “Yes”, please answer the following questions about these difficulties: 
 
How long have these difficulties been present? 
 
         Less than  1-5   6-12     Over  
  a month  months   months    a year 
 
 
 
 
Do these difficulties upset or distress or upset you? 
 
   Not  Only a   Quite   A great                               
at all  little       a lot deal 
 
 
 
 
Do the difficulties interfere with your everyday life in the following areas? 
 
   Not   Only   Quite  A great 
   at all   a little   a lot  deal 
 
HOME LIFE 
 
FREINDSHIPS 
 
CLASSROOM 
LEARNING 
 
LEISURE 
ACTIVITIES 
 
Do the difficulties make it harder for those around you (family, friends, teachers, etc)? 
 
   Not   Only a  Quite   A great 
   at all    little           a lot  deal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F: UCL ethical approval confirmation 
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UCLRESEARCHE
THICSCOMMITTE
E 
ACADEMICSERVI
CES 
 
16May2016 
 
ProfessorPeterFonagy 
Divisionof PsychologyandLanguageSciences 
UCL 
 
DearProfessorFonagy 
 
Notificationof EthicalApproval 
Re:EthicsApplication8843/001:Epistemictrustinadolescents 
 
Furthertoyoursatisfactoryresponsestothecommittee‟scomments,Iampleasedtoconfirminm
ycapacityas Chairof 
theUCLResearchEthicsCommittee(REC)thatyourstudyhasbeenethicallyapprovedbytheU
CL RECuntil16thMay2018. 
 
Approvalis subjecttothefollowingconditions. 
 
1.  YoumustseekChair‟sapprovalforproposedamendmentstotheresearchforwhichthis 
approvalhas been given.Ethical approval 
isspecifictothisprojectandmustnotbetreatedasapplicable toresearchofa similarnature.   
Eachresearchprojectisreviewedseparatelyandiftherearesignificantchangestothe 
research protocol you should seek confirmation of continued ethical approval by 
completing the 
„AmendmentApprovalRequestForm‟:http://ethics.grad.ucl.ac.uk/responsibilities.php 
 
2.
 ItisyourresponsibilitytoreporttotheCommitteeanyunanticipatedproblemsoradverseev
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entsinvolving riskstoparticipantsorothers. 
TheEthicsCommitteeshouldbenotifiedofallseriousadverseeventsvia the 
EthicsCommittee Administrator  (ethics@ucl.ac.uk)immediatelythe incident occurs.   
Where the adverseincidentisunexpectedandserious,theChairorVice-
Chairwilldecidewhetherthestudyshould beterminated 
pendingtheopinionofanindependentexpert. Theadverseeventwillbeconsidered atthe 
nextCommitteemeetingandadecisionwillbemadeontheneedtochangetheinformationlea
fletand/or studyprotocol. 
 
3. Fornon-seriousadverseeventstheChairorVice-
ChairoftheEthicsCommitteeshouldagainbenotified 
viatheEthicsCommitteeAdministrator(ethics@ucl.ac.uk)withintendaysofanadverseinci
dent occurring andprovideafullwrittenreportthatshouldincludeanyamendments 
totheparticipantinformation sheet andstudyprotocol. TheChairorVice-
Chairwillconfirmthattheincidentisnon-serious andreporttothe 
Committeeatthenextmeeting.Thefinalviewof theCommitteewillbecommunicatedto you. 
 
Oncompletionoftheresearchyoumustsubmitabriefreportofyourfindings/concludingcommentst
othe 
Committee,whichincludesinparticularissuesrelatingtotheethicalimplicationsof theresearch. 
 
Yourssincerely 
xxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
ProfessorJohnForeman 
ChairoftheUCLResearchEthicsCommittee 
 
Cc:TobiasNolte,EliseDraper,JessieGreisbach&TalReches,Applicants 
 
Academic Services,1-
19Torrington 
Place(9thFloor), University 
CollegeLondon 
Tel: +44(0)2031088216 
Appendix G: NHS ethical approval confirmation 
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27January2017 
 
Professor Peter Fonagy 
FreudMemorial Professorof Psychoanalysis 
UniversityCollege London 
PsychoanalysisUnit 
Research DepartmentofClinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
London 
WC1E6BT 
 
DearProfessorFonagy 
 
Studytitle:                            Exploringhowtrauma, 
symptomatologyand expectations 
ofhelping relationshipsarerelated 
to epistemictrust inadolescents. 
REC reference:                     16/LO/2108 
IRAS projectID:                   217408 
 
Thankyouforyourletter of05January2017, responding totheCommittee‟s request 
forfurther informationonthe above researchandsubmitting reviseddocumentation. 
 
Thefurtherinformationhas been 
consideredonbehalfoftheCommitteebytheChairandMs Gila Falkus. 
Weplanto publish your researchsummarywordingfor theabove studyon 
theHRA website, togetherwith yourcontactdetails.Publication 
willbenoearlier thanthreemonthsfrom the date of thisopinionletter. Should 
youwish to providea substitute contactpoint, require further 
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information,orwish tomake arequest topostponepublication,pleasecontact 
hra.studyregistration@nhs.netoutlining thereasonsforyour request. 
 
Confirmation ofethical opinion 
 
On behalfof theCommittee, Iampleasedtoconfirm afavourable ethical 
opinionfor the above researchonthebasisdescribedin 
theapplicationform, protocol and supporting 
documentationasrevised,subject totheconditionsspecifiedbelow 
 
Conditionsofthefavourableopinion 
 
TheRECfavourable opinionissubject tothefollowingconditionsbeingmet prior tothe 
start ofthestudy. 
 
 Pleaseensurethat thePISfor theParent/Carerstatesthat it 
isinformationforParent/Carerand notYoung People. 
 
You should notifytheREC onceallconditions have been met (exceptforsite 
approvalsfromhostorganisations)and provide copiesofanyrevised 
documentation with updated versionnumbers.Revised documentsshouldbe 
submittedtothe REC electronicallyfrom IRAS.The 
RECwillacknowledgereceiptand provide a final listof the approved 
documentationfor the study, whichyou can makeavailableto host 
organisationstofacilitatetheirpermissionforthestudy.Failureto provide 
thefinal versions tothe REC maycause delayin obtaining permissions. 
 
Managementpermission mustbeobtainedfromeach host organisation priortothe 
startofthe studyatthesiteconcerned. 
Managementpermissionshould besoughtfromall NHS organisationsinvolvedin 
thestudy in accordancewith NHS researchgovernance arrangements.Each NHS 
organisationmust 
confirmthroughthesigningofagreementsand/orotherdocumentsthat ithasgiven 
permissionfortheresearch toproceed (exceptwhere explicitlyspecifiedotherwise). 
Guidanceonapplyingfor NHS permissionfor research isavailable in theIntegrated 
ResearchApplication System, www.hra.nhs.ukorat http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk. 
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Wherea NHS organisation‟s role inthestudy islimitedto identifyingand 
referringpotential participants toresearchsites("participant identification centre"), 
guidanceshould besought from theR&D officeontheinformationit requirestogive 
permissionforthisactivity. 
Fornon-NHS sites,sitemanagementpermissionshould beobtained inaccordance 
with the proceduresoftherelevanthostorganisation. 
Sponsorsare not required tonotifytheCommitteeofmanagementpermissions from 
host organisations 
 
Registration ofClinical Trials 
All clinical trials (definedas thefirstfourcategoriesontheIRASfilterpage) must 
be registeredonapublicallyaccessible databasewithin 6weeksof recruitmentof 
thefirst participant (formedical device studies,within thetimelinedetermined 
bythe current registrationandpublication trees). 
There is norequirement to separatelynotifytheREC butyoushould dosoat 
theearliest opportunitye.g. when submitting anamendment.Wewill 
audittheregistration detailsas part oftheannual progress reporting process. 
Toensure transparencyin research, we stronglyrecommendthat all research 
isregistered but for non-clinicaltrialsthisisnot currentlymandatory. 
Ifa sponsorwishes to requestadeferralforstudyregistrationwithin the 
requiredtimeframe, theyshould 
contacthra.studyregistration@nhs.net.Theexpectation isthat all clinical trials 
will be registered,however, in exceptional circumstancesnonregistrationmaybe 
permissible with prioragreementfromtheHRA. Guidanceonwhere 
toregisterisprovided on theHRA website. 
It istheresponsibilityofthesponsortoensure thatall theconditions are 
complied with beforethestartof the studyor itsinitiation at a 
particularsite(as applicable). 
 
Ethical reviewofresearch sites 
NHS sites 
Thefavourable opinionapplies to all NHS sitestakingpart inthestudy,subject to 
managementpermissionbeingobtainedfromtheNHS/HSC R&D office prior 
tothestartof thestudy(see"Conditionsofthefavourable opinion"below). 
 
Approved documents 
Thefinal listofdocuments reviewedand approvedbytheCommitteeisasfollows: 
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Document Versi
on 
Date 
Contract/StudyAgreement [DraftAgreement]   
Contract/StudyAgreement [InsuranceCertificate]   
Copies ofadvertisementmaterialsfor research 
participants [Guideforclinicians to share with 
youngpeople (changes accepted)] 
2 05January2017 
Coveringletteronheaded paper [Covering letter to REC] 1 
 
05January2017 
EvidenceofSponsor insurance 
orindemnity(nonNHS Sponsorsonly) [Insurance 
confirmation] 
 05April 2016 
Interviewschedules or 
topicguidesforparticipants[Interview schedule] 
1 05February2016 
IRAS Application Form [IRAS_Form_11112016]  11November 
2016 IRAS Application Form XML file [IRAS_Form_11112016]  11November 
2016 IRAS Checklist XML [Checklist_21112016]  21November 
2016 IRAS Checklist XML [Checklist_13012017]  13January2017 
Letter from funder [FundingConfirmation]  08June 2016 
Lettersofinvitationto participant [Coverletter] 2 16September 
2016 Non-validatedquestionnaire [DilemmaTask] 1 05February2016 
Non-validatedquestionnaire [Computer task] 1 05February2016 
Other [Email confirmation re:AcademicSupervisors]  20November 
2016 Other [Schedule ofevents]  22November 
2016 Other [Statementof activities]  22November 
2016 Participant consentform [Consent Parent/Carer] 2 16September 
2016 Participant consentform [Consent 16-18] 2 16September 
  2016 
Participant consentform [Assent 12-15] 2 16September 
2016 Participantinformationsheet (PIS) [PIS 12-
15(changes accepted)] 
3 05January2017 
Participantinformationsheet (PIS) [PIS 16-
18(changes accepted)] 
3 05January2017 
Participantinformationsheet (PIS) [PIS Parent/Carer 
(changes accepted)] 
3 05January2017 
Referee'sreportorotherscientificcritique report [Critique1]  28 October2016 
Referee'sreportorotherscientificcritique report [Critique2]   
Referee'sreportorotherscientificcritique report [Critique3]   
Referee'sreportorotherscientificcritique report [REC 
feedback forassociatedapplication 1] 
 21September 
2016 Referee'sreportorotherscientificcritique report [REC 
feedback forassociatedproject2] 
 05 October2016 
Referee'sreportorotherscientificcritique report 
[Response to REC] 
 15 October2016 
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Researchprotocolorproject proposal [Protocol] 2 16September 
2016 Summary CVforChiefInvestigator (CI) [Summary CV 
Chief 
Investigator] 
 28 October2016 
Summary CVforstudent [Jessie Greisbach CV]  28 October2016 
Summary CVforstudent [Elise DraperCV]  28 October2016 
Summary CVforstudent [Tal RechesCV]  28 October2016 
Summary CVforsupervisor (student research) [Tobias 
Nolte 
CV] 
 28 October2016 
Validatedquestionnaire [BPFSC]  28 October2016 
Validatedquestionnaire [CTES]  28 October2016 
Validatedquestionnaire [CTQ]  28 October2016 
Validatedquestionnaire [APPA-R]  28 October2016 
Validatedquestionnaire [NRI-SPV]   
Validatedquestionnaire [NRI-SPV (short version)]  28 October2016 
Validatedquestionnaire [PEPI]  28 October2016 
Validatedquestionnaire [RFQY]  28 October2016 
Validatedquestionnaire [SDQ]  28 October2016 
 
Statementofcompliance 
TheCommitteeisconstitutedin accordancewith the GovernanceArrangementsfor 
ResearchEthicsCommitteesandcompliesfully with 
theStandardOperatingProceduresfor ResearchEthicsCommitteesintheUK. 
 
Afterethical review 
Reporting requirements 
Theattacheddocument“Afterethicalreview–guidance for researchers”gives 
detailed guidanceonreporting requirementsforstudieswith afavourable 
opinion,including: 
 
Notifyingsubstantial amendments 
    Addingnewsites andinvestigators 
Notification ofseriousbreachesof theprotocol 
Progressand safetyreports 
Notifyingtheendofthe study 
 
TheHRAwebsite also providesguidanceonthese topics,which is updated in 
thelightof changesinreporting requirementsorprocedures. 
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UserFeedback 
TheHealth Research Authority iscontinuallystriving toprovidea highqualityservice to 
all applicantsand sponsors. Youare invited togive yourviewoftheservice youhave 
received and theapplicationprocedure. Ifyouwish tomake yourviewsknown please 
usethe feedback form availableon theHRA website: http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-
the-hra/governance/quality-assurance/ 
 
HRATraining 
Weare pleasedtowelcomeresearchersand R&D staff at our trainingdays–
seedetailsat http://www.hra.nhs.uk/hra-training/ 
 
16/LO/2108                         Pleasequotethis numberonall correspondence 
 
WiththeCommittee‟sbestwishesfor thesuccessofthisproject. 
Yourssincerely 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
Reverend JimLinthicum 
Chair 
 
Email:                       nrescommittee.london-bloomsbury@nhs.net 
Enclosures:             “Afterethical review –guidanceforresearchers” 
Copyto:                   MsTaniaWest 
Ms.Fiona Horton, 
North EastLondon NHSFoundationTrust  
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Appendix H1:Participant information sheet – clinical adolescent version 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Epistemic Trust and Learning in Adolescence 
INFORMATION FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 
 
 
Invitation and brief summary 
We would like to invite you to join a research project. We want to learn more about 
how teenagers learn and what makes learning easier or harder. We are specifically 
looking at epistemic trust, which means an openness to learn from others.  We are 
looking at how difficult situations and mental health in childhood may lead to 
people being less trusting of things that they are told and therefore find it more 
difficult to learn new information. We are also looking at how trust affects young 
people’s expectations of helping relationships. This is important to us because the 
information that we get from this project might help us understand the process of 
learning and help people in the future. 
 
What would taking part involve? 
Before meeting we will ask half of the young people joining the project to email the 
researcher a photograph of their mother, so we can include it in a section of the 
computer task.  
We will meet you at CASUS and your key worker will introduce us.  We will ask you 
to sign a form, complete some computer tasks, fill in some questionnaires and then 
do a short activity. Each of these things are described below. 
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 The form  
The assent form shows that you agree to take part in the study.  
 The computer tasks 
You will be asked to play some games on a computer, these involve: 
o Trading coins with the computer 
o Making decisions whether to move towards or away from different objects  
o A dilemma task - the purpose of this task is to look at how people make 
decisions in a dilemma situation, where different people may act in different 
ways.Before you begin playing each game, the researcher will go through it 
with you to make sure you understand what you’re doing.  
 
 The questionnaires 
There are questions about: 
o Your behaviour and how you are feeling 
o How you get on with friends and family 
o Difficult situations you may or may not have experienced 
o Your expectations of helping relationships 
The questionnaires we will ask you to complete are the Strength and Difficulties 
Questionnaire, Reflective Functioning Questionnaire for Youth, The Inventory of 
Parent and Peer Attachment Revised questionnaire, The Borderline Personality 
Disorder Features Scale for Children, Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, the 
Childhood Traumatic Events Scale, the Network of Relationship Questionnaire 
Manual, Psychotherapy Expectation & Perception Inventory, and the Child Rejection 
Sensitivity Questionnaire.   
 The short activity 
We would like to give you some words and ask you what they mean. For example, 
words that describe animals and words that describe feelings, such as anger. There 
is also another short activity, like a puzzle. The short activities have been taken from 
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. 
It is important to note that this is NOT a test.  
All this should take around 2-3 hours (with breaks). If you decide that you want to 
stop before all the different tasks are finished then you can.  
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We would like to say thank you for helping us by giving you a £30 voucher for 
completing the tasks.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
If you do decide to participate you will be helping us to understand the part trust 
plays in learning. This may help other people in the future. You may find some of 
the tasks enjoyable to complete. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The research is not intended to be upsetting. But, if you do find it stressful or 
upsetting we will give you information about who you can contact for support. 
Rules that we must follow 
There are a few things for you to know before you decide whether or not to take 
part in this study. We have to follow some important rules to make sure that people 
who help us are treated well and are safe: 
(1) Consent or agreeing to take part in the study 
 You do not have to agree to take part if you do not want to. You are 
completely free to decide whether or not you want to take part in 
the study. 
 If you decide you would like to take part in the study both you and 
your parent or carer have to agree 
 If you do agree to take part, you can change your mind and stop at 
any time, without giving a reason. This will not affect any support 
you are receiving. Your decision not to take part or to withdraw 
from the study will override the wishes of your parent or carer.  
 
(2) Confidentiality: keeping what you tell us private 
The information you give is private. Nothing you say will be told to anyone 
outside the research team, except in three circumstances: 
 You tell us that you or another person are planning to seriously harm a 
specific person.  
 You tell us that you or another young person is at risk of harm. 
 We may inform your mental health worker if we are concerned about your 
mental health. 
If it was necessary to take any of the above steps, this will be discussed with you 
first.  
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Further supporting information 
How will my information be kept confidential?  
We will keep all the information that you give us private (confidential). You will be 
given an ID number (e.g. 001) so your name will not be on any of your answers. The 
information will not be shared with anyone (e.g. school) and it will be used only for 
this project. Once the project is finished we will happily tell you what we have 
learnt.  
What will happen to the results of the study?  
The report will be written about the results of the study. In that report, no one 
could identify you, or your parent or carer. In other words, we can guarantee that 
information about you will be secret and private because we talk about groups not 
the individual.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect you. This study has been reviewed and given 
favourable opinion by London - Bloomsbury Research Ethics Committee (Project ID 
Number): 16/LO/2108  
How have young people been involved in this study? 
Young people have provided consultation to the research project by reviewing 
materials, planning how to present the questionnaires and computer tasks to young 
people and making adaptations to the questionnaire pack and computer tasks.  
Who is organising and funding the study? 
Doctoral trainees at the Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
at University College London have set up the project. Professor Peter Fonagy and Dr 
Tobias Nolte are supervising the research. The research is being funded by 
University College London and is an educational project. 
What if something goes wrong? 
If you have any worries about how this study is being run, you should ask to speak 
to the researcher who will do their best to answer your questions. If you would like 
to contact someone outside the team you can do this through the Research 
Governance Sponsor, University College London (UCL). You can write to Joint 
UCLH/UCL Biomedical Research Unit, R&D Directorate (Maple House), Rosenheim 
Wing, Ground Floor, 25 Grafton Way, London, WC1E 5DB quoting reference 
16/0021. All communication will be in confidence. 
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If something does go wrong and you are harmed then you may have grounds for a 
legal action for compensation against University College London (UCL).  
If you would like to contact Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Patient Advice and 
Liaison Services (PALS), they can be contacted either by calling 0800 376 0775, via 
email PALS@cpft.nhs.uk, or in writing to: 
Patient Advice and Liaison Service,  
Elizabeth House, 
Fulbourn,  
Cambridge 
CB21 5EF 
 
Thank you for reading  
 
We will contact you shortly to answer any questions and discuss whether this is a 
project that you would like to join.   
 
Our contact details are 
Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. If you have 
any questions about the project you can contact them on: 
 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Dr Tobias Nolte is a supervisor on the project. If you have any concerns you wish to discuss, 
you can contact him on: 
 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk 
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Appendix H2:Participant information sheet – clinical parent version 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Epistemic Trust and Learning in Adolescence 
INFORMATION FOR PARENTS/CARERS 
 
Invitation and brief summary 
We are asking you to help us with a study that we are doing to learn about how 
teenagers learn and generalise new pieces of information. We are telling all 
teenagers who attend CASUS about this project. 
We want to learn more about how adolescents learn and what makes learning 
easier or harder. We are specifically looking at epistemic trust, which refers to an 
openness to learn from others. We are looking at how difficult situations and 
mental health in childhood may lead to people being less trusting of things that 
they are told and therefore find it more difficult to learn new information. We are 
also looking at how trust influences young people’s expectations of helping 
relationships. This is important to us because the information that we get from this 
project might help us understand the process of learning and help people in the 
future. 
Do I have to take part? 
As a legal guardian of your child you are the person who must legally consent on 
their behalf. If you do not wish your child to participate then that will be respected 
and we will not contact you or your child about this project in the future. However 
even if you consent, if your child does not want to participate then that will be 
respected and they will not be approached to participate in this project in the 
future. There are no consequences for not participating.  
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What would taking part involve? 
Before meeting we will ask half of the young people joining the project to email the 
researcher a photograph of their mother, so we can include it in a section of the 
computer task. We may ask for a photo as we are interested to see whether the 
presence of the image affects how young people learn a new task. 
We will meet your child at CASUS and their key worker will introduce us. Your child 
will be asked to sign a form to show that they have agreed to take part, complete 
some computer tasks, fill in some questionnaires and then do a short activity. Each 
task is described below in more detail. 
 The computer task 
Your child will be asked to play a game on a computer where they will be trading 
coins with the computer. Then they will play a different game that involves making 
decisions about whether to move towards or away from different objects. The last 
section is a dilemma task – the purpose of this task is to look at how people make 
decisions in a dilemma situation. The dilemmas will contain a mixture of moral and 
amoral situations. Before they begin playing each game, the researcher will go 
through it with them to make sure they understand and answer any questions.  
 The questionnaires 
Your child will be asked to complete a questionnaire pack that the researcher will 
offer to read to them and complete together. The pack includes questions about 
their behaviour, mental health, how they get on with friends and family, difficult 
situations they may or may not have experienced and their expectations of helping 
relationships. 
The names of these questionnaires are the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire, 
Reflective Functioning Questionnaire for Youth, The Inventory of Parent and Peer 
Attachment Revised questionnaire, The Borderline Personality Disorder Features 
Scale for Children, Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, the Childhood Traumatic 
Events Scale, the Network of Relationship Questionnaire Manual, Psychotherapy 
Expectation & Perception Inventory, and the Child Rejection Sensitivity 
Questionnaire. 
 The short activity 
The activities include asking the meaning of words. For example, words that 
describe animals and words that describe feelings, such as anger. There is also 
another short activity, like a puzzle. The short activities have been taken from the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. 
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The above tasks will take approximately 2-3 hours (with breaks). 
It is important to note that this is NOT a test.  
If they decide that they want to stop before all the different tasks are finished 
then they can.    
We would like to show your child our appreciation for agreeing to participate by 
offering them a £30 voucher for completing the tasks.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
If your child does decide to participate they will be helping us to understand the 
part trust plays in learning. This may help other people in the future. Your child may 
also find completing some of the activities enjoyable. 
Are there any risks to you if you take part in the research? 
The research is not intended to be upsetting. However, if you or your child do find it 
stressful or are upset by it we will provide you with information on who you can 
contact for support.  They can also stop participating at any point during the 
research.  
Rules that we must follow 
There are a few things for you to know before you decide whether or not you would 
like your child to take part in this study. When running studies, there are some 
important rules we have to follow to make sure that people who help us are treated 
well and not harmed in any way. Here are those rules: 
(3) Consent 
First, you should know that your child does not have to agree to take part, if they or 
you do not want them to. In other words, this is voluntary. If your child does not 
take part, it will not disadvantage them in any way. If they do agree to take part, 
you or your child can change your mind and withdraw consent at any time and 
without giving a reason. This will result in no negative consequences and it will not 
affect any support you or your family are receiving. If your child decides not to 
consent or chooses to withdraw consent at anytime their wishes will be respected 
and override any consent given by yourself. 
(4) Confidentiality 
Secondly, you should know that all the information your child gives is 
confidential. All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data 
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Protection Act 1998. Nothing you or you child says will be told to anyone 
outside the research team, except in three circumstances: 
 We would have to tell the police or another relevant agency if we were told 
that someone was planning to seriously harm a specific person. 
 We would also have to tell the police or another relevant agency if we were 
to learn that a person under the age of 18 was currently at risk.  
 We may inform your child’s mental health worker if we are concerned about 
their mental health. 
If it was necessary to take any of the above steps, this will be discussed with the 
young person.  
Further supporting information 
How will our information be kept confidential?  
All the information that your child provides will be treated confidentially. Your child 
will be assigned an ID number (e.g. 001) and they won’t be identified by name to 
anyone. The information will not be shared with anyone (e.g. school) and it will be 
used solely for this project. Once the project is finished we will happily give you a 
report of our findings if you are interested.  
What will happen to the results of the study?  
The report will be written about the results of the study. In that report, the results 
will be presented in such a way that no one can identify the young person or you. In 
other words, we can guarantee that information will be anonymous because we talk 
about groups not the individual.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given favourable opinion by London - Bloomsbury Research Ethics Committee 
(Project ID Number): 16/LO/2108  
How have young people been involved in this study? 
Young people have provided consultation to the research project by reviewing 
materials, planning how to present the questionnaires and computer tasks to young 
people and making adaptations to the questionnaire pack and computer tasks.  
Who is organising and funding the study? 
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Doctoral trainees at the Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
at University College London have set up the project. Professor Peter Fonagy and Dr 
Tobias Nolte are supervising the research. The research is being funded by 
University College London and is an educational project. 
What if something goes wrong? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
researcher who will do their best to answer your questions. If you have any 
concerns and would like to contact someone outside the team you can do this 
through the Research Governance Sponsor, University College London (UCL). You 
can write to Joint UCLH/UCL Biomedical Research Unit, R&D Directorate (Maple 
House), Rosenheim Wing, Ground Floor, 25 Grafton Way, London, WC1E 5DB 
quoting reference 16/0021. All communication will be dealt with in strict 
confidence. 
If in the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the 
research and this is due to someone’s negligence then you may have grounds for a 
legal action for compensation against University College London (UCL).  
If you would like to contact Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Patient Advice and 
Liaison Services (PALS), they can be contacted either by calling 0800 376 0775, via 
email PALS@cpft.nhs.uk, or in writing to: 
Patient Advice and Liaison Service,  
Elizabeth House, 
Fulbourn,  
Cambridge 
CB21 5EF 
 
Thank you for reading  
We will contact you shortly to answer any questions and discuss whether this is a 
project that you would like to join study.   
 
Our contact details are 
Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. If you have 
any questions about the project you can contact them on: 
 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
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elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Dr Tobias Nolte is a supervisor on the project. If you have any concerns you wish to discuss, 
you can contact him on: 
 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk 
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Appendix H3: Participant information sheet – community adolescent version 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A study about trust and learning 
INFORMATION FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 
 
 
Invitation and brief summary 
We would like to invite you to join a research project. We want to learn more about 
how teenagers learn and what makes learning easier or harder. We are specifically 
looking at epistemic trust, which means an openness to learn from others. We think 
that when people are babies they learn through their relationship with their 
parent(s) or the person who takes care of them. We also think that being in difficult 
situations may lead to people being less trusting and this might mean they find it 
more difficult to learn new things. This is important to us because the information 
that we get from this project might help us get a better understanding about how 
teenagers learn and help people in the future. 
 
What would taking part involve? 
Before meeting we will ask half of the young people joining the project to email the 
researcher a photograph of their mother, so we can include it in a section of the 
computer task.  
We will meet you at your home or at the Anna Freud Centre, whichever you and 
your parent or carer prefer.We will ask you to sign a form, complete some 
computer tasks, fill in some questionnaires and then do a short activity. Each of 
these things are described below. 
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 The form  
The assent form shows that you agree to take part in the study. We will also ask you 
to give us your doctors (GP) contact details as part of our routine safeguarding 
protocol.  
 
 The computer tasks 
You will be asked to play some games on a computer, these involve: 
o Trading coins with the computer 
o Making decisions whether to move towards or away from different objects  
o Problem solving tasks where you are asked to make decisions about 
conflicting advice  
Before you begin playing each game, the researcher will go through it with you to 
make sure you understand what you’re doing.  
 The questionnaires 
There are questions about: 
o Your behaviour and any worries you may have 
o How you get on with friends and family 
o Difficult situations you may or may not have experienced 
The questionnaires we will ask you to complete are the Strength and Difficulties 
Questionnaire, Reflective Functioning Questionnaire for Youth, The Borderline 
Personality Disorder Features Scale for Children, The Inventory of Parent and Peer 
Attachment Revised questionnaire, The Measure of Parental Style, Childhood 
Trauma Questionnaire, the Childhood Traumatic Events Scale, the Network of 
Relationship Questionnaire Manual, Psychotherapy Expectation & Perception 
Inventory, and the Child Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire.   
 The short activity 
We would like to give you some words and ask you what they mean. For example, 
words that describe animals and words that describe feelings, such as anger. There 
is also another short activity, like a puzzle. The short activities have been taken from 
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. 
It is important to note that this is NOT a test.  
All this should take around 2-3 hours (with breaks). If you decide that you want to 
stop before all the different tasks are finished then you can.  
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We would like to say thank you for helping us by giving you £10 for every hour that 
you help us.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
If you do decide to participate you will be helping us to understand the part trust 
plays in learning. This may help other people in the future. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
The research is not intended to be upsetting. But, if you do find it stressful or 
upsetting we will give you information about who you can contact for support. 
 
Rules that we must follow 
There are a few things for you to know before you decide whether or not to take 
part in this study. We have to follow some important rules to make sure that people 
who help us are treated well and not harmed in any way: 
(5) Consent or agreeing to take part in the study 
 You do not have to agree to take part if you do not want to. You are 
completely free to decide whether or not you want to take part in 
the study. 
 If you decide you would like to take part in the study both you and 
your parent or carer have to agree 
 If you do agree to take part, you can change your mind and stop at 
any time, without giving a reason. This will result in no negative 
consequences and it will not affect any support you are receiving. 
Your decision not to take part or to withdraw from the study will 
override the wishes of your parent or carer.  
 
(6) Confidentiality: keeping what you tell us private 
The information you give is private. Nothing you say will be told to anyone 
outside the research team, except in three circumstances: 
 You tell us that you or another person are planning to seriously harm a 
specific person.  
 You tell us that you or another young person is at risk of harm. 
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 We may contact your GP if we are concerned about your mental health or 
emotional difficulties. 
 
Further supporting information 
How will my information be kept confidential?  
We will keep all the information that you give us private (confidential). You will be 
given an ID number (e.g. 001) so your name will not be on any of your answers. The 
information will not be shared with anyone (e.g. school) and it will be used only for 
this project.  
 
 
What will happen to the results of the study?  
The report will be written about the results of the study. In that report, no one 
could identify you, or your parent or carer. In other words, we can guarantee that 
information about you will be secret and private because we talk about groups not 
the individual. Once the project is finished we will happily give you a report of what 
we learn. 
How have young people been involved in this study? 
Young people have provided consultation to the research project by reviewing 
materials, planning how to present the questionnaires and computer tasks to young 
people and making adaptations to the questionnaire pack and computer tasks.  
Who is organising and funding the study? 
Doctoral trainees at the Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
at University College London have set up the project. Professor Peter Fonagy and Dr 
Tobias Nolte are supervising the research. The research is being funded by 
University College London. 
What if something goes wrong? 
Professor Peter Fonagy, Principle Investigator, will be available if you have any 
questions or concerns. You can contact him at: 
Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
1-19 Torrington Place, WC1E 7HB 
Tel: 020 7679 1943 
Email: p.fonagy@ucl.ac.uk 
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If you have any concerns and would like to contact someone outside the team you 
can email the Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee, Professor John Foreman 
c/o Helen Dougal at: 
Email: ethics@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for reading  
 
We will contact you shortly to answer any questions and discuss whether this is a 
project that you would like to join.   
 
Our contact details are 
Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. Dr 
Tobias Nolte is a supervisor on the project. If you have any questions or concerns, 
you can contact them on: 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk 
 
This study has been approved by UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID 
Number): 6129/003 
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Appendix H4: Participant information sheet – community parent version 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A study about trust and learning 
INFORMATION FOR PARENT/CARER 
 
Invitation and brief summary 
We are asking your child to help us with a study that we are doing to learn about 
how teenagers learn and generalise new pieces of information.  
We want to learn more about how adolescents learn and what makes learning 
easier or harder. We are specifically looking at epistemic trust, which refers to an 
openness to learn from others.We think that when people are babies they learn 
through their relationship with their parent(s) or the person who takes care of 
them. We also think that difficult situations may lead to people being less trusting 
of things that they are told and therefore find it more difficult to learn new 
information. This is important to us because the information that we get from this 
project might help us understand the process of learning and help people in the 
future. 
Do I have to take part? 
As a legal guardian of your child you are the person who must legally consent on 
their behalf. If you do not wish your child to participate then that will be respected 
and we will not contact you or your child about this project in the future. However 
even if you consent, if your child does not want to participate then that will be 
respected and they will not be approached to participate in this project in the 
future. There are no consequences for not participating.  
What would taking part involve? 
211 
 
Before meeting we will ask half of the young people joining the project to email the 
researcher a photograph of their mother, so we can include it in a section of the 
computer task.  
We will meet your child at home or at the Anna Freud Centre, which ever you and 
your child would prefer. Your child will be asked to sign a form to show that they 
have agreed to take part, complete some computer tasks, fill in some 
questionnaires and then do a short activity. Each task is described below in more 
detail. We will also ask for the contact details of your child’s doctor (GP) as part of 
our routine safeguarding protocol. 
 The computer task 
Your child will be asked to play a game on a computer where they will be trading 
coins with the computer. Then they will play a different game that involves making 
decisions about whether to move towards or away from different objects. The last 
section is a dilemma task where they will be given situations and asked to make 
decisions about conflicting advice. Before they begin playing each game, the 
researcher will go through it with them to make sure they understand and answer 
any questions.  
 The questionnaires 
Your child will be asked to complete a questionnaire pack that the researcher will 
offer to read to them and complete together. The pack includes questions about 
their behaviour, worries they may have, how they get on with friends and family, 
and difficult situations they may or may not have experienced. 
The questionnaires we will ask you to complete are the Strength and Difficulties 
Questionnaire, Reflective Functioning Questionnaire for Youth, The Borderline 
Personality Disorder Features Scale for Children, The Inventory of Parent and Peer 
Attachment Revised questionnaire, The Measure of Parental Style, Childhood 
Trauma Questionnaire, the Childhood Traumatic Events Scale, the Network of 
Relationship Questionnaire Manual, Psychotherapy Expectation & Perception 
Inventory, and the Child Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire.   
 The short activity 
The activities include asking the meaning of words. For example, words that 
describe animals and words that describe feelings, such as anger. There is also 
another short activity, like a puzzle. The short activities have been taken from the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. 
The above tasks will take approximately 2-3 hours (with breaks). 
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It is important to note that this is NOT a test.  
If they decide that they want to stop before all the different tasks are finished then 
they can.    
We would like to show you our appreciation for agreeing to participate by offering 
your child £10 for every hour that you help us with the above tasks.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
If your child does decide to participate they will be helping us to understand the 
part trust plays in learning. This may help other people in the future. 
Are there any risks to you if you take part in the research? 
The research is not intended to be upsetting. However, if your child finds it stressful 
or are upset by it we will provide them with information of whom they can contact 
for support.  They will also be reminded that they can stop participating at any point 
during the research.  
 
Rules that we must follow 
There are a few things for you to know before you decide whether or not to take 
part in this study. When organisations like ours do studies, there are some 
important rules we have to follow to make sure that people who help us are treated 
well and not harmed in any way. Here are those rules: 
(7) Consent 
First, you should know that you do not have to agree to take part if you do not want 
to. In other words, this is voluntary. If you DO NOT take part, it will not 
disadvantage you in any way. If you DO agree to take part, you can change your 
mind and withdraw your consent at any time and without giving a reason. This 
will result in no negative consequences. If your child decides not to consent or 
chooses to withdraw consent at anytime their wishes will be respected and override 
any consent given by yourself. 
(8) Confidentiality 
Secondly, you should know that all the information you give is confidential. All data 
will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
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Nothing you say will be told to anyone outside the research team, except in three 
circumstances: 
 We would have to tell the police or another relevant agency if we were told 
that someone was planning to seriously harm a specific person. 
 We would also have to tell the police or another relevant agency if we were 
to learn that a person under the age of 18 was currently at risk.  
 We may contact your child’s doctor (GP) if we are concerned about your 
child’s mental health. 
 
Further supporting information 
How will our information be kept confidential?  
All the information that you provide will be treated confidentially. You will be 
assigned an ID number (e.g. 001) and we won’t identify you by name to anyone. The 
information will not be shared with anyone (e.g. school) and it will be used solely 
for this project. Once the project is finished we will happily give you a report of our 
findings if you are interested.  
What will happen to the results of the study?  
The report will be written about the results of the study. In that report, the results 
will be presented in such a way that no one can identify the young person or you or 
know that you took part. In other words, we can guarantee that information about 
you will be anonymous because we talk about groups not the individual.  
How have young people been involved in this study? 
Young people have provided consultation to the research project by reviewing 
materials, planning how to present the questionnaires and computer tasks to young 
people and making adaptations to the questionnaire pack and computer tasks.  
Who is organising and funding the study? 
Doctoral trainees at the Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
at University College London have set up the project. Professor Peter Fonagy and Dr 
Tobias Nolte are supervising the research. The research is being funded by 
University College London. 
What if something goes wrong? 
Professor Peter Fonagy, Principle Investigator, will be available if you have any 
questions or concerns. You can contact him at: 
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Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
1-19 Torrington Place, WC1E 7HB 
Tel: 020 7679 1943 
Email: p.fonagy@ucl.ac.uk 
 
If you have any concerns and would like to contact someone outside the team you 
can email the Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee, Professor John Foreman 
c/o Helen Dougal at: 
Email: ethics@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for reading  
 
We will contact you shortly to answer any questions and discuss whether this is a 
project that you would like to join study.   
 
Our contact details are 
Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. Dr 
Tobias Nolte is a supervisor on the project. If you have any questions or concerns, 
you can contact them on: 
 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk 
 
This study has been approved by UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID 
Number): 6129/003 
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Appendix I1: Adolescent over 16 years consent form – clinical sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre Number: 
Study Number: 
Participant Identification Number for this trial: 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project:                 Epistemic Trust and Learning in Adolescence 
Name of Researcher: 
Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated 05.01.2017 (version V3.0) 
for theabove study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and havehad these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at  
3. any timewithout giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected. 
 
4. I understand that some documents from the study may be looked at by 
responsible people appointed by UCL, who must make sure (as Research 
Governance sponsor) that the study is being run properly. I give permission for this 
group to have access to the necessary information. 
 
216 
 
5. I understand that information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled  
in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1988.  
 
 
6. I understand that the information collected about me may be used to support 
other research in the future, and may be shared anonymously with other  
researchers. 
 
7. I agree that the research project named above can request information from my  
clinical records held at the support service that referred me to this research 
project. 
 
8. I agree that someone from the research study can contact me in the future. 
 
9. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
            
Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
 
            
Name of Person  Date    Signature 
taking consent 
________________________________________________________________
___________ 
 
Our contact details are 
 
Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. If you have 
any questions about the project you can contact them on: 
 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
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tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Dr Tobias Nolte is a supervisor on the project. If you have any concerns you wish to discuss, 
you can contact him on: 
 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk 
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Appendix I2: Adolescent over 16 years consent form – community sample 
 
 
 
 
 
A study about trust and learning 
 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take part, the 
person organising the research must explain the project to you.  
 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation given to you, 
please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join.  
 
Before you can take part in the research study we need your consent (that means you 
agree) to take part. Therefore, please can you complete, sign and date this form in the 
space provided. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep and refer to at any 
time. 
This study has been approved by UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 
6129/003 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
I ……………………………………………………………………………… 
 Have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet, and understand why I’m 
being asked to participate in this study  
 Understand that I will be requested to complete some questionnaires and take part in a 
computer task 
 Understand that if decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this 
project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw immediately.I 
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understand that withdrawing will result in no negative consequences and it 
will not affect any support I am currently receiving. 
 Consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research 
study. 
 Understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in 
accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 Agree to the research team obtaining my doctor’s (GP) details as part of the routine 
safeguarding protocol. 
 Agree that the research project named above has been explained to me by the 
researcher and I agree to take part in this study.  
Optional 
 Agree that the research project named above can request information from my clinical 
record held at the support service that referred me to this research project  
   Yes / No / Not applicable 
      
Signed ………………………………………………………..   
Name in block letters ……………………………………………………………………………… 
Date ……………………………… 
________________________________________________________________
___________ 
 
Taking part in the research involves you answering questions about your mental health. As 
part of our routine safeguarding protocol we are required to obtain the contact details of 
your GP. Please provide these details below: 
 
Name of doctor (GP) …………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Name of surgery ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Telephone number …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
________________________________________________________________
___________ 
 
To be completed by the Research Assistant 
I am satisfied that the person named above had given their informed assent to 
take part in this study:   Signed: ………………………………………………. 
Name in block letters: ……………………………… 
Date: ………………………………………………....    
 
Our contact details are 
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Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. Dr Tobias 
Nolte is a supervisor on the project. If you have any questions or concerns, you can contact 
them on: 
 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk 
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Appendix J1: Parental consent form – clinical sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre Number: 
Study Number: 
Participant Identification Number for this trial: 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project:                 Epistemic Trust and Learning in Adolescence 
Name of Researcher: 
Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated 05.01.2017(version V.2)  
for theabove study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and havehad these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my child‟s participation is voluntary and is free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason, without their medical care or legal  
rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that some documents from the study may be looked at by  
responsible people appointed by UCL, who must make sure (as Research 
Governance sponsor) that the study is being run properly. I give permission 
for this group to have access to the necessary information. 
 
4. I understand that information will be treated as strictly confidential and  
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handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1988.  
 
5. I understand that the information collected may be used to support other  
research in the future, and may be shared anonymously with other  
 researchers. 
 
6. I agree that the research project named above can request information from  
my child‟s clinical records that is held at the support service that referred my 
child to this research project. 
 
7. I agree that someone from the research study can contact me in the future 
 
8. I agree to my child taking part in the above study. 
 
            
Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
 
            
Name of Person  Date    Signature 
taking consent 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Our contact details are 
 
Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. If you have 
any questions about the project you can contact them on: 
 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
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Dr Tobias Nolte is a supervisor on the project. If you have any concerns you wish to discuss, 
you can contact him on: 
 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk 
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Appendix J2: Parental consent form – community sample 
 
 
 
 
A study about trust and learning 
 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take 
part, the person organising the research must explain the project to you.  
 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation given 
to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join. You will be 
given a copy of this consent form to keep and refer to at any time. 
 
Before you can take part in the research study we need your consent (that means 
you agree) to take part. Therefore, please can you complete, sign and date this 
form in the space provided. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep 
and refer to at any time. 
This study has been approved by UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID 
Number): 6129/003 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
If applicable, please complete either participant statement 1 or 
participant statement 2 
 
I ……………………………………………………………………………… 
 Have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet, and understand why my child is 
being asked to participate in the study. 
 Understand that my child will be requested to complete some questionnaires and take part in a 
computer task 
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 Understand that if my child decides at any time that I no longer wish to take part in 
this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw immediately.I 
understand that withdrawing will result in no negative consequences and it will not 
affect any support we are currently receiving. 
 Consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. 
 Understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance 
with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 Agree to the research team obtaining the contact details of my child’s doctor (GP) as part of the 
routine safeguarding protocol. 
 Agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree for my child to take part in this study.  
 
Signed ………………………………………………………..   
Name in block letters ……………………………………………………………………………… 
Date ……………………………… 
 
Taking part in the research involves your child answering questions about their mental health. As part 
of our routine safeguarding protocol we are required to obtain the contact details of your child’s GP. 
Please provide these details below: 
 
Name of doctor (GP) …………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Name of surgery ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Telephone number …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
To be completed by the Research Assistant 
I am satisfied that the person named above had given their informed assent to take part in 
this study:   Signed: ………………………………………………. 
Name in block letters: ……………………………… 
Date: ………………………………………………....    
 
Our contact details are 
 
Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. Dr Tobias Nolte is a 
supervisor on the project. If you have any questions or concerns, you can contact them on: 
 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk  
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Appendix K1: Assent form – Clinical sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre Number: 
Study Number: 
Participant Identification Number for this trial: 
 
ASSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project:                 Epistemic Trust and Learning in Adolescence 
Name of Researcher: 
Please initial box 
 
10. I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated 05.01.2017 (version V3.0)  
for theabove study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and havehad these answered satisfactorily. 
 
11. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any timewithout giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights 
being affected. 
 
12. I understand that some documents from the study may be looked at by 
responsible people appointed by UCL, who must make sure (as Research 
Governance sponsor) that the study is being run properly. I give permission 
for this group to have access to the necessary information. 
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13. I understand that information will be treated as strictly confidential and  
handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act  
1988.  
 
14. I understand that the information collected about me may be used to support 
other research in the future, and may be shared anonymously with other  
researchers. 
 
15. I agree that the research project named above can request information from  
my clinical records held at the support service that referred me to this  
research project. 
 
16. I agree that someone from the research study can contact me in the future. 
 
17. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
            
Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
 
            
Name of Person  Date    Signature 
taking consent 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Our contact details are 
 
Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. If you have 
any questions about the project you can contact them on:  
 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
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elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Dr Tobias Nolte is a supervisor on the project. If you have any concerns you wish to discuss, 
you can contact him on: 
 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk 
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Appendix K2: Assent form – Community sample 
 
 
 
 
 
A study about trust and learning 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take 
part, the person organising the research must explain the project to you.  
 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation given 
to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join.  
 
Before you can take part in the research study we need your assent (that means 
you agree) to take part. Therefore, please can you complete, sign and date this 
form in the space provided. You will be given a copy of this assent form to keep and 
refer to at any time. 
This study has been approved by UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID 
Number): 6129/003 
 
 
ASSENT FORM 
 
I ……………………………………………………………………………… 
 Have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet, and understand why I’m being 
asked to participate in this study  
 Understand that I will be requested to complete some questionnaires and take part in a computer 
task 
 Understand that if decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this project, 
I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw immediately. I understand that 
withdrawing will result in no negative consequences and it will not affect any support 
I am currently receiving.  
230 
 
 Consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. 
 Understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance 
with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 Agree to the research team obtaining my doctor’s (GP) details as part of the routine safeguarding 
protocol. 
 Agree that the research project named above has been explained to me by the researcher and I 
agree to take part in this study.  
Optional 
 Agree that the research project named above can request information from my clinical record held 
at the support service that referred me to this research project    
 Yes / No / Not applicable 
      
Signed ………………………………………………………..   
Name in block letters ……………………………………………………………………………… 
Date ……………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________________
____ 
 
To be completed by the Research Assistant 
I am satisfied that the person named above had given their informed assent to take part in 
this study:   Signed: ………………………………………………. 
Name in block letters: ……………………………… 
Date: ………………………………………………....    
 
Our contact details are 
 
Jessie Greisbach, Tal Reches and Elise Draper are researchers on the project. Dr Tobias Nolte is a 
supervisor on the project. If you have any questions or concerns, you can contact them on: 
 
j.greisbach@ucl.ac.uk 
tal.reches.13@ucl.ac.uk 
elise.draper@ucl.ac.uk 
t.nolte@ucl.ac.uk 
 
 
 
231 
 
Appendix L: Correlation Matrix for Independent and Dependent variables 
Correlations 
  ETI 
factor 
Trust 
Game 
factor 
BPFSC 
affect 
BPFSC 
identity 
BPFSC 
relation-
ships 
BPFSC 
self-
harm 
BPFSC 
total 
SDQ 
emotional 
SDQ  
hyper-
activity 
SDQ 
conduct 
SDQ 
relation-
ship 
SDQ 
pro-
social 
SDQ 
total 
Relation-
ships 
score 
ETI 
factor 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.066 
 
.569 
 
76 
-.109 
 
.338 
 
79 
-.090 
 
.430 
 
79 
-.251* 
 
.026 
 
79 
-.071 
 
.533 
 
79 
-.164 
 
.149 
 
79 
-.262* 
 
.020 
 
79 
.023 
 
.843 
 
79 
-.004 
 
.969 
 
79 
-.438** 
 
.000 
 
79 
-.092 
 
.420 
 
79 
-.251* 
 
.026 
 
79 
-.317** 
 
.004 
 
79 
Trust 
Game 
factor 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
.066 
 
.569 
 
76 
1 
 
 
 
76 
.106 
 
.363 
 
76 
-.024 
 
.838 
 
76 
-.143 
 
.219 
 
76 
-.069 
 
.554 
 
76 
-.041 
 
.727 
 
76 
-.052 
 
.655 
 
76 
-.016 
 
.889 
 
76 
.037 
 
.751 
 
76 
-.109 
 
.351 
 
76 
-.036 
 
.755 
 
76 
-.056 
 
.633 
 
76 
-.110 
 
.343 
 
76 
BPFSC 
affect 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.109 
 
.338 
 
79 
.106 
 
.363 
 
76 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.444** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.561** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.609** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.843** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.483** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.435** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.410** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.330** 
 
.003 
 
79 
.029 
 
.797 
 
79 
.577** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.585** 
 
.000 
 
79 
BPFSC 
identity 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.090 
 
.430 
 
79 
-.024 
 
.838 
 
76 
.444** 
 
.000 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.434** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.313** 
 
.005 
 
79 
.668** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.589** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.315** 
 
.005 
 
79 
.085 
 
.456 
 
79 
.150 
 
.188 
 
79 
.180 
 
.112 
 
79 
.413** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.288 
 
.010 
 
79 
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BPFSC 
relation- 
ships 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.251* 
 
.026 
 
79 
-.143 
 
.219 
 
76 
.561** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.434** 
 
.000 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.535** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.805** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.512** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.337** 
 
.002 
 
79 
.352** 
 
.001 
 
79 
.555** 
 
.000 
 
79 
-.119 
 
.298 
 
79 
.622** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.678** 
 
.000 
 
79 
BPFSC 
self-
harm 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.071 
 
.533 
 
79 
-.069 
 
.554 
 
76 
.609** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.313** 
 
.005 
 
79 
535** 
 
.000 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.809** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.358** 
 
.001 
 
79 
.656** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.533** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.290** 
 
.009 
 
79 
-.229* 
 
.043 
 
79 
.626** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.803** 
 
.000 
 
79 
BPFSC 
total 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.164 
 
.149 
 
79 
-.041 
 
.727 
 
76 
.843** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.668** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.805** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.809** 
 
.000 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.608** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.568** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.458** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.426** 
 
.000 
 
79 
-.059 
 
.606 
 
79 
.720** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.769** 
 
.000 
 
79 
SDQ 
emotion
al 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.262* 
 
.020 
 
79 
-.052 
 
.655 
 
76 
.483** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.589** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.512** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.358** 
 
.001 
 
79 
.608** 
 
.000 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.404** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.261* 
 
.020 
 
79 
.456** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.054 
 
.637 
 
79 
.771** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.507** 
 
.000 
 
79 
SDQ  
hyperac
tivity 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
.023 
 
.843 
 
79 
-.016 
 
.889 
 
76 
.435** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.315** 
 
.005 
 
79 
.337** 
 
.002 
 
79 
.656** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.568** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.404** 
 
.000 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.523** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.198 
 
.081 
 
79 
-.133 
 
.244 
 
79 
.720** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.531** 
 
.000 
 
79 
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SDQ 
conduct 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.004 
 
.969 
 
79 
.037 
 
.751 
 
76 
.410** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.085 
 
.456 
 
79 
.352** 
 
.001 
 
79 
.533** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.458** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.261* 
 
.020 
 
79 
.523** 
 
.000 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.283* 
 
.012 
 
79 
-.331** 
 
.003 
 
79 
.685** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.508** 
 
.000 
 
79 
SDQ 
relation 
ship 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.438** 
 
.000 
 
79 
-.109 
 
.351 
 
76 
.330** 
 
.003 
 
79 
.150 
 
.188 
 
79 
.555** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.290** 
 
.009 
 
79 
.426** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.456** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.198 
 
.081 
 
79 
.283* 
 
.012 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
-.126 
 
.270 
 
79 
.691** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.803** 
 
.000 
 
79 
SDQ 
pro-
social 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.092 
 
.420 
 
79 
-.036 
 
.755 
 
76 
.029 
 
.797 
 
79 
.180 
 
.112 
 
79 
-.119 
 
.298 
 
79 
-.229* 
 
.043 
 
79 
-.059 
 
.606 
 
79 
.054 
 
.637 
 
79 
-.133 
 
.244 
 
79 
-.331** 
 
.003 
 
79 
-.126 
 
.270 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
-.171 
 
.131 
 
79 
-.221 
 
.051 
 
79 
SDQ 
total 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.251* 
 
.026 
 
79 
-.056 
 
.633 
 
76 
.577** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.413** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.622** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.626** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.720** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.771** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.720** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.685** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.691** 
 
.000 
 
79 
-.171 
 
.131 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.820** 
 
.000 
 
79 
Relation
-ships 
score 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.317** 
 
.004 
 
79 
-.110 
 
.343 
 
76 
.585** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.288 
 
.010 
 
79 
.678** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.803** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.769** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.507** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.531** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.508** 
 
.000 
 
79 
.803** 
 
.000 
 
79 
-.221 
 
.051 
 
79 
.820** 
 
.000 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix M: Correlation Matrix for Demographic and Dependent variables 
 
Correlations 
  ETI factor Trust Game factor SES Age Gender Ethnicity IQ 
ETI factor Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
1 
 
 
 
79 
.066 
 
.569 
 
76 
.173 
 
.128 
 
79 
-.094 
 
.410 
 
79 
-.007 
 
.949 
 
79 
.044 
 
.702 
 
79 
.096 
 
.399 
 
79 
Trust Game factor Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
.066 
 
.569 
 
76 
1 
 
 
 
76 
-.235* 
 
.041 
 
76 
.262* 
 
.022 
 
76 
.010 
 
.928 
 
76 
-.159 
 
.170 
 
76 
.054 
 
.642 
 
76 
SES Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
.173 
 
.128 
 
79 
-.235* 
 
.041 
 
76 
1 
 
 
79 
-.236* 
 
.036 
 
79 
.105 
 
.355 
 
79 
-.095 
 
.405 
 
79 
.287* 
 
.010 
 
79 
Age Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
-.094 
 
.410 
 
79 
.262* 
 
.022 
 
76 
-.236* 
 
.036 
 
79 
1 
 
 
79 
.089 
 
.436 
 
79 
-.043 
 
.708 
 
79 
.041 
 
.719 
 
79 
Gender Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
-.007 
 
.949 
.010 
 
.928 
.105 
 
.355 
.089 
 
.436 
1 
 
 
.044 
 
.701 
.158 
 
.165 
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Tailed) 
N 
 
79 
 
76 
 
79 
 
79 
79  
79 
 
79 
Ethnicity 
 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
.044 
 
.702 
 
79 
.044 
 
.702 
 
79 
-.159 
 
.170 
 
76 
-.095 
 
.405 
 
79 
-.043 
 
.708 
 
79 
1 
 
 
79 
.054 
 
.638 
 
79 
IQ Pearson 
correlation 
Sig (2- 
Tailed) 
N 
.096 
 
.399 
 
79 
.054 
 
.642 
 
76 
.287* 
 
.010 
 
79 
.041 
 
.719 
 
79 
.158 
 
.165 
 
79 
.054 
 
.638 
 
79 
1 
 
 
 
79 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix N:Joint project contributions 
This thesis was conducted as a joint project with two other trainee clinical psychologist; Tal 
Reches and Jessie Greisbach, who were both also supervised by Professor Peter Fonagy. 
Tal‟s thesis explored the relationship between attachment, epistemic trust and expectations 
of helping relationships in adolescents (Reches, 2017). Jessie‟s thesis explored the impact 
of early adversity and trauma on adolescent‟s epistemic trust (Greisbach, 2017).  
Whilst we recruited participants from the same populations and the measures packs used for 
testing contained the measures for all three projects, testing sessions were carried out 
separately. Additionally the projects investigated different hypotheses using different 
measures. We entered and analysed our data separately and wrote our empirical papers 
independently. 
 
 
